059334 JPRS 82589 5 January 1983

Near East/South Asia Report

No. 2687

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NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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UNEMPLOYMENT CAUSES ANALYZED

Algiers ALGERIE-ACTUALITES in French 18-24 Nov 82 pp 5-6

[Article by Ahmed Larbi: "The Weight of the Past"]

[Text] One hundred and sixty thousand jobs created in 1983. But, paradoxically, the situation of employment offers a startling picture: large sectors are looking for manpower whereas others show a job deficit, the causes of which are analyzed here.

In offices in a still brand-new building, officials of the Ministry of Planning and National Development have been bustling about for several days. The central theme of their successive meetings is the situation of employment in our country. The three directorates concerned, viz. those of demographic and social statistics, social balances and skilled-labor planning, are reviewing all aspects of the labor market. Non-employment is a major topic, all the more so as the Council of Ministers itself devoted part of its last meeting to that problem and decided that 160,000 new jobs would be created under the 1983 annual plan.

At the Ministry of Planning and National Development, a study of the results showed a variable job deficit which should be taken care of as soon as possible. The Ministry of Labor, for its part, arrived at the same conclusion. With respect to employment, we are pleased to note that the authorities are now considering scientific bases to reduce unemployment. What is actually going on? Do we have unemployment or not? And even if we do, how does it manifest itself? Finally, can we really talk of unemployment, or non-employment or under-employment in our country?

To grasp the meaning of such a phenomenon, let us follow the reasoning resulting from the many meetings held at the Ministry of Planning, and let us take 1977, the year of the census, as an illustration. At first sight, the figures are extremely clear. First, the active population, which includes all those employed and those who are not employed but are looking for a job, numbers 3,110,000 men and women. Those employed form a population of 2,350,000 people, also of both sexes. The difference between these two figures represents the deficit which planners are talking about. Also, this deficit is increasing as years go by. It represented 750,000 people in 1977. A few years later, it dropped to 600,000 and reached again 750,000 people in 1981.

According to the Ministry of Labor, which essentially is in charge of managing the job market, there are reasons for all this. The causes are known and they can be listed to place the problem of employment in its true context in the national development strategy. In other words, to understand the genesis of the problem, we must go back in time and define the place of employment. As an example, let us see what was the situation of the job market just after independence? From 1963 to 1970—reports leave no doubt as to this—the situation was characterized by a "fluctuation" marked by a quantitative imbalance of the national job market. Beyond that period and until now, this imbalance has become qualitative, generating a large but unskilled labor force on the market and thus resulting in a paradox since the large number of jobs offered for which a high level of skill is required, as a result of industrial expansion and a rapid economic development, is widening the gap and enormously increasing "non-employment." The volume of skilled jobs will not stop increasing to reflect the rapid rate of demographic growth.

As years went by, the Ministry of Planning and National Development established estimates; however, in the short term, these could not make up for the massive arrival of 200 to 360 thousand 16-year olds on the job market--the number varies according to sources, as we shall see later. For instance: in 1980, the total active population increased by 3.8 percent within one year and, according to the Ministry of Planning and National Development's report, the increase in employment was 4.5 percent. This did not prevent the deficit from reaching a figure of 670,000. Not mentioning the vocational training system designed for the young and not so young, or agricultural employment which has its own specific characteristics with which we shall deal at length later on, this summarizes the global situation of employment during the past two decades. Thus, for pragmatic reasons that have something to do with everyday life, let us present a picture of this situation through the activities of the 105 employment offices distributed throughout the territory and which are answerable to ONAMO [National Algerian Manpower Bureau]. A law dating back to 1963 gives this organization a monopoly when it comes to relations with both job seekers (the citizens) and enterprises. Bringing the two together makes it possible to fill in jobs, although this is not totally obvious since no guarantees are given to either party when a worker is referred to an enterprise. Actually, even if the worker has the profile required, he may be turned down by the enterprise merely on the ground that the tests were not conclusive. Or again, the worker may be demanding, and ask for social benefits such as housing and transportation which it is impossible to provide. In that case, too, there is no placement. But without dwelling longer on this point which we shall examine later, let us consider some figures which give an idea of what is at stake. Thus, the number of job offers recorded were 82,771 in 1979; 76,677 in 1980; 98,102 in 1981; and 70,297 in 1982 (first 8 months, through August). Similarly, the total number of job applicants was 105,100 in 1980; 130,032 in 1981; and 104,374 during the first 8 months of this year. Looking back at the above, some positions offered were not filled and some job applications not satisfied. The two must agree if there is to be a placement. Thus, the number of placements throughout the country were around 62,033 in 1979; 60,213 in 1980; and 78,866 in 1981. These may be for and etermined periods. may be temporary or, again, they may receive priority when it comes to the application of the law concerning the automatic recruiting of former mujahedins or children of chouhada [children of the martyrs].

In addition, and to complete our analysis, we should know who is asking for a job and who is offering jobs. According to ONAMO, 112,021 of the 130,032 job applicants there were in 1981 were males; 18,011 were females. Of this total, 56,361, i.e. 43 percent, were young people under 25. Of these, 13,622 had prior training. Half the remainder, i.e. 20,000, were looking for training, which leads to a series of problems the consequences of which we shall try to isolate with the help of officials from the Ministry of Vocational Training. So, let us remain with ONAMO and let us look at the second question concerning the origin of employment. The creation of jobs receives its primary impetus from the public sector. Indeed, half the jobs offered are offered by public enterprises. Many offers come from the building and public works sector. It is followed by the textile sector, then come the others... Also according to ONAMO, most job seekers are people with very few skills. The ads published in our dailies, which have been approved by the organizations involved, rarely reflect the actual situation. This is true of people with diplomas in certain specialties. A physician, an engineer, never go through an employment office. The same is true of certain secretaries who can find a job directly with administrations having their own recruiting methods or in the private sector. Finally, according to ONAMO, the situation of employment remains ambiguous. It is in imbalance because it is subject to many phenomena: people's attitudes; increasing demands on the part of enterprises; and, above all, the problem of inter or intra-governorate compensation. There is no lack of examples in this respect. One governorate may find itself saturated by a demand that is too strong, even in some specialties, whereas an other one, which may not be adjacent, is looking for such a skilled labor force. Its only problem is that it cannot provide the benefits requested. In the same order of ideas, whereas the problem is not as acute between North and South, it is more frequent between the East and West of the country. Especially, people do not want to go to the East for various reasons (harsher climate; inadequate social benefits and a rather low remuneration). For instance, if no housing, no transportation and no cafeteria are offered, the people prefer not working and waiting... Waiting when and for how long? This is often the case of these young people who, while waiting, get involved in all sorts of "small trafficking" on the black market. Yet, as we just saw, most of them register at the employment office to request a vocational training which the ministry involved cannot manage to provide in spite of its numerous attempts at accelerating its efforts. In this respect, the figures provided are quite revealing. As far as school dropouts are concerned, the Ministry of Vocational Training has only 88 centers which can receive 28,000 trainees, and 2 technological institutes each with a capacity of 1,500. Although quite late, a considerable effort is being made this year. It consists in reinforcing existing centers to increase their original capacity to 40,000. The schoolyear will have two sessions: one starting in February and the other in September. Ninety-six specialties are taught today, 161 will be taught by the end of the plan.

In the coming years, an attempt will be made at accelerating the construction of additional centers. They are talking about 100 in 1983. Sections will be dispatched throughout the territory, and the help of mass organizations and People's Communal Assemblies will be requested. Vocational training will take place in enterprises. Briefly, an attempt will be made to increase the number of centers from 88 to 350 by the end of the five-year plan, and to create

five vocational training institutes, five national arts and crafts institutes, one national center for the handicapped and one national institute for training in enterprises. But until then, applications are flooding the existing centers, the ministry, etc. "We receive 2,500 applications for each training position," according to a ministry official, which is a far cry from a policy that would welcome the young and get them motivated. However, and this is paradoxical, there are sectors looking for a labor force which does not always have to be skilled. One of them is agriculture. We are discussing the primary sector last for the obvious reason that it is far from playing its full role. Indeed, a decade ago, in a study that must be gathering dust in some office or other at the ministry involved, a few planners had demonstrated the laborabsorption capacity generated by the agricultural development policy. This study provided an answer to the question of whether increased unemployment was to be expected and whether, in this perspective, the objectives assigned to the agricultural plan of the time could, in a first stage that extended through 1973, prevent the creation of additional unemployment. Beyond that, i.e. starting in 1974, the study went on, the implementation of the agricultural plan would provide the basis for an agriculture that would be able to fully absorb all unemployment. Ten years later, we know that things happened differently. We also know that the situation of employment in agriculture did not change in the same manner as in the secondary and tertiary sectors. As an example, the active agricultural population, which was 1,040,000 in 1977, dropped to 965,000 in 1981. In 1982, it is estimated at 950,000 and is expected to decrease further during the next few years, as a number of farm workers are due to retire. Nevertheless, this contrasts with a certain increase in the number of people employed in agriculture. Actually, this increased employment is supposed to involve full-time employees, i.e. employees under the direct authorities of the ministry's administration, but in no way the farm workers and still less the seasonal workers. If one excepts those who have found refuge on the land since the implementation of the agrarian revolution, the others have no choice but to collect a most ridiculously low daily wage, and only for workdays. They also have no form of social security, if one excepts a fortuitous allowance for up to four children. A tour on various farms in the Algiers governorate demonstrates these facts. For instance, the Ben Haddadi Said farm. Location: Cheraga. Acreage: 170 hectares. Specific activities: livestock raising, garden crops, tree growing. Number of farm workers: 52 full-time and 13 seasonal workers. Of this total, 6 full-time workers have reached retirement age; 30 are over 40. Daily wages of the seasonal workers: 42 Algerian dinars. Same thing in a neighboring farm: Khaiti Ahmed at Staoueli; 157 hectares; garden crops and tree growing. The personnel numbers 76. Their average age is about 45. Two are about to retire. The seasonal work force is provided by farm workers' children. Wages: 42 Algerian dinars.

Do these two cases show everything there is to be shown? At any rate, they reflect the stagnation of agriculture, a stagnation which is also due to the exodus toward the industrial sector. Indeed, because of his upbringing—there are such cases (the father advising his son to do anything except work the land)—or merely because of a lack of motivation (there is no policy to encourage the young to work the land), people will become farmers only if they have no other choice or with the vague idea of saving up during the two or three months they spend on the farm.

Therefore, this does in no way reflect a de facto situation resulting from a mixture of various things which themselves are the consequences of various circumstances. It is possible to find remedies for the last ills of the modern world, such as the rural exodus which is synonymous with concentration in large urban centers, or even the saturation in some skilled jobs, like those related to literary fields (literature, sociology, law, etc.). The rural exodus was understandable during the 1970's; there would be no reason for it any more if consistent efforts were made to make the rural masses aware of the importance of farming and if the sons of farm workers were offered social benefits similar to those of other workers. As for the saturation of some skilled jobs, according to an official of the Ministry of Planning and National Development, if it must be blamed on something, it should be blamed on the lack of planning, on the orientation of high-school students approaching college-age, even on the lack of a school map like the one recently prepared.

But this is not the only problem. The question which has become everybody's problem today in a country with 60 percent of young people is to know what openings are available to the young school dropouts. This makes it necessary to assess the effect of the crisis which makes it more difficult and uncertain for the young to find a job. All the more so as the requirements of the national production apparatus restrict the job openings that can be offered to such a large number of young people who, lacking something better, get involved in all sorts of speculations in which some will see a new evil.

Considering the number of dropouts at the various schooling levels, a far greater number are excluded than give up on their own. Thus, the highest number of dropouts corresponds mainly to the last years of each schooling cycle. As an example, in 1978-1979, out of 216,736 students excluded from elementary schools, 146,314, i.e. approximately 49 percent, were 6th or 7th year students. Out of 73,957 students expelled from middle schools, 54,494 were 4th year students, i.e. approximately 73 percent; and out of 30,100 students excluded from secondary schools, 23,883, i.e. approximately 79 percent, were third year AS [expansion unknown] students. In 1982, the current year, out of 101,000 candidates to the various types of baccalaureate, close to 70,000 failed. Fortunately, that same year, remedial measures were adopted for those who had failed the French baccalaureate, while the APN [People's National Assembly] passed the law on apprenticeship, thereby offering serious training possibilities to several tens of thousands of young people. Certainly, all these facts are the result of an inadequate schooling of the young, but it is due essentially to the inadequate capacity of the schools and to the lack of structures to receive students in cycles immediately above. Faced with such a situation, what can we do? Pending an exhaustive study on the situation of employment, we try to close the gaps. First, we must create some coordination at all levels, which is far from easy if we must compare figures from different sources. "We must tune our violins," as an official at the Ministry of Labor likes to point out. Then, as the general directorate of employment at the same ministry recommends, we must prepare a balance sheet for employment and annual and pluriannual recruiting forecasts, the main objective being to provide the authorities in

charge with the information and data they need to define a national policy for the valorization and utilization of our human resources. If we are to achieve all this, we must have a breakdown of the situation of employment by sectors and branches of activity; we must know what jobs are available to the active non-employed population; and, finally, we must make proposals concerning the adjustments that must be made in the field of employment and distribution of the labor force. Thus, thanks to all these efforts, we can hope to contain a phenomenon which is haunting many highly developed foreign countries. Then, there will be employment situations that will be more tense than others, where the motto "no matter how little you work or how poor your work is, no matter whether you have a diploma or not, no matter whether you go to work or not, you are sure to have a job" will no longer be in use, and where, little by little, all that characterizes the present situation and which may be falsely attributed to "the weight of the past" will disappear.

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CONDITION OF NATION'S NEWSPAPER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM REVIEWED

Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 25 Nov 82 p 5

Article by Saad Bouakaba: "The Distribution of Domestic Newspapers, between Sparse Resources and Poor Organization"

Text Domestic newspapers are experiencing a chronic deficiency in the distribution process. Poor distribution in the case of domestic papers manifested itself in the early years of independence. In the 20 years since independence, domestic papers have been subjected to numerous distribution patters, from distribution in the nationwide one, from distribution via the papers' own facilities to distribution through the National Publication and Distribution Company - not to mention distribution via party organizations, in the case of the party and mass organization press.

In all these instances, the newspaper and magazine distribution process has continued to suffer from obvious inadequacies.

The reasons for this problem, which has been going on for 20 years, may be explained by the interaction of numerous elements, some related to the distribution organization, and others related to the environment, while a third group may be attributed to the organizations of the papers themselves.

In addition, a large segment of the problems may basically be attributed to the policy followed in the field of the distribution of newspapers in the domestic and international contexts.

The Pre-emption of a Balance

Before 1966, the party's Organization of Newspaper Distribution did the work of distributing the newspapers.

In 1966, the National Publication and Distribution Company was established, and this company took charge of distributing domestic and foreign papers, except for the regional newspapers AL-NASR and AL-JUMHURIYAH, which at that time were issued in French and had their own distribution facilities.

After the AL-NASR and AL-JUMHURIYAH were converted to Arabic, SNED /the National Publication and Distribution Company/ started to do all the work of distributing

domestic papers, and in 1976 three main distribution regions were created for SNED — one in Algiers, the capital, another in Constantine, and a third in Oran. The transformation which the domestic press had undergone, following the Arabization of AL-NASR and AL-JUMHURIYAH, resulted in complications in the distribution of nationwide and regional papers, once the reader had been shifted in abrupt fasion from one language to another in a period of no more than 24 hours!

Before 1976, about 85 percent of the papers distributed were in French; the result of the sudden shift to Arabic was that readers turned from AL-NASR and AL-JUMHURIYAH to EL MOUDJAHID, which was in French. For that reason, the latter paper experienced increasing demand that resulted in the adoption of rapid measures to respond to the demand, including its reprinting in Constantine. It experienced a circulation increase of about 250 percent in the course of 4 years!

Meanwhile, the newspapers AL-NASR and AL-JUMHURIYAH experienced \(\sigma \) a drop in circulation as a result of problems arising from the shift from the one language to the other.

During this period, the circulation of the newspaper AL-SHA'B itself did not noticeably increase, as a consequence of the "customs protection" decrees adopted against it in the areas of Oran and Constantine, based on the fear that it would compete with the fledgling AL-JUMHURIYAH and AL-NASR. AL-SHA'B became a semi-regional paper because of this measure, and this situation led to a growth in the role of the French-language EL MOUDJAHID, as virtually the only nationwide paper, since it was the only one that reached all the areas of the republic the same day it was issued.

These vacillations and confusions resulted in vacillations and confusions in the SNED system's distribution "nexus," and it started to deal with papers as if they were commodities that had to be shipped to specific areas without attention to the readers' needs or lack of needs and without attention to the time in which the newspaper had to arrive. AL-SHA'B reached Annaba or Souk Ahras in 3 or 4 days — that is, it turned into a weekly paper!

During this period, also, foreign papers, especially French ones, were active in the distribution process in Algeria. These papers to a large extent benefited from the international events Algeria was going through in the first part of the seventies, and they gained the attention, under the cover of concern with these events, of the French language readership.

In addition, this period also experienced an intensification of the struggle between Arabic and French in the framework of public opinion.

The circulation of the daily EL MOUDJAHID rose from 33.6 million copies in 1976 to 85 million in 1981, while the distribution of AL-JUMHURIYAH declined from 4.7 million copies in 1975 to 1.6 million in 1976; not until 1981 did its circulation return to its 1975 level (about 4.2 million copies a year).

The newspaper AL-NASR did not experience the same degree of decline that AL-JUMHURIYAH had experienced, but it did not enjoy any substantial growth in the circulation field, and it ranks third in newspaper circulation nationwide.

AL-SHA'B newspaper had a circulation of 4 million copies a year in 1976; by 1981 that had come to 21 million.

Noticeable Improvement

Arabic newspapers distributed on national soil total 39 million in number, but the paper distributed in French, the daily edition of EL MOUDJAHID, had a circulation of 85 million copies in 1981.

This means that the three daily papers do not have a circulation even half as great as that of EL MOUDJAHID alone!

It is said that there has been some relative progress in the case of papers issued in Arabic in the past 5 years, since the ratio of French-language publications relative to those in Arabic dropped from 85 percent in 1967 to 55 percent in 1981.

Publications at the Expense of Circulation

The volume of distribution of papers /reflects/ a form of circulation that is subject to the distribution system the distribution organization possesses.

There is a sort of uniqueness in the character of the newspaper distribution system which reaches the point of weirdness. It involves objective problems that prompt us to appreciate the efforts exerted by SNED's newspaper distribution organization.

SNED, as its name indicates, is a publication and distribution company, but it is concerned with publication at the expense of circulation: publication is a profitable business, while the profits in distribution are limited. The organization's charter says "I am a commercial, industrial organization, and profits are a necessity."

SNED tries to engage in the distribution operation with pure economics, not culture or service, in mind.

The Means Are Judged by the Ends

Before 1976, the number of communities reached by the nationwide press did not exceed 294, constituting just 41 percent of the total area of the country.

SNED says that it is now covering 97 percent of the total area of the nation, that the papers reach about 686 of a total 704 communities, and that there are just 18 communities which the paper does not reach - isolated communities in the Sahara which are not reached by transportation of any kind.

The distribution system has access to 1,839 newspaper sales outlets throughout the nation which distribute the nationwide daily papers of AL-SHA'B, EL MOUDJAHID, AL-HADAF, and AL-JAZA'IR AL-AHDATH.

Here we might note that it is the distribution and transportation system that governs the circulation, and not the type of paper.

AL-HADAF, for example, as a result of its link with AL-NASR and EL-MOUDJAHID, is distributed by all the sales outlets which distribute the daily press, although it is a weekly, and the same is the case with AL-JAZA'IR AL-AHDATH.

Meanwhile, we can observe other important weekly papers which do not have as wide a circulation as the abovementioned papers; among these are, for instance, the magazine AL-THAWRAH AL-IFRIQIYAH, which is distributed by just 400 sales outlets!

Deficiencies in Sales Outlets

The newspaper AL-SHA'B, for instance, is not distributed in the same sales outlets as the daily EL MOUDJAHID, and, when it is, it is not distributed as thoroughly. A city like Skikda gets no more than 150 copies of AL-SHA'B, and SNED does not ship more than 500 copies of AL-SHA'B newspaper to Annaba.

These numbers are not enough even to cover all the sales outlets! The distribution system suffers from a deficiency in the field of transport and communications; trucks are few in number and each of them covers close to 300 kilometers a day. Therefore they are prone to break down; if the trucks break down, the papers do not get to the readers at the stipulated time.

The volume transported by air does not exceed 5 percent of the total number of daily papers distributed.

Relations between SNED and Air Algeria are not as they ought to be, in this matter, especially on the southern routes, where only airplanes are practicable for rapid newspaper distribution work.

It is said that the airplane schedules do not correspond to the newspaper distribution schedules, which adds to complications in the system of transport by airplane.

Airplanes, in addition, do not give priority to the shipment of newspapers. Absolute priority goes to medicine, followed by the mail, then passengers, especially on routes that have the character of service routes, where the papers lie at the bottom of the order of importance! In addition to that, airplanes are not prepared to ship SNED'S entire load. Moreover, the shipping resources of trains and trucks are still limited because of the factor of time on the one hand and the limited scope of these facilities' routes on the other. These facilities are suitable only for weekly and monthly papers; the daily papers need rapid modes of transport, like airplanes.

Communities Sell Papers!

In addition to the forms of transportation that the SNED organization deals with in the field of distribution, there is the system of vendors. Of a total of 1,839 sales outlets throughout the nation, only 402 are permanent. These are outlets that consist of stands, bookshops, and stationary dealers. For this reason, weekly and monthly papers are distributed through this limited network, while the other sales outlets are not permanent; you might find a paper being sold in a remote village by milk sellers, bakers or proprietors of coffee shops; in some instances the mayor's office itself performs the function of selling papers in remote communities!

SNED distribution company officials say that the communities must exert efforts in the field of establishing facilities for receiving papers, for example by building newspaper stands in all remote towns, at least.

In addition, summer vacation periods are also faced with disruptions in distribution, since some shops close down in the summer and newspapers are absent from specific areas for an entire month, disrupting citizens' habits. It is difficult to resume these habits easily later.

The distribution system suffers from an imbalance among sales outlets. Most settled sales outlets are located in the main cities, while the unsettled ones are restricted only to villages and rural communities. This has an effect on the stability of circulation in the rural areas.

In theory, there are two and a half sales outlets per community, but in practice a number of communities share a single sales outlet.

In Algiers there is a sales outlet for every 10,000 inhabitants, while there is a sales outlet for every 1,000 inhabitants in other communities, which means that the situation with the distribution of newspapers is worse than that with the distribution of doctors!

Circulation in Two Directions!

SNED is suffering from another phenomenon, the large amount of returned copies. The proportion of daily papers that are returned ranges from 15 to 20 percent, while with some daily papers the proportion that is not sold comes to about 30 percent!

Numerous factors combine to raise the rate of returned copies, among them:

The lack of organization in the issuance of papers and fluctuations between high and low quality.

Problems bearing on distribution and the newspaper's failure to appear at the appropriate time.

The presence of distribution channels alongside SNED's channels, in the case of party papers, since these carry out direct distribution via the channels of the party and the mass organizations.

The high proportion of returns multiplies the financial burdnes on SNED.

An OFLA-Style Relationship!

SNED's relationship with the press organizations is to some extent similar to OFLA's relationship with the self-managed farms!

The SNED company takes 25 percent of the proceeds of what is sold, the newspaper dealer takes 30 percent, and the papers get the remainder, which is no more than 45 percent in the best of cases.

Returned copies are debited to the newspaper, and SNED has no responsibility for them. Recently, an organization was established whose task was to receive returned newspapers and magazines, while SNED collects what is not sold once a month - a long period as far as the collection process goes that has prompted the dealers to be wary of taking all papers for fear that their stands will be inundated with stacks of papers, since SNED does not rapidly remove those that are not sold, and that has had an effect on the distribution system.

Outside the country, domestic papers are sold only in six countries in the world, countries where there is an Algerian expatriate community, especially France, which gets more than half the domestic papers distributed outside our borders. The proportion of the volume of papers distributed abroad is no greater than 2 percent of all the papers distributed!

Algeria receives about 27 million copies of foreign papers of various national ities a year, but exports only 6 million, mostly to France. All the papers of the Arab East come to Algeria and circulate very freely, but not a single Algerian paper is distributed in the countries of the Arab East! SNED is awaiting the formation of companies in these countries so that it may deal with them in matters of distribution.

Distribution suffers from extreme inadequacies in the area of circulation via subscription. Subscriptions account for barely 2 percent of the total circulation of some papers, which is a phenomenon that merits study.

Deceit!

It has been said that the SNED organization is playing a game of "hide and seek" with the press organizations, if one may use such an expression. The press organizations have numerous problems, the most important of which may be attributed to the inadequacy and obsoleteness of equipment, especially printing and folding machinery. This affects the newspaper's appearance at the right time for distribution, that is, before 0400 hours in the morning. In some occasions, the paper is issued politically, as a result of technical problems, and SNED distributes it politically also. Because of technical problems, SNED is constantly distributing newspapers politically. Political distribution means that a paper reaches areas that might become restive and whose angry reactions could influence the course of events in SNED! SNED says that there are papers that come out in separate sections which cannot be distributed in instalments, so it is compelled to distribute them politically alone. The organization bears all the consequences of the delay, and political distribution guarantees SNED political silence regarding the defects in distribution. It also guarantees silence on the part of the press organization regarding the reasons for its tardiness or failure to appear in its entirety or in part, or the fact that it appears in separate sections!

The subject of circulation, to this day, is still not based on a firm plan to guarantee proper, effective distribution of domestic papers, in spite of the numerous meetings and studies that have taken place with the objective of putting a limit to this situation, which causes anxiety in the whole media sector.

11887

CSO: 4504/95

AGRICULTURE MINISTER DISCUSSES INCREASING OUTPUT OF MAIN CROPS

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 30 Nov 82 p 3

/Article by Su'ad Abu Zayd: "When Will We Attain Self-Sufficiency in Crops?"/

/Text/ In the government statement, Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din, the prime minister, declared that intensified activity is taking place in Ministry of Agriculture agencies to double production. It is evident that it has been possible to realize great increases in the production of corn, wheat, rice and fava beans, in which imports ceased this year for the first time since 1965. Indeed, some fava beans have been exported.

How was this increase attained? Can it be ascribed to a change in strains or agricultural practices? What will the volume of exports be next season? What was the value of exports the last 2 years? When will it be possible to attain self-sufficiency in crops? What are the main features of agricultural policy in the coming stage?

I directed these questions to Dr Yusuf Wali, the minister of agriculture, who said, "The main features of agricultural policy include the possibility of realizing self-sufficiency in main crops in the next 7 years, especially in the case of corn, to reduce the volume of imports of that crop and saving the millions of pounds the government spends to that end, in view of its strategic importance, since it is the basis for bread production for the majority of inhabitants in rural areas and is also a main component of chicken fodder and a basis for the production of cornstarch, sugar and oil."

I asked, "What is the problem?"

He said, "The area planted with Syrian corn annually comes to about 1.9 million feddans, about one-sixth the /total/ crop area. Local production of corn covers only 77.4 percent of our requirements."

 \sqrt{Q} uestion/ What are the reasons for the low production?

/Answer/ The low local production may be attributed to the low general average production per feddan, which could be as much as double the current output by the use of scientific methods.

/Question/ How can one come up with a solution?

/Answer/ A program has been set forth to develop corn output which is based on applying the conclusions of scientific research by using high-yield pest-resistant seeds, following the method of intensified farming to double the average output per feddan, with the provision that the areas where the project is to be carried out will serve as centers for propagation for the remaining governorates in order to improve farmers incomes, which will be reflected in the quality of life in the countryside.

Therefore, this year we have started to apply the results of the research that the ministry has carried out in participation with the National Research Center and the Scientific Research Academy, aimed at planting an area of 200,000 feddans with the Giza-2, Giza 201 and Pioneer corn strains, since the output from these strains is double our current output, and, in some areas farmed in al-Sharqiyah Governorate, has come to 40 ardebbs and in Bani Suwayf to 29.7 ardebbs, whereas the average production per feddan throughout the governorate is 12 ardebbs. Thus the ministry can double the production of close to 2 million feddans of Syrian corn in 5 years.

 \sqrt{Q} uestion/ What have been the factors in raising fava bean output and bringing about a surplus for export?

/Answer/ These include a number of aspects, most important of them vertically increasing the productivity per feddan as well as raising the price of fava beans, which has encouraged farmers to supply large volumes in excess of consumption requirements, creating a surplus for export, in addition to improved strains, at the appropriate times, now that experiments with them have succeeded, along with attention to fertilizing, irrigation and drainage activities and the use of machinery. Therefore we have concentrated on the use of seeds of improved pest-resistant strains and have spelled out the suitable area for the cultivation of each strain, in Upper and Lower Egypt. The men from the Agricultural Guidance Department and the Agricultural Research Center will supervise the farming activities to monitor the condition of maturation up to the harvesting of the crop. This year, an average output of 6.11 ardebbs per feddan has been realized.

New Rice Strains

I asked, "What is your plan with respect to rice?"

He said, "We have introduced Japanese and Filipino strains along with Egyptian ones, and have started to use machinery in nursery maintenance, harvesting and hulling activities, up to the packaging /stage/, over an area of 1,000 feddans this year. Per-feddan rice production has ranged from 3.4 to 4.2 tons, whereas the average for the republic is 2.38 tons. Therefore, an expansion will take place in mechanization next year to cover 65,000 feddans in al-Daqahliyah, and the rest will be apportioned among the Governorates of al-Shaqiyah, al-Gharbiyah and Kafr al-Shaykh. In coming years, we will cover the rice area, amounting to 1 million feddans, with machinery.

"Thus it will be possible to achieve an increase of 1 million tons in rice which will be allocated for export, at a rate of 1 ton per feddan. The government's policy is founded on the fact that exporting 1 ton of rice will enable us to import 2 tons of wheat, which is a national policy President Mubarak has been promoting. The government considers itself responsible for providing a minimum of basic commodities to the people."

Increased Per Capita Consumption

I asked, "Is it possible to realize an increase in wheat production, as with the other crops?"

/Answer/ We are importing 75 percent of our requirements, but by introducing exceptional strains, that is, Giza 157, Sakha 8, and Sakha 61 and 69, it will be possible to raise production by high rates. However, there is one problem, which is that we have found that per capita wheat consumption in recent years has risen to 170 kilograms a year, whereas in past years it was 100 kilograms, as a result of the drainoff of wheat for use as animal fodder and the consumption of wheat instead of corn flour in the rural areas. One should bear in mind that the more per capita income increases, the more the individual's consumption of fruit and meat, but not bread, rises.

The minister said, "The wheat research section has derived a new strain of wheat whose cultivation in hot areas has been a success. It was farmed in the New Valley, where its production totalled 26 ardebbs per feddan. It is well known that these areas are suitable for wheat; therefore we have decided to experiment in planting it over an area of 10 feddans in the Integration Area in the Sudan. So far, it goes by code number 2,188, and Presidents Mubarak and Numayri have reached agreement to give it the name 'integration' as a good omen for integration between the two countries. We hope that its cultivation in the Sudan will succeed as it has succeeded in the New Valley, thus bringing about an abundance of wheat in the two countries."

To learn about the applied procedures which have produced these results, I went to the Agricultural Research Center and met with Dr 'Ali 'Abd-al-'Aziz, director of the Field Crop Research Institute, to ascertain the most important factors that led to increased fava bean production last season.

He said, "These are principally the result of the improved strains which researchers have produced, that is, the Giza 3 strain, which is allocated for farming in the northern Delta and is distinguished by its resistance to the brown infestation disease common in this region which has caused great crop losses, and the second strain, Giza 2, which is allocated for farming in the southern Delta and central Egypt and is distinguished by a long blooming period, providing an opportunity for the crop to weather periods of cold and frost.

"The fhird strain, Rababah 40, resists (al-haluk), and is planted in Upper Egypt, since that disease threatened the crop in extensive areas there. This strain will be planted this year over an area of 400 feddams, as its success was established

on an area of 20 feddans last year; it was afflicted with (al-haluk) but was not affected."

He added, "Agricultural practices, and the determination of the most suitable growing times for each area, will play a big part in increasing production, as will the number of plants per feddan, since they come to no less than 140,000, and fertilizer use and the number of irrigation cycles, based on Agriculture /Ministry/ recommendations, with attention to resistance to pests, especially the (al-munn) insect in central Egypt."

He stated, "The necessary seeds have been provided to cover the area which has been targeted for cultivation with exceptional strains this year, which totals 300,000 feddans."

Improved Seeds

Dr 'Abd-al-Rahim Shahatah, the vice chairman of the Institute of Crops and the chairman of the Corn Research Program, asserted that the most important factors which brought about increased corn output were the improved Giza 2 strain seeds, which was derived under the aegis of the Corn Research Department and in its production is superior to imported strains, Giza 201 and Pioneer, along with proper rates of fertilizer application, farming at the suitable times, which are from the middle of May to the middle of June, the removal of leaf growth, sterilization, and compensating sterilization by planting 10 percent of the area with summer fodder. "He said, "Production perfeddan of corn in some of the area of the main seed improvement project, which the Center for Agricultural Research is carrying out in cooperation with the Americans, has, in some districts of al-Minufiyah and al-Gharbiyah, come to 40 ardebbs. The average that is being attained this year ranges from 25 to 30 ardebbs, depending on the fertility of the soil, farmers' practices, the application of good fertilizer, and resistance to pests, especially the (al-munn) and spiders."

He said, "A plan has been drawn up to cover the entire corn area in the 1985 season with new improved strains. This year, 200,000 feddans will be covered with these strains, apportioned among the Governorates of al-Sharqiyah, al-Gharbiyah, al-Minufiyah, Giza, Bani Suwayf, al-Minya, al-Fayyum and Asyut."

I asked, "What are the obstacles in the way of your advancing toward the attainment of the goal?"

/Answer/ Problems with existing irrigation and drainage systems are preventing the attainment of high crop levels in various crops, especially Syrian corn; this problem must be remedied so that the other factors can reach their objectives. Similarly, it is necessary to expand the programs of upgrading and preserving the fertility of agricultural land while overcoming the problems of salinity and alkalinity which have become aggravated recently."

Pricing Policy

Eng 'Ali Dakruri, the deputy minister of agriculture, stated that pricing policy is one of the most important factors encouraging farmers to produce large amounts

of fava beans, and provide an amount surplus to export needs. The government has raised the price of wheat and corn, and will do likewise in the case of fava beans, because the farmer is now giving wheat, along with hay, to livestock, since the price of hay is higher than that of flour. The same is the case with Syrian corn, since 1.2 million tons were imported last year for processing fodder. Therefore, it is necessary to hasten to set out an independent pricing policy."

He added, "An important factor has resulted in increasing field and plant crop production by 25 to 30 percent, and that is the factor of drainage by proper methods, in addition to the use of select strains, the application of fertilizer, and service operations."

He said, "One of the most important factors which have helped increase production in the case of rice is early planting, the use of integrated mechanization and the application of phosphorus fertilizers, which have raised average per-feddan production."

Statistics on Crops

In order to learn the status of our crop production and the volumes of imports, I asked Dr Yahya Muhyi-al-Din, chairman of the ministry's central department of agricultural economics, about total fava bean production this year.

He said, "Total fava bean production came to 775,023 ardebbs, which were produced over an area of 274,091 feddans, realizing an average per-feddan output of 6.11 ardebbs, as compared with 5.64 ardebbs last year. Production was 1,240,566 ardebbs, which were produced over 237,731 feddans. The area targeted for planting in the 1982-83 season comes to 300,000 feddans, to meet our own requirements, with surplus for export."

Dr Yahya stated that the government imported about 74,000 tons of fava beans worth 22,981,000 pounds in 1980, and that 80,000 tons worth 22 million pounds were imported in 1981.

I asked, "What did our production of Syrian corn come to in 1981?"

/Answer/ Our production of summer Syrian corn came to 19,093,363 ardebbs, which were produced over 1,434,341 feddans. An average production of 13.31 ardebbs per feddan was realized. In the current season, Syrian corn came to 4,532,636 ardebbs, which were produced over 489,490 feddans, or an average of 9.26 ardebbs per feddan.

Wheat realized an average yield of 9.79 ardebbs per feddan this year, and total production came to 13,446,616 ardebbs, which were produced over an area of 1,373,613 feddans. The area targeted for planting this year comes to 1.14 million feddans.

In 1980, the government imported about 2,126,000 tons of wheat worth 308.89 million pounds.

Development of Corn Output

On the results the Governorate of Giza achieved in the first corn farming experiment last year, which the remaining governorates applied this year, Eng 'Abd-al-Raziq Badawi, deputy minister of agriculture in the governorate, stated that the idea of the project to develop corn output by using scientific methods began in the governorate last year with the objective of raising the average output per feddan by planting strains of high-production type seeds resistant to pests--the Giza 2 and Pioneer strains.

Agreement was reached by the Department of Agriculture and the research centers, and execution of the project began over an area of 1,360 feddans. The experiment attained an average per feddan output of 24.29 ardebbs throughout the governorate, as compared with 10.28 ardebbs in traditional adjacent fields, or an increase of 13 ardebbs. Some farmers also realized record figures, which came to 41 ardebbs per feddan in the District of Imbabah and 35 ardebbs in the District of al-Badrashayn, which is the highest rate that has been attained by Syrian corn.

He added, "Once the project had achieved this success, agreement was reached with 8,000 farmers to carry it out this year over an area of 12,495 feddans in Giza, al-Fayyum and Bani Suwayf, to give the maximum number of farmers an opportunity to benefit, while following the most modern scientific methods.

"Corn cultivation achieved an average output of 29 ardebbs per feddan, as compared with 24 ardebbs last year.

"The project's output comes to about three quarters of a million ardebbs of corn, whose value, at the price set by the Ministry of Supply, is estimated at about 3.5 million pounds."

11887 CSO: 4504/101 EUROPEAN IMPORTS, EXPORTS OF VARIOUS AGRICULTURAL, INDUSTRIAL GOODS REVIEWED

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 26 Nov 82 p 4

/Article: "Developments in Exports to the European Market Countries_____/

 $/\overline{\text{Text}/}$ Hamdi Mitwalli, director of the Western European Countries Department in the commercial representation sector, stated that European Common Market countries have a demand for Egyptian commodities, in the form of domestic textiles, spinning and patterned cloth.

The volume of overall imports common to Egypt and the European market countries came to 1,426,000,000 pounds in 1980 and 2,609,000,000 million in 1981. That may be attributed to imports of machinery, equipment and electric machinery to establish projects on which agreement had been reached by Egypt and the European countries

He went on to state that the volume of Egyptian exports in 1981 dropped to 948 million pounds as compared with 1,005,700,000 pounds in 1980, which could be explained by the fact that the European market needed commodities that were characterized by high quality and taste, and in addition that it was an open market, in which commodities from most countries of the world were in competition.

Egypt's exports to France rose from 36.9 million pounds in 1980 to 71 million in 1981. In addition, Egypt's imports from France increased to 583 million pounds. Egypt's most important exports are cotton, cotton products, vegetables and fruit; Egypt imports machinery, equipment and electrical machinery from France.

Hamdi Mitwalli says that the markets in the United Kingdom have a demand for Egyptian exports in the form of textile products, cotton, potatoes and crude oil, while Egypt imports machinery, chemicals and foodstuffs. The volume of Egyptian exports dropped to 29.4 million pounds in 1981, as compared with 67.7 million pounds in 1980, and imports rose from 207 million pounds in 1980 to 303 million pounds in 1981.

Germany Requires Aluminum

The West German market has a demand for cotton, aluminum, leatherwork, rugs and patterned cloth. It also exports machinery, equipment and transportation

equipment. Egypt's exports to Germany dropped to 51.7 million pounds in 1981, as compared with 55.4 million pounds in 1980, and imports rose, from 321 million pounds in 1980 to 628.1 million pounds in 1981.

The Netherlands Has a Demand for Oil

Egypt's exports to The Netherlands dropped from 1,226,000,000 pounds in 1980 to 93.3 million pounds in 1981, and imports rose from 69.3 million pounds to 191 million.

Denmark Has a Demand for Onions

Egypt exports cotton spinning, cotton cloth, and dried onions to Denmark, and imports consist of machinery, transportation equipment and foodstuffs. The volume of imports came to 32.9 million pounds in 1981 as compared with 13.2 million pounds in 1980. Exports dropped from 4.5 to 2.5 million pounds.

Italy Requires Watermelons

Egypt exports crude oil to Italy (88 percent of total exports), in addition to petroleum products, unprocessed cotton, cotton textiles and watermelon. It imports equipment, machinery, cars, spare parts, iron and steel. The volume of exports dropped from 610 million pounds in 1980 to 580 million pounds in 1981.

Exports to Greece rose from 61 million pounds in 1980 to 109 million in 1981, and Egyptian imports from Greece rose to 169 million pounds, as compared with 75 million.

The volume of exports to Spain came to 49.8 million pounds in 1981 as compared with 32 million pounds in 1980. Imports from Spain increased from 83 million to 150 million pounds.

The volume of Egyptian exports to Sweden came to 1.6 million pounds in 1981 as compared with 1.8 million pounds in 1980, and imports from Sweden increased from 66.1 million pounds to 67 million.

The volume of exports to Switzerland dropped from 63 million pounds in 1980 to 45 million pounds in 1981, and the volume of imports rose from 59 million to 94 million pounds.

The volume of exports to Turkey rose from 3 million pounds in 1980 to 10.9 million in 1981.

Imports rose from 11 to 35 million pounds.

Austrian markets have a demand for Egyptian exports--crude oil, vegetables, fruit, leather products and textiles. The volume of exports came to 9.4 million pounds in 1981 as compared with 9.7 million pounds in 1980, and imports rose from 19.5 to 27 million pounds.

11887 CSO: 4504/101

VARIOUS EXPERTS DEBATE WISDOM OF PRICE CONTROLS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 10 Dec 82 p 5

Article by Amal 'Allam and Ahmad Husayn: _"The Price Agency -- Will It Resume Controling Prices in the Egyptian Market?"

/Text/ We are not arguing that it is necessary to pause to review the subject of prices in Egypt. The need to alleviate the masses' sufferings was the main concern of the government's statement, and the most important thing the masses are suffering from is runaway prices. It is true that the issue of prices, as we are presenting it for discussion, has many sides, including some related to the overall economic situation in terms of the relationship between deficiencies or inadequacies of goods, and the absence of goods from the standpoint of supply and demand, then the stages of distribution, then the pricing imposed on commodities subject to compulsory pricing. However, the responsibility of oversight agencies and the degree of effectiveness of the law on price violations are also significant. The third dimension in this issue is the fact that none of the attempts at oversight by consumers themselves to which thought has been given have met with success, in spite of our faith that consumer self-protection is an important part of the problem; no matter how great government oversight might be, it cannot go on for 24 hours; rather, it is up to the consumer to defend his rights, and he is in charge of doing so. Because of all these dimensions - these ones related to economics, oversight and the society - the issue is being raised for discussion. Since stanching the hemorrhaging of prices has become a demand of the masses, it is necessary, along with that, to strike out at people who are speculating with the people's livelihood and essential to take the necessary measures to apply the laws and to deter anyone who engages in speculation. Therefore, the first question on this issue arises: are the laws, and their stipulated penalties, alone adequate to damp the flame of prices? The second question concerns the explanation behind the multiplicity of prices for individual commodities -- does that make a return to price planning appropriate?

How Can We Plan for Public and Private Sector Prices?

'Ali Labib, the first deputy planning minister and former chairman of the Planning Agency, states that the product of the planning process, ultimately, is goods and services - goods for the consumer, goods for production, services people and services for the productive process. In order for this product to reach consumers, it must be within their grasp, that is, the prices at which

goods are sold must be appropriate, or we will be faced with one of two things -inflation, expressed by high prices, and the existence of a black market;

Or a recession, expressed by the sluggish pace of transactions in the market.

This is on the one hand; on the other, the setting of prices occurs in two contexts, that of the public sector, where numerous non-economic factors enter into pricing, and that of the private sector, where profit plays a greater role in the pricing process, except for the setting of imports prices as spelled out by Decree 119 and other stipulations, which play a major role in the setting of prices.

Therefore, as 'Ali Labib says, because of the chaos in pricing and prices with which consumers and producers are generally faced, the need to revert to price planning becomes apparent.

Price planning is not just a process of setting and planning prices -- more important than that, it entails the study of production processes with the goal of planning production costs, raising labor productivity and modernizing the productive process.

After the price planning process comes the process of setting prices; other non-economic elements enter into this, and it is primarily political and social.

It would have been possible to abandon the notion of price planning had domestic product been able to cover all requirements and had people's incomes made it possible to obtain goods and services; however, because that was not the case, and because it was necessary to protect the consumer and provide a minimum of welfare, price planning, which would help decisionmakers cover these stipulations to cope with the needs of consumers with limited incomes and at the same time provide production commodities, for craftsmen in particular, and make it possible to create a sort of balance in the domestic economy which would make national planning acceptable, became an essential concept.

Price planning does not mean that setting prices becomes an obligatory process—rather, it is advisory in nature, as the former chairman of the Planning Agency says, because other factors, social and political, are involved. Moreover, we cannot compel productive units to adhere to specific prices under present conditions.

If we want to revert to price planning, we will have to think of reviewing oversight statutes and administrative agencies, in addition to technical agencies in productive units.

'Ali Labib asserts that the notion of price planning applies only to public sector goods and products, not to the private sector.

While the price planning process in Egypt is important and urgent, there are people who consider that it cannot be carried out in the context of present circumstances. Dr Ramzi Zaki, a National Planning Institute expert, considers that price planning can be carried out only through comprehensive national planning, which became downplayed during the seventies, and that price planning cannot be carried out in isolation from investment, planning, foreign trade and other forms of planning.

Ramzi Zaki adds that there is another problem with the price planning process, and that is the proliferation of social production organizations in Egypt. These organizations vary in terms of their contribution to commodity production and the nature of the system of ownership governing their activities. If we look at commodity production in Egypt /line missing/, but the main difficulty facing price planning in the public sector, and its objectives of attaining price stability and economic sufficiency, is the fact that the prices of production components in this sector are faced with constant increases under conditions of local and international inflation. In addition, there has been a constant increase in the prices of local and imported raw materials and there have been periodic increases in wages. How can one plan prices in this sector when it is impossible to plan costs? Dr Ramzi Zaki adds that it is difficult to plan public sector prices, unless we can solve the public sector's problems.

Members of the Legal Profession Assert That Supply Laws Are Adequate To Control Prices and Deter Speculators

Counsellor 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hamadah, the Council of State's counsellor in the Ministry of Planning, states that legislation and the laws are adequate to deter people speculating in the people's livelihood and control efforts to act exploitatively in raising prices. Egypt's first supply law was Law 95 for 1945, which gave the supply minister the power to set prices in commodities and materials the Supply Ministry was in charge of and those whose distribution it supervised. The law also prohibited factory owners and merchants who produced or dealt in the supply commodities specified by decree of the minister of supply from stopping work in their factories or refraining from pursuing commerce in the normal manner, except by permit from the supply minister. In the case of bread, the law stipulates that the supply minister may suspend the distribution of permits for flour to be used for bread for a period of no less than 1 week and no more than 1 month if the provisions of the decrees regulating the bread industry are violated, and, in the event of repetitions, the suspension period is to be doubled, without prejudice to other stipulated penalties. The law also prohibits owners of bakeries from producing flour, offering it for sale or possessing it in any way whatever, in violation of specifications and conditions. In the case of sugar, the supply minister can suspend wholesale sugar merchants if it is proved that they have speculated or disrupted Supply Ministry orders with respect to the distribution of the allotted volume of sugar. The law also addresses itself to yarn and cotton textiles; it stipulates that the sale of yarn offered on the market in accordance with permits or cards is not to be allowed and that yarn is not to be relinquished or disposed of by barter or any form of disposition. It is not possible to use it, either, except for the purposes for which it is given out.

The law stipulates stiff penalties, amounting to imprisonment for a period of no more than 3 months and a fine of 50 pounds, or either of the two, for anyone who fails to present invoices or documents bearing on stores, factories or warehouses to judiciary seizure officials, or anyone the minister of supply delegates for that purpose, as well as people providing inaccurate data.

In 1960, Law 1963 was issued bearing on matters of compulsory pricing and the setting of profits. It stipulated the formation of a committee on pricing in each governorate which would take charge of setting the prices of different

types of foods and the formation of a higher Council of Ministers committee which would propound principles for setting prices for governorate committees, oversee price movement, and recommend measures that would result in combatting inflation. In addition, anyone selling a commodity whose price was set or whose profits had been stipulated, offering it for sale at a price or profit in excess of the set price or profit, or refraining from selling it at that price or profit, and making the sale contingent on some other condition which was in violation of commercial usage, would be punished by imprisonment for a period of no less than 6 months and no more than 2 years or a fine of no less than 100 pounds and no more than 500 pounds or both. In all cases, the objects that were the subject of the crime would be seized and a verdict would be issued confiscating them. In all cases, the objects that were the subject of the crime would be seized and a verdict would be issued confiscating them. In the event of a repetition, the minimums and maximums of the penalty would be doubled and it would be mandatory to issue a verdict shutting down the store. The following would be punished by imprisonment for a period of not less than 1 month or more than 2 years and a fine of no less than 20 pounds or more than 500 pounds, or both:

- 1. Anyone offering food and drink, supplying it at prices in excess of the stipulated price, or refraining from offering it.
- 2. Anyone renting out a room, or offering it for rent, at a rental in excess of the stipulated ceiling.

Rulings would be made on the crimes committed in violation of the provisions of this law on an urgent basis.

If the supply laws are adequate, what are the views of the people carrying them out?

Col 'Abdallah Ghallush, director of the Cairo office of the supply investigator, says that the supply issue in reality is composed of commodities, prices and consumers. Consumers want to get commodities easily, without difficulty and at the right price, although there are factors that affect the level of prices in general, such as changes in the consumption patterns of some segments of the masses, inflation and increased demand for the purchase of goods.

Col 'Abdallah Ghallush adds that there are two types of goods subject to compulsory pricing:

- 1. The type that is to be found on the supply cards, namely sugar, vegetable oil, tea, fava beans and detergents.
- 2. The second type consists of commodities offered for sale in consumer cooperatives frozen meat, chicken, rice, goods in sacks and other grocery items.

That leaves other goods subject to compulsory pricing, which are in hands of the private sector.

As far as vegetables to, the prices on these are set weekly, since a pricing committee in Cairo Governorate meets on these every Wednesday, and the prices

of vegetables for the week and retail prices from Saturday morning to the following Friday are set there.

The director of the Cairo supply investigator's office says, "In order to carry out surveillance over the sales prices of commodities in the markets, there is a supply investigation office unit in the wholesale market in Rawd al-Faraj which operates 24 hours a day whose goal is to prevent crimes before they take place. As far as fruit goes, the pricing on that is set on a seasonal basis, grapes and watermelon alone in the summer, and citrus fruit and bananas in the winter. A decree on this pricing is issued by the minister of supply, stipulating prices from the producer to the wholesale merchant to the retail merchant and the consumer. We seek to honor compulsory pricing and provide goods in the light of these decrees.

"Over the past 4 months, up to the end of October, the office of the supply investigator has managed to crack down on 4,613 supply cases, and these cases have been submitted to the office of the state security prosecutor."

The director of the Cairo supply investigator's office demanded that:

Supply and demand be brought into balance, especially as far as consumer goods go.

Population density be used as a guide when the consumer market is planned and the commodity quotas for each governorate are determined.

Attainment of a suitable profit margin be observed in the various stages of transactions in each commodity.

Outlets for the distribution of various goods in newly developed areas of Cairo be increased.

Awareness of supply conditions be propagated by avoiding the hoarding of supply commodities.

Consumer leagues be formed, as soon as they are selected, to be concerned with boycotting the purchases of one or more commodities, especially those that are not subject to compulsory pricing, where merchants continue to raise prices without justification.

Society companies perform their obligations in terms of marketing their requirements from production areas directly, in order to ensure that the wholesale transaction stage is fully covered.

Cooperative societies be established for growing fruit and vegetables, raising livestock, fish and poultry, and dealing directly with retailers.

Prior planning take place in the case of seasonal and consumer goods in regard to the requirements of the inhabitants of Cairo in suitable time for <u>frest</u> of line missing.

Oversight agencies be provided support in the form of necessary resources in terms of cars and people.

Three new wholesale markets be established in Cairo, one in Madinat al-Salam to serve the various sections of eastern Cairo and Heliopolis, a second in south Cairo to serve the sections of Hilwan, al-Ma'adi and al-Tabin, and a third in the al-Khalifah area to serve the sections of west Cairo.

11887 CSO: 4504/100

PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY CONSIDERS LEGISLATION BASED ON ISLAMIC LAW

Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 27 Oct 82 p 3

[Article: "The People's Assembly Speaks Out on the Most Serious Resolution Awaited by the People"]

[Text] Legislation based on Islamic law has been drafted; it is to be presented to a special parliamentary committee for its approval in a matter of weeks. Committees codifying Islamic law made a point of indicating the legal origin of each provision so that in interpreting the law, one would refer to Islamic, not foreign jurisprudence. Laws that are consistent with conditions of the age and compatible with the spirit of Islamic law have been drafted for bank, insurance and investment transactions.

The parliamentary committee that is to approve new legislation which would put the rules of God into practice is to begin its work in the next few weeks.

The new statutes took into account the letter of Islamic law, exegesis of a legal ruling or the source of one of those rulings. This is based on the fact that religious statutes are divided into only two groups.

1. Statutes that provide absolute confirmation and evidence, and these do not allow for independent judgments. The other group [involves] statutes that are based on independent judgments either because these are presumed to be confirmed or they are presumed to provide evidence. These statutes change with time and place, and it is this that led to the multiplicity of Islamic denominations and even to the multiplicity of opinions within one denomination. The committee made a point of indicating the legal source of every text or the sources or principle from which a statute was derived so that instead of always referring to foreign jurisprudence in explaining and interpreting a statute, one can go back to references on Islamic jurisprudence.

With regard to new social relations and financial transactions that have been introduced [on the scene] but not dealt with by experts in Islamic jurisprudence, the committees made an effort to derive rulings that would be compatible with the conditions of society and the spirit of the age, provided that they conform to the spirit and principles of Islamic law. Examples of this are bank transactions, insurance [transactions] and methods of investing funds.

The committees were intent on using familiar legal terminology; only when it was necessary did they depart from such usage. The substance and the sense [of these statutes] conform to [the precepts of] Islamic jurisprudence.

The preliminary reports on each one of the five bills that were completed by the codifying committee in 1978 follow:

The Civil Procedure Bill

Dr Jamal al-'Atifi, reporter of the bill says, "The Civil Procedures Law is the backbone of all other laws and legislation.

"It is known that Islamic jurisprudence achieved distinction in this area. Its experts set up a distinguished legal system that was recognized at international legal gatherings and conferences on comparative law. It is considered the heritage of our entire society; both Muslims and Copts took part in its formulation.

"The provisions of the canonical law of Islam in this bill are derived from all schools of Islamic jurisprudence. Coordination between these provisions has been taken into account to preserve the unity of the legislative process and the consistency and harmony of its provisions.

"Developments and progress in the law have been taken into account, in light of the development of Islamic society and the progress of human thought.

"All legislation that has been enacted in Arab and Islamic countries and whose provisions were derived from Islamic law was taken into account. Efforts made by experts in jurisprudence to draft legislation under the guidance of the provisions of the canonical law of Islam were also taken into account."

In that light the salient features of the bill are defined as follows:

The Fundamental Principles Included in the Prefatory Chapter

The First Principle: In interpreting legislative provisions a judge is to follow legal methods of evidence; his interpretation is to be inspired by the intentions of Islamic law. If he finds no provision or customary law [to guide him in his judgment], he is to render a judgment in accordance with the principles of the canonical law of Islam.

The Second Principle: Definitive provisions of the canonical law of Islam are considered part of the general system. Accordingly, any provision or agreement that differs with these statutes is invalid.

The Third Principle: A person who is entitled to exercise a right loses that right if he departs from the social purpose intended by the draft legislation which mentioned specifically certain controls in light of this general principle. All these controls are derived from Islamic jurisprudence.

Dr al-'Atifi adds, "The bill prohibited usury. It ruled invalid any agreement that is made to receive interest in return for utilizing a sum of money or

delaying payment of a sum of money. The bill allowed a creditor to ask for damages when payment [of a loan] is delayed. It ruled invalid every stipulation increasing the damages a borrower would pay to a lender. The bill set up limited partnership companies as a legitimate alternative to borrowing money with interest when an entrepreneur needs funds to set up a project. The bill disregarded regulating the subject of a constant income, due to the fact that the most important application of that matter in professional life is lending money with interest. The bill removed all references to interest in all articles, and it closed various loopholes that could be used for conducting deceptive sales. This is in accordance with perceptions of Islamic jurisprudence and contrary to what is required by present legislation. The bill took into account what is required in a contract and, in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence, did not permit agreements that would violate Islamic jurisprudence.

"The bill derived from Islamic jurisprudence the procedure of a suspended contract instead of that of a contract that may be invalidated. [The latter] is followed by the present code. This is because the former system, which is an Islamic system, is preferred to the latter from a technical standpoint even by people and men in the legal profession."

The bill also derived from Islamic jurisprudence the principle of disallowing a lawsuit instead of that of a person losing his right to plead his case with the lapse of time. [The latter principle] is the one followed by the present code.

The bill introduced subjects it derived from Islamic jurisprudence. Among these are kinds of sales, which are called in Islamic jurisprudence sales in good faith; and special kinds of companies, limited partnership companies which are considered the legal alternative to borrowing money with interest when an entrepreneur needs money to set up a project. [Other kinds of companies are] business companies and front companies, which respond to a practical reality in society.

The bill also added statutes to close the deficiency in many of the statutes of the present code. [The following] are examples of this.

The bill mentioned what can be done to close loopholes that can be used against a party in a contract who has been defrauded. The bill universalized the principle of responsibility stemming from objects. The bill completed a ruling on sales carried out in case of a fatal disease, and it added a few provisions on making endowments. These are mentioned in detail in the bill.

The bill relied on standards that were set forth by Islamic jurisprudence among a group of subjects. In everything it mentioned the bill referred to the legal source from which a statute is derived. For example, the bill makes a stipulation about the theory of using one's right arbitrarily and states that legal permissibility is incompatible with a guarantee. In this, the bill is guided by Islamic jurisprudence. Anyone who exercises his right in a legal manner is not to be liable for any damage that may ensue as a result. The bill is also guided by Islamic jurisprudence in an article pertaining to legal defense and states that exigencies warrant restrictions, but that they are to be evaluated accordingly.

These are examples of what the bill adopted directly from the principles of Islamic jurisprudence. However, the most important matter in the bill is its

organization of an insurance contract. The bill considered an insurance contract a cooperative agreement by which the insured makes installments or monetary payments in the face of an accident or danger that may befall any of the insured. An insurance contract thus represents a cooperative effort between all those who are insured. Each one of them makes a payment in a certain amount, and from the total that is paid by all, the few who are victims of an accident or who suffer the danger against which they have been insured are compensated. Thus, the insured cooperate to compensate this small number of people, and the loss is shared by all.

Insurance thus is a commendable cooperative effort, and those who are party to the insurance agreement treat each other with charity. Thus, insurance ceases to be a forbidden, indistinct transaction and becomes a cooperative one that people can turn to legally. As a result of an insurance contract a limited partnership company is established between the community of those who are insured and the insuror (the company). The insuror manages and invests the insurance funds which are entrusted to him. The share of the profits due to the insured are added to these funds. The insuror takes from all these funds monies that must be paid to the insured or to a beneficiary in case an accident occurs or the danger against which the insurance was made transpires. These are the most important points which the bill came to. It is in this manner that the bill highlighted the cooperative aspect of an insurance contract, and that is the aspect that must have primary consideration in making a judgment about this contract.

Some experts in jurisprudence had prohibited insurance contracts because they had disregarded this basic aspect of insurance. The bill also guaranteed that the insured receive a share of the profits earned by their funds after payments are made to those who are insured or to their beneficiaries in case an accident occurs or a danger transpires.

The bill did nevertheless retain the provisions of the present code which rely on the principles of Islamic law, and it referred them to these sources.

The bill also retained the provisions of the present code which deal with aspects of business that Islamic jurisprudence did not deal with. These provisions did not contradict the provisions of the canonical law of Islam. The bill also mentioned the legal basis for these provisions.

The bill very carefully avoided any provisions that contradicted definitive statutes in the canonical law of Islam.

The bill did nevertheless retain the legal terminology that has become familiar in legal practice in Egypt, and it adopted as many terms from Islamic jurisprudence as it deemed appropriate. In drafting the provisions of the bill, it took into account in general all the observations made by jurisprudence on present provisions and all the shortomings and deficiencies in these provisions revealed by practical application. Thus, this action in itself is considered an improvement of the present code.

Two Bills: The Litigation Procedures Code and the Rules of Evidence Code

Regarding the Litigation Procedures Code and the Rules of Evidence Code Reporter Mumtaz Nassar said, "We must thank the efforts of His Eminence al-Shaykh Salah

Abu Isma'il, the recording secretary of this committee. We all know that the committee which is drafting the Litigation Proceedings Code and the Rules of Evidence Code began its work in February 1979. It was commissioned by the speaker of the People's Assembly to codify and reformulate the articles of the Civil and Commercial Proceedings Code and the present Rules of Evidence Code so as to make them conform to the rules and provisions of the canonical law of Islam. A debate arose when the committee began its work: will this work be confined to a review and an examination of present provisions to determine which of them violate the provisions of Islamic law so they can be abolished or amended accordingly while provisions that do not violate Islamic law would remain unchanged? Or should the source of each article in the amended bill be mentioned so that each statute would have its genuine legal source [identified], either from the True Book of God Almighty, from the Tradition of His Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, from the consensus [of Muslims] or from the opinions of legal experts in jurisprudence. The forementioned committee adopted the former opinion on the basis of the fact that it would allow the committee to complete [its task] quickly.

The committee divided its work into five parts, and it assigned each part to a subcommittee. These subcommittees are: the Judiciary and Court Organization Subcommittee; the Legal Action and Public Affairs Subcommittee; the Litigation Procedures Subcommittee; the Rules of Evidence Subcommittee; and the Subcommittee on Sentencing, Appealing and Carrying out Sentences.

Each one of these subcommittees submitted its report to the committee that is drafting the Litigation and Legal Proceedings Code. That committee wrote a general report whose argument was based on the rule that permissibility is the principal rule in everything unless there is evidence of prohibition. In this light the committee approved those articles of the present legal proceedings code, issued as Law Number 13 for 1968, which did not contradict the fundamentals of Islamic law. Those articles that contradicted these fundamentals were either amended by the forementioned committee or they underwent additions or deletions. [In some cases] new articles were introduced. After this work was completed, the committee submitted a report to that effect to the People's Assembly Public Committee for Codifying the Provisions of Islamic Law. It attached to the report its proposals for the bills it had drafted to amend the Legal Proceedings Code, the Rules of Evidence Code and the law on judicial authority.

However, the forementioned public committee returned this report so that the sources of all articles mentioned therein would be established and the legislation would be linked with its original sources in legal books. [This activity] was not to be restricted to amending those articles that contradicted the provisions of Islamic law and retaining those that did not. In July 1981 the speaker of the People's Assembly issued a decree appointing Justice Ibrahim al-Qalyubi, former public prosecutor, and His Eminence al-Shaykh Ibrahim al-Waqfi, member of the Academy of Islamic Studies and former inspector of religious subjects at al-Azhar to a committee of two that would carry out this task of establishing sources.

This two-man committee began its work in September 1981, and it performed its work in three stages. The first stage was that of consulting the most important legal references necessary for this work. The committee selected over 25 of the most authoritative references by leading scholars of jurisprudence and well-known

jurists who had formulated independent opinions, books of exegesis and books about the Tradition. The library of the People's Assembly acquired these books, but a few of them could not be obtained. The committee set up its working office in the library of the People's Assembly or at other locations. It used to have three or two [work] sessions a week. Review of these references lasted till the end of December 1981. During that period everything pertaining to the subject of our study in the civil and commercial proceedings law was excerpted and all these excerpts were compiled. After the two-man committee completed this first stage of its work, it began the second stage, which was that of attaching these excerpts and studies that had been compiled to their proper place on the agenda of the parts of the legal proceedings code which had been distributed among the forementioned five subcommittees.

Early in January 1982 the committee began the third important and final stage of its work. That stage manifested itself in establishing the sources of articles whose sources have not been established and referring those articles to their sources in Islamic law: from the Holy Book, the Sunna [the practices of the Prophet], the consensus of Muslims or the opinion of an expert in jurisprudence. Thus the code that is being sought can be linked to its legal sources and when points of view on application differ, reference can be made to these Islamic sources and references and not to foreign laws and references. Existing Islamic codes and draft legislation are to be utilized and care is to be taken that the overall structure of existing Egyptian legislation is retained. As much as that is possible, footnotes are to be provided for each article or for some articles that have to do with one subject to indicate the legal sources of a statute in books of Islamic jurisprudence. This process is to start with the first section of the law which pertains to the judicial system and to the organization and jurisdiction of the courts. This process is to continue with subsequent sections. Articles regulating new matters that have no sources in Islamic law and articles that do not contradict the sources of Islamic law will be placed in the bill on the basis of the rule of inspired authority which authorizes a ruler to lay down those rules that are appropriate to the achievement of absolute interests as long as these do not conflict with the provisions of Islamic law and there is no legal provision acknowledging them or repealing them.

The Principles of the Bill

The attached bill was based on the following principles:

The first principle is that of linking the code that is being sought to its legal sources in the Koran, in the Sunna [the practices] of God's noble Prophet, in the consensus of the Muslim community or in one of the opinions by an expert in jurisprudence recorded in one of the books of Islamic jurisprudence. Thus, when differences in points of view on application arise, reference would be made to these Islamic sources and books and not to foreign laws.

The second principle is that of not being restricted to a certain school of Islamic jurisprudence, even if it were the Hanafi school. We would thus get out of the confinement of a single school and into the vastness of various schools of Islamic law. The Islamic schools of jurisprudence express only the points of view of their proponents. Others are bound by those points of view only in so far as there is evidence that these points of view are genuine and realize an interest that is acknowledged by the law.

The third principle: Articles regulating new matters for which there are no legal sources and articles that do not violate these sources of Islamic law will be included in the bill on the basis of the rule of inspired authority which permits a ruler to lay down appropriate rules that would realize the absolute interests of society, as long as these do not conflict with the provisions of Islamic law and as long as there is no legal provision acknowledging or repealing them. These articles are to go along with what people have become accustomed to in their lives and with the dealings they have had according to the provisions of Islamic law. This is because the law must be closely related to the life, customs and traditions of society.

The fourth principle is this: A thorough examination of all details and particulars is not to be attempted, and their rulings are not to be stipulated. The over-all [intent of an article] is to be considered satisfactory so that flexibility can be realized and the courts and jurisprudence can play their roles in applying these over-all [intentions] and using them to explain the facts in accordance with the set rules of Islamic jurisprudence.

The Structure of the Bill

The bill includes [the following]:

First, general provisions of litigation and the execution [of sentences] and then two books.

Second, the first book is about litigation procedures and rules of legal proceedings.

Third, the second book includes the measures and conditions of execution.

The First Book

The first book has four chapters.

The first chapter pertains to the rules of the judicial system, the organization and jurisdiction of the courts—international, categorical or local jurisdiction—the provisions and conditions for disqualifying, returning and removing from office judges and members of the prosecutor's office, as well as the conditions and rules of arbitration.

The second chapter pertains to litigation measures and to the rules for filing and registering a lawsuit.

The third chapter includes the conditions and measures for the progress of a lawsuit in court; the rules of attendance, absence and power of attorney in litigation; provisions for intervention by the public prosecution in a lawsuit; and provisions for court session proceedings and rules. Included in this chapter also are rules for defense, introduction [of evidence], intervention, incidental requests, stopping litigation, interrupting its progress, and dropping and abandoning a lawsuit or letting it lapse with time. This chapter also includes rules for filing and obtaining an official record thereof.

The fourth chapter includes methods for appealing sentences, and this includes general sentences, appealing a sentence, petitioning for reconsideration and appealing for reversal of a sentence.

The Second Book

This includes the book of execution and it comprises its general provisions, the rules for an executing magistrate, the rules for an executive authority, summary executions, carrying out sentences and orders, foreign authorities, execution procedures and problems, the rules for precautionary seizure, seizing the property of a debtor for a creditor and the property of a debtor for others, seizing real estate, some special sales, in kind execution, and the distribution of the proceeds of execution.

The Penal Code

The reporter of the Penal Code, Hafiz Badawi said that the bill was based on the fact that the purpose of inflicting punishment is to reform the criminal and accordingly reform society. "The bill also relies basically on the policy of a merciful father who becomes stern [with his children] to reform them and warns them to teach them a lesson. In Islamic law punishment is preventive before the fact and deterrent after the fact. Islamic law adheres to the principle of the legitimacy of crime and punishment and to the principle of personal responsibility in keeping with what God Almighty said, "Each soul is the hostage of its own deeds" [al-Muddathir: 38]. Islamic law enjoins physical punishment and measures as a kind of censure. The punishment is limited to the enormity of the crime and the danger of its perpetrator.

The second book includes legal punishments. This book contains eight chapters, each of which pertains to the provisions that deal separately with each legal punishment.

The first chapter includes the sentences that pertain to the legal punishment for theft. The second chapter includes the sentences that pertain to the legal punishment for assault. The third chapter includes the legal punishment for adultery. The fourth chapter includes the legal punishment for slander. The fifth chapter includes the legal punishment for the consumption of alcoholic beverages and the prohibition of alcohol. The sixth chapter includes the legal punishment for apostasy. The seventh chapter pertains to retaliation comparable to the offense. And the eighth chapter deals with retaliation that falls short of the offense.

Each one of these chapters contains a definition of the punishable crime; how it is committed and established; conditions for inflicting the punishment set by law; and also the conditions for exemption from that penalty and warding off the legal punishment.

The text also includes inflicting the set censure as punishment in case one of the required conditions for inflicting the maximum legal punishment is not available.

It is worth noting here that the committee found it [appropriate] to follow the

rules of jurisprudence about which the majority of experts and scholars of jurisprudence agree and which do not conflict with conditions in our country. The committee also thought it [appropriate] that the provisions pertaining to legal punishments be unequivocal so that anyone who looks into them can determine what their intent is without obscurity or stultification.

The third book pertains to censure.

This book contains 14 chapters.

The first chapter pertains to crimes that affect the internal and foreign security of the country.

The second chapter includes crimes that affect the national economy.

The third chapter is about crimes of failing to fulfill work duties and failure to act on behalf of others.

The fourth chapter is about crimes perpetrated against public authorities.

The fifth chapter is about crimes that upset the course of justice.

The sixth chapter is about crimes that upset public culture.

The seventh chapter is about crimes that are dangerous and threatening to the public.

The eighth chapter is about crimes that affect the inviolability of religions.

The ninth chapter is about crimes perpetrated against people.

The tenth chapter is about crimes that are perpetrated through newspapers and other public means.

The eleventh chapter is about crimes affecting respect, public morals, eavesdropping and disclosure of secrets.

The twelfth chapter is about crimes against property.

The thirteenth chapter is about gambling and lottery tickets.

The fourteenth chapter is about crimes that pertain to public health, disturb the peace and threaten danger.

The third book is based on the following principles:

First, censure is to be imposed as punishment for crimes that are punishable by law where the conditions for maximum punishment are not available. This is to avoid having the criminal escape punishment for a crime he committed.

Second, actions that a ruler thinks should be considered criminal are to be considered criminal to protect society and to preserve its security and the security of its citizens and to keep public life going.

Third, actions that are not mentioned in the Koran or in the Sunna [the practices of the Prophet] but which the ruler thinks should be considered criminal are to be so classified so that people's interests would not be tampered with and so that each citizen would rest assured about his present and his future.

The Maritime Trade Law

The reporter of the Maritime Trade Law, Justice Ahmad 'Ali Musa says that the affairs of maritime trade are currently being regulated by a law that was issued in 1883. The provisions of that law are derived from the French trade group [of laws which was issued in 1807. Accordingly, it is no longer acceptable that such a law continue to apply to maritime trade relations which have undergone tremendous change during the past 100 years since the law was issued. It essential that the legislation be accompanied by this tremendous development so that the new problems that have come on the scene in these areas can be confronted and the international treaties and agreements which Egypt joined could be taken into account. The Ministry of Justice has drafted a maritime trade bill, realizing thereby all of this. A select group of men in the legal profession who specialize in this area took part in drafting this bill. Among them are law professors, judges and others men of good judgment. This matter has been turned over to the People's Assembly which has turned it over to the Committee for Constitutional and Legislative Affairs. The committee began to study this matter with the aid of a technical committee that consists of men in the legal profession and people who are employed in maritime businesses.

Pursuant to the constitutional amendment to Article Two enacted in 1980, making Islamic law the principal source of legislation, the committee has reconsidered the bill to ensure that its provisions are consistent with the provisions of the canonical law of Islam. In drafting the provisions of the bill the committee has adhered to [those principles] that are positively established and proven in a text of Islamic law. In the absence of a text, the committee followed the various ways for deriving legal provisions: a consensus of Muslims, analogy or custom. In determining [the propriety of] some provisions the committee also sought [guidance from] the inpsired authority. This is defined by scholars of Islamic jurisprudence as everything that realizes what is good for society or wards off something that would hurt it when there is no stipulation in Islamic law acknowledging or repealing those provisions. These two principal conditions set by scholars of jurisprudence are to be taken into account in acknowledging inpsired authority. These are:

- A. That the interest be public and genuine, entailing with certainty and not entertaining the hope that something beneficial will be gained or something harmful will be warded off.
- B. That legislation for this interest not conflict with a provision of Islamic law established by a definitive text that cannot be otherwise interpreted.

With these general principles it is possible to permit every new measure that would bring about the public good. It is also possible to permit every new mode of business to which people have become accustomed and which is not explicitly forbidden by an existing text, and it is possible to permit every agreement that does not allow something that is forbidden and does not forbid something that is good. It need not be said that disagreements among scholars of jurisprudence

about these dealings give one the opportunity to choose the most suitable opinions to make a judgement about what people have done to realize their common interests.

The Names of a Few Professors and Scientists Who Took Part in Drafting the Laws That Are Based on Islamic Law

The honor list included the names of a number of professors, scientists and Muslim thinkers who took part in completing these five laws. They are:

His Eminence, Dr al-Shaykh Jad al-Haqq 'Ali Jad al-Haqq, the shaykh of al-Azhar; Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im Sabrah, professor of civil law at Cairo University and former deputy director of Cairo University; Dr Husayn Hamid, professor of Islamic law and chairman of the Islamic Law Department in the College of Law at Cairo Univer-Justice Ibrahim al-Qalyubi, former public prosecutor; His Eminence al-Shaykh Ibrahim al-Waqfi, member of the Academy of Islamic Studies and former inspector of religious studies at al-Azhar; Dr Muhammad Zaki 'Abd-al-Barr; Dr Muhammad Anis 'Abadah; Justice Ahmad Hasan Haykal, former president of the Court of Cassation; Justice al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hindi, Court of Cassation judge; Dr Ahmad Fathi Surur, professor of the Penal Code in the College of Law at Cairo University; Justice Salah Yunis, vice president of the Court of Cassation; Dr Jamal al-Din Mahmud, secretary general of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs; Justice Muhammad Rafiq al-Bastawisi, Court of Cassation Justice; Dr Yusuf Qasim, professor of Islamic law in the College of Law at Cairo University; Justice Mas'ud Sa'dawi, public attorney in the Court of Cassation; Dr Muhammad Muhi al-Din 'Awad vice president of al-Mansurah University; Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Amir, former professor of Islamic law in the College of Law at Cairo University; Dr Mahmud Tantawi, professor of Islamic Law in the College of Law at 'Ayn Shams University; Dr 'Abd-al-'Azim Mursi Wazir, associate professor of criminal law at the College of Law of al-Mansurah University; and Dr Taymur Fawzi Mustafa Kamil, justice at the State Administrative Court.

Mr Muhammad al-Buhayri, deputy minister at the assembly and Mr Shibil Badawi, a technical researcher at the assembly carried out the secretarial work for the committees.

8592 CSO: 4504/55

BRIEFS

NEW INFORMATION HEAD--Mr Safwat al-Sharif, the minister of state for information, declared that it had been decided to appoint Dr Mamduh al-Baltaji chairman of the General Information Authority and that a republican decree to that end would be issued in the next few days. Dr al-Baltaji now holds the position of media consultant in Paris, and obtained a doctorate, specializing in economics, from the Sorbonne in 1973, then a doctorate in political science (international relations) from the Sorbonne. /Text//Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 11 Dec 82 p 1

DEPUTY INFORMATION HEADS--In the context of the Information Authority's new organizational structure, it has been decided to appoint two deputy authority chairmenfor the foreign media, Mr 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Sharbini, and, for the domestic media sector, Mr 'Adli Hashad. The minister of state for information has also issued a decree filling employment positions in all sectors in accordance with the new structure. These are six deputy ministers heading up central departments and 23 directors of general departments. /Text//Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 11 Dec 82 p 1/ 11887

CSO: 4504/101

PROGRESS OF ARABIZATION PROGRAM REVIEWED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 9 Nov 82 pp 1, 3

[Text] On the morning of Monday, 8 November 1982, M'Hamed Boucetta, minister of state in charge of planning, cadre training and vocational training, presided over the official opening of the 1982-1983 session of the National Commission on Planning and the Arabization of Scientific and Technical Terms. The session, held at the headquarters of the Cadre Training Directorate, was attended by Dr Azzedine Laraki, minister of national education, Abdelkarim Ghallab, minister delegate in the Prime Minister's Office, Dr Said Belbachir, minister of cultural affairs, Abbdes el Kaissi, secretary general of the government, and Mohamed Toughani, secretary of state for administrative affairs.

In his opening remarks, Douiri thanked the ministers for attending the session and emphasized that their presence reflected the interest which the prime minister and the government have, in keeping with the instructions of King Hassan II, in the matter of the Arabization of technical and scientific terms. The minister then related the efforts made by every minister within the framework of his own department and powers with respect to Arabization, whose realization will free Arabs from cultural alienation, consolidate the Arab-Muslim identity of Morocco and make its influence both regional and universal, he said. This is the goal toward which the king is working in order to ensure our country's participation in the consolidation of security and peace, as well as general prosperity for all mankind.

Speaking to the members of the commission, Douiri said that the government, headed by the prime minister, is aware of the deliberate nature of their action. He stressed that the work of the commission requires the recruitment of full- and part-time government employees and officials, which requires more funds than granted in the past.

Dissemination of Arabized Terms

Touching upon the work of the national commission, Douiri then described its achievements aimed at enabling Arabic to occupy its rightful place in the community of international languages and to follow the evolution of civilizations and technologies in the world. He then outlined the planned action of the commission at the session and listed the objectives to be achieved.

With respect to the putting together of lexicons, Douiri pointed to the completion, despite the inadequacy of resources, of dictionaries for postal and telecommunications equipment and banking. As for the Institute of Studies and Research for Arabization, considered to be the backbone of the national commission, Douiri said that it has worked to set up the standard system for Arabic in publishing and data processing and toward the establishment of a lexical data bank based on Arabic and has purchased electronic equipment making it possible to store the bilingual Arabic lexicon. "These efforts must be stepped up through the work of the commission with respect to the coining of terms, their utilization and their dissemination throughout the kingdom by means of the unversalization of cultural activity."

The minister then praised the action of members of the planning and followup subcommittee, who have drawn up the national commission's program of action and developed a plan of work enabling other subcommittees to continue their activity under better conditions.

Honorable Results

After emphasizing the slowness in the evolution of the Arabic language, given the absence of any unified methodology of work and compared with the rapid development of technical and scientific discoveries and inventions, Douiri said that it was imperative to embark upon a new phase in the work of the commission, whose main characteristics will be strictness and rapidity in order to catch up in the field, keep pace with scientific progress and have higher quality in education. "Your commission has scientific competence enabling it to achieve these objectives.... Consequently, you should take practical measures in cooperation with the Office for the Coordination of Arabization and consolidate cooperation with other Arab countries so that our participation in the coordination and unification of terminology throughout the Arab nation may be effective."

Within this framework, the minister announced that he has recently worked toward the establishment of a joint Moroccan-Tunisian commission for the Arabization of planning and economic terms.

The minister also said that his department will work toward the promulgation of the law organizing the national commission in order to give it the human and material means opening up new prospects in the field of execution and practice. In addition to the Arabization of education, particularly professional and technical education, it will have to work in many other sectors.

First Graduating Class

Douiri then recalled that at this session, the commission will have to Arabize 25 words a day, or 750 a month, in order to assemble the lexicons which the commission has set as its goal, in keeping with the scientific methodology of the Institute of Studies and Research for Arabization.

"Knowing that the year 1990 will watch the first graduation of classes with the 'Arabized' baccalaureate, the commission has a duty to prepare the way for them, doubling its efforts to Arabize technical and scientific terms with maximum speed and accuracy."

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CSO: 4519/84

SUDANESE PEOPLE'S GROUPING ISSUES REPORT ON ECONOMIC SITUATION

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 260, 15 Nov 82 pp 23, 24

[Article: "Sudanese People's Grouping Asks What Are Conditions in Sudan Leading to? Where Does the Solution Lie?]

[Text] The Sudanese People's Grouping issued a political Statement early last month—this was the third statement issued by the Grouping since it was formed—in which it reviewed the high cost of living, the decline of the economic condition, the absence of democracy and the deliberate destruction that is being carried out by the government of vital organizations that have a close bearing on people's daily lives. The statement linked the conditions to which the country had come to to the regime that is in power, and it defined a way out of the crisis.

The statement said, "The dictatorial May regime has led the country into a bottom-less pit; there is no longer any reason for its survival. The survival of that regime has come to represent the continuous destruction of all the country's resources. With every day that goes by the situation gets worse. The May regime has failed to provide the necessities of life to citizens of Sudan. [The May regime] has depleted the country's hard currency resources. It has borrowed from foreign countries and banks without limits until [our] indebtedness exceeded 5 billion dollars. The country's returns cannot even pay the interest on these debts. The government has seized all the available funds of local organizations and banks and emptied their safes. The price of the Sudanese pound has declined and its purchasing power fell to 10 piasters."

The High Cost of Living

The statement included a table comparing the prices of basic goods in 1969 with the prices of those same goods in 1982. The table indicated in figures the astounding rise in prices as follows:

The Article	The 1969 Price	The 1982 Price	The Increase			
Bread (1 loaf 300 grams)	3 pounds	42 pounds	24 times			
	22 piasters	175 piasters	8 times			
	3 piasters	12 piasters	4 times			
	25 piasters	3 pounds	12 times			

Okra (1 roubouh)	80 piasters	14 pounds	17 times
Egyptian beans (1 roubou	h) 40 piasters	10 pounds	25 times
Calico (1 bolt)	2 pounds	20 pounds	10 times
Dabalan (1 bolt)	2.5 pounds	25 pounds	10 times
1 U.S. dollar	33 piasters	143 piasters	4 times
Beef (1 kilogram)	12 piasters	3 pounds	25 times
Sugar (1 pound)	6 piasters	26 piasters	4 times
Laundry soap	2 piasters	22 piasters	11 times
Coal (1 sack)	50 piasters	6 pounds	12 times
Cement (1 sack)	55 piasters	12 pounds	24 times

The statement mentioned that these were the prices in the capital. Outside the capital, however, prices were double that and more. The price of 1 pound of sugar in the city of al-Fashir, for example, in West Sudan, rose to 70 piasters. A gallon of gasoline sells there for over 10 pounds. The scarcity of gasoline has weakened the capacity for transportation and has reduced the productivity of agricultural projects that rely on pumps. It has also deprived citizens in west Sudan of drinking water.

Reasons for Inflation

The statement affirmed that Sudan's inflation has been unprecedented in the world. It is due not only to the world-wide inflation, but also to the following reasons:

- 1. There is no freedom and no democracy; repressive methods are being pursued; and people are being arbitrarily arrested, killed and driven out of their homes. This has led to the absence of all kinds of popular control; it has weakened people's feelings of citizenship; and it has driven away sincere workers from production sites.
- 2. Political and executive leaders have no feelings for the country.
- 3. Corruption has become rampant at the top of the political leadership, which is totally isolated from the people.
- 4. Production has declined in the absence of economic planning; the national economy has been subjugated to the interests of foreign powers and parasitic capitalists; and productive forces have been subdued and weakened.
- 5. The people's funds have been squandered in wasteful spending on rallies and on inconsequential organizations like the Socialist Union and other organizations that include only opportunists and hypocrites.
- 6. Repressive agencies that have unlimited budgets have been increased and expanded.
- 7. Indirect taxes have been increased, and the value of the Sudanese pound has continually been reduced. This has placed a burden on those Sudanese people who are not well-off. Sudan has resorted to begging from other countries: now the country which used to be called the [future] bread basket of the world has turned into the recipient of charity and alms.

Health and Treatment

The statement referred to the fact that all health and therapeutic services have become non-existent. Contagious diseases like malaria, dysentery and stomach disorders have become native to the capital which has become a fertile breeding ground for flies, mosquitoes and other harmful insects. In the face of the scarcity and high price of medicines—even to people of average means—people have resorted to "folk" medicines. Patients who go to state hospitals—and these are mostly people from the oppressed classes—have to bring with them their own medicines. Even anesthetics have become unavailable. Ether is now used in surgical procedures; it was the first substance to be used as an anesthetic a century ago. Its use was then abandoned by modern medicine.

Education

The lack of freedom and bread and the bitter hardships teachers go through daily have caused thousands of them to emigrate. Weak resources have produced [situations] where more than 100 pupils are crowded in 1 classroom. Laboratories and school supplies are scarce, and the educational curriculum is weak and unstable. There are also other factors which led to the decline of education.

The Armed Forces

The statement spoke about defense and security and stated, "The regular forces are in a pathetic condition. Members of these forces are suffering from the high cost of living and a decline in transportation, housing and educational services. The weak preparation and training of the armed forces and their primitive weaponry are undermining their role in protecting the independence of Sudan and the unity of its national soil. For security [each] citizen now depends on himself to defend himself, his family and his home. All the regime's efforts have been confined to reinforcing the agencies that protect it."

Sovereignty of the Law

Bribery and favoritism have become rampant in the judicial system as a result of the state's interference in its activities. The state appoints and fires people in the judicial system, and it carries out their functions. Thus the courts have now become a government agency that is not independent. Because oppressive regimes fear the law and its controls, the May regime has degraded the court system and humiliated judges by suspending their privileges and their high standing [in society]. It has taken away their immunity and has recently demolished the judicial system by putting into practice a system of regional government.

Foreign Policy

In the area of foreign policy the statement criticized the regime's subordination to U.S. imperialism and its participation in U.S. imperialist plans. It went on to say, "[The regime] demeaned others after demeaning itself. Thus, instead of bridging the gap that separates our country from advanced countries, our Sudan is falling into the bottomless pit of backwarness and moral decadence."

A Solution to the Crisis

The statement went on to say, "These are glimpses of what our country has come to. There are other illustrations of that situation which every citizen has experienced in pain and suffering. Correcting the situation will not be easy, but

that is no reason for us to feal frustrated. Our people who created the heroic actions of (Karari), the 1924 Revolution, the Graduates' Conference, the battle of independence, the glorious battle of October and all the daring uprisings against the dictatorial regime of May are capable of restoring freedom, democracy and progress. It is for this reason that the Sudanese People's Grouping has been created: it united the political opposition in the north and in the south for the purpose of overthrowing the dictatorial May regime and setting up a democratic regime that would make it possible for the Sudanese people to realize their aspirations and their hopes and keep their will free and independent.

"[This new regime] would grant the masses all the democratic liberties; it would set up constitutional institutions of government that would be independent of the head of state; it would abide by the sovereignty of the law; it would honor the independence of the courts, the universities and academic research; it would limit the expenditures of state agencies; it would stop wasteful spending; it would pursue a fiscal and an economic policy whose purpose is to build an independent national economy; it would set up a just tax system that would place the burden on those who have the means; it would reduce the cost of living so that workers can have a free and honorable life; it would carry out radical agricultural reform whose purpose would be to increase production and change agricultural relationships in favor of farmers and tenants; it would adopt the principle of what is in the national interest to free the country's foreign trade from subordination to foreigners; it would improve services to alleviate the suffering citizens have to go through to get therapy, education, housing, transportation, etc.; it would build a strong, modern army capable of protecting the independence and territorial unity of our country; it would abide by the Addis Ababa Agreement; it would take into account balance in economic and social development plans; it would take an interest in developing the more backward areas as a means for achieving the country's national unity; it would pursue an Arab policy that stays away from alliances; it would adhere to supporting the Palestinian Resistance; it would defend the right of Arab countries to exercise sovereignty over their land and their waters; it would reinforce and support African liberation movements that are struggling against colonialism and racial discrimination; it would abide by a policy of non-alignment and the right of nations and peoples to determine their own destiny; and it would condemn intervention, aggression and illegal seizures."

Finally, the statement called upon citizens in cities, deserts and various parts of Sudan and abroad to rally around the chapters of the Sudanese People's Grouping, to step up their struggle against the State Security Law and to call for the release of the fighter Samuel Aru and all those who are being interned.

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CSO: 4504/106

DIFFERENCES OF FORMER POLITICAL COLLEAGUES DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1358, 12 Nov 82 pp 44-46

[Interview with Mohamed Belhaj Amor: [Mohamed Belhaj Amor Tells AL-HAWADITH in Tunis, 'Let Ahmed Ben Salah Admit His Mistake before Returning to the Popular Unity Movement; He Did not Establish the Movement; He Does not Believe in Pluralism; He Rejects Freedom of Opinion and Dialogue; I Support Law and Order but not Amending the Constitution or Keeping It Unchanged"]

[Text] The multiplicity of political currents and the proliferation of political divisions in Tunisia are not new phenomena. With the exception of the communist party, the ultra-left, the religious ultra-right and a few nationalist sectors, most of the movements and tendencies that exist at the present time are products of the Destourian Socialist Party. [Naturally], each one of these has its own products. As usual, the hostility of yesterday's associates is stronger and subtler than that of one's associates in the distant past or one's original opponents. The struggle over a legal name and representation sometimes takes precedence over the struggle over ideas and programs. The second Popular Unity Movement (MUP II) was no exception [to that rule]. It split from the movement that has the same name, a movement that is led by former minister Ahmed Ben Salah from his exile in Europe.

According to Engineer Mohamed Belhaj Amor, secretary general of the second movement who used to be one of Ahmed Ben Salah's aides in the cooperatives experiment of the sixties, the second Popular Unity Movement is the movement that separated Ben Salah from his people. Mohamed Belhaj Amor had been the second man in the Popular Unity Movement ever since it was established in 1973 before leading the faction that opposed Ben Salah's practices in running the movement. Mohamed Belhaj Amor is a member of the Executive Office of the Association of Arab Engineers. In his interview with AL-HAWADITH he sheds considerable light on the climate of political activity in Tunisia through the experience of his movement, the second Popular Unity Movement (MUP II).

[Question] Let us begin with the conditions under which the second Popular Unity Movement was formed, particularly since it is being said that your separation [from the MUP] was merely an attempt to hurt Ahmed Ben Salah. It is also being said that some parties of the regime, particularly the Praiseworthy Wassila had something to do with the organization of this movement.

[Answer] Such statements merely cast doubts [about our credibility]. They are

basically the result of what Ahmed Ben Salah has been telling the press, or they are the result of his cassette communications, since he now uses cassettes to communicate. He also communicates through his friends whom we call "Ben Salahists." The truth is that if he did in fact want to criticize us, he should have dealt with our political positions and the positions assumed by the movement vis a vis the regime on domestic or foreign questions so that it would become evident whether or not his criticism is credible. But he has always resorted to inaccurate personal affairs. There has not been a single corrective action in the heart of the movement. We are among those who brought the movement to life, even though many of our colleagues and part of the public believe to a certain extent that the Popular Unity Movement, up to a certain date, was organically related to Ahmed Ben Salah. Those colleagues and the public believe this because they think that Ben Salah is the one who established the movement, but this is not true. The idea of establishing the movement was born before Ben Salah's escape from prison. The idea was born outside prison, and Ben Salah had rejected it when it was proposed to him when he was in prison. [At that time] Ben Salah was awaiting a pardon and did not want to muddy the waters for himself and force the regime to resent him even further.

[Question] What is curious is that the announcement about your movement was made immediately after your meeting with President Bourguiba. This was followed by granting you a permit to publish a weekly newspaper.

[Answer] I began talking about the movement ever since it began in 1970, but in 1981 we corrected the movement when we submitted a report asking that a party called the Popular Unity Party be established and granted a legal permit. All the fighters agreed with us about that, but Ben Salah was strongly opposed to it.

[Question] All the fighters? How many fighters?

[Answer] The fighters with whom we are in touch and who continually meet with us.

[Question] Approximately hom many are they?

There are about 100 [of them] who make up the [organizational] structure of the movement. Most of them agreed with us right after the memorandum that we had addressed [to the authorities] in which we criticized some nondemocratic practices that would disturb the climate within the movement. We recorded our observations in that regard to prevent the occurrence of any crack within the movement. We proposed a democratic posture that would require going back to the general membership and would not stem from the conduct of one individual. In the aftermath of this handwritten memorandum, of which there was only one copy, Ahmed Ben Salah ousted four leading fighters [in the movement]. At that time we said that was preposterous. We are people who cherish the movement, and we can never run the movement in this manner. At first there was a dispute between us and some of our colleagues about our view of the movement itself, of its birth and its future. That is, the movement was the subject of discussion. It became evident from their position that they were determined to keep the movement in the context of a pressure group and not to turn into a political movement seeking the creation of a new political party in the country. They wanted to apply pressure on the government by criticizing and defaming one of its positions so they can return to government. We, however, hoped to establish chapters [of our movement] everywhere, and we hoped to implant the movement and its positions quite firmly.

[Question] Originally, however, you were a group of people who assisted Ahmed Ben Salah, weren't you?

[Answer] Not at all. Not all of us. This is a mistake. We did not work directly with Ahmed Ben Salah. We did not work under his direct orders, nor did we work under his party and administrative organizations.

[Question] What was the nature of your personal relationship with Ahmed Ben Salah?

[Answer] Our relationship was that of a fighter and a leading party official. We never had a good personal relationship because of his practices.

[Question] How far back does your relationship as fighters and your party relationship with Ben Salah go?

[Answer] I've known him since he [joined] the party.

[Question] Were you dismissed from government when he was dismissed?

[Answer] Yes, I was excluded from party activity.

[Question] How did you resume the relationship with him?

[Answer] When he was suspended and imprisoned, a group was organized. Its purpose at the outset was to try to give assistance to the families of the men who were imprisoned. The family of Ahmed Ben Salah was among those families. We continued [to function] in this framework, and then we made contact with a group of young people who were students in Paris, like Mohamed Da'ud and Munir Kashrukh. They did not know Ben Salah personally.

[Question] But you did, didn't you?

[Answer] Yes, I did.

[Question] Were you later shocked by Ben Salah's attitude, or weren't you surprised by what happened?

[Answer] I was not surprised [by what happened]. I had always had problems with him in his capacity as a party official.

[Question] What kinds of problems?

[Answer] [I thought] what he did when he was minister was not satisfactory. I used to criticize him, and I never agreed with him at all.

[Question] From the working standpoint you were actually his right hand. Weren't you the director of cooperatives?

[Answer] No, I was not his right hand.

[Question] Exactly what position did you hold?

[Answer] I was a director in the Ministry of Agriculture in the Department of Experiments. After that I served as commissioner of agricultural development in the country's three most important agricultural provinces. After that I became director general of central mutual cooperation for major agricultural products when the cooperative firms were formed. I used to act in a knowledgeable fashion.

[Question] Were you satisfied with the idea of cooperatives?

[Answer] I was, but not in this manner. I did not agree with the practices. I used to make public remarks to that effect, directly or indirectly, and Ben Salah did not like that. Thus from an ideological standpoint I believed, and I still do, in the trend of the sixties.

[Question] What was it then that brought you and Ben Salah together?

[Answer] We share some common ideologies.

[Question] What? Do you share one, two or three ideologies?

[Answer] [We share] a socialist ideology that puts an emphasis on people. He sees that ideology in the context of one party, and we see it in the context of multiple parties. We think that placing the socialist ideology in place has to be done democratically.

[Question] Does this mean that you think Ben Salah does not believe in pluralism?

[Answer] No, he doesn't. He assured us of this several times. Nor does he believe in freedom of opinion, in dialogue or in discussion. Otherwise he would not have stood against those who fought with him and on whom the movement stands. He stood against them for no reason other than that they made some material observations that would benefit the life, continuity and future of the movement.

[Question] You did not answer my first question. Isn't there at least a temporal connection between your proclamation of the second movement and the fact that President Bourguiba received you?

[Answer] Not at all. We announced that we would submit an application for a permit, and when the French newspaper, LE MONDE printed that, the president requested a meeting with us. He asked to meet with us, but he never encouraged us to establish this movement.

[Question] What did the president tell you?

[Answer] He said that he agreed with our principles, and he asked us to go back to the party and work in the government and in state machinery so that we can apply these ideas and put them to work within the scope of the existing party.

[Question] Why didn't you accept [this advice]? Do you have something against being in government?

[Answer] The principle that we indicated to the president, and I believe that he was satisfied with our explanation, is one about which we do not agree. That is the principle of pluralism. We believe in something called pluralism.

[Question] Is this then the only difference between you and the government?

[Answer] No. Besides pluralism, of course, we disagree about the economic and social trend that existed in the seventies. Despite what has been said about changing that trend, no change has taken place.

[Question] If the principle of pluralism is fully approved, are you willing to join the government, give up the idea of an independent party and join the Destourian Party so you can achieve your objectives from within that party?

[Answer] No, never. Pluralism is a fundamental principle. When we say this, we mean the existence of our party. We will struggle in our party on the economic and social plane. [We will struggle for] the socialist liberties we have been calling for which the opposition does not believe in so far.

[Question] What do you mean by socialist liberties?

[Answer] That the popular classes, insofar as they constitute the vast majority in the country, impose their opinions and their trends in a democratic fashion to serve the popular class and the toiling class.

[Question] Do you believe that the toiling class makes up the majority in Tunisia?

[Answer] Certainly. This is obvious.

[Question] How will the popular classes impose their will?

[Answer] In a democratic manner, by means of free elections [and] free opinions.

[Question] Like Algeria or Libya, for example?

[Answer] No, not like Algeria and not like Libya. The pluralism [we are talking about] is the pluralism of parties and opinions, and it is the majority [of people] who would impose their opinions.

[Question] Is the ideology of so-called international socialist parties what you have in mind when you say socialist democracy?

[Answer] No, not at all. A people's democracy is based on the fact that it is the public at large that must be liberated so people can express their opinions as they ought to do. This is done by making the popular classes participate in determining political directions in the country.

[Question] How is that to be done? By freedom and elections?

[Answer] By freedom and elections. Workers are to have their place on the boards of directors of organizations.

[Question] Do you mean they are to be self-operated?

[Answer] Not literally. Participation [means that] they are to participate in making decisions and carrying them out. They are to know everything about an

organization, whether it is private or public. In addition, they are to benefit from production returns.

[Question] But the movement of Socialist Democrats is saying the same thing!

[Answer] I don't think they are saying the same thing with regard to all the organizations, and....

[Question] This means that you believe that you did not contribute to the undermining of Ahmed Ben Salah vis a vis the regime by forming an independent movement. On the other hand, you are affirming that your organization was spontaneous and independent although it is being said that the Praiseworthy Wassila played a role in forming your organization. For example, [it is said that] she arranged the meeting with the president.

[Answer] Not at all. You can talk to her. She had nothing to do with it.

[Question] What then is your relationship with the "Boss Lady?"

[Answer] We have nothing to do with her, directly or indirectly. To this day none of us and none of those who run the business of the movement knows her personally or officially. But if the regime takes advantage of an opportunity, that is something to which it is entitled. We, however, do not try to give it the opportunity.

[Question] Don't you have some friends in the government, people who are considered to be in your movement?

[Answer] They were with us when they were in the opposition, in an opposition [party] other than ours. Their opposition was based on the fact that the Destourian Party lacks the democratic conditions that would enable them to work in the party. When it appeared to them that these conditions were available, they returned to government. Our contacts with them are personal in nature and occasional. This is a personal friendship. They know that we do not agree [with them] politically.

[Question] Am I to understand that you are against taking the reins of power?

[Answer] No. We are not against that. We would take the reins of power on the basis of a program that we accept. What exists is something we do not accept.

[Question] If Ahmed Ben Salah were to return now to Tunisia and if he were given freedom of action and asked you to hold a joint conference to restore the party to unity, would you be prepared to do that?

[Answer] It would not be enough for him to return. He has to admit to his mistake first. As far as we are concerned, we have corrected the movement, and we have dismissed everyone who would hurt it. Accordingly, Ben Salah is like others. He and his group have been dismissed. Even if they wanted to return, they will not be able to do so.

[Question] But don't you agree with me that you have fallen in a so-called trap

of "reverse imprisonment?" In other words, you are still in one way or another the prisoners of Ahmed Ben Salah. Even the press refers to you as the Popular Unity Movement that split from Ahmed Ben Salah.

[Answer] The press is trying to diagnose matters. We, [however], are trying as much as possible to stay away from diagnosing [this situation].

[Question] Why then don't you change the name of your movement so you can rest?

[Answer] I have already said that we have carried out a corrective process. If one day and for some reason our fighters wish to bring about a progressive grouping, that would be up to them.

[Question] How would you summarize the movement's program now?

[Answer] [I would say it has] an economic and a social direction: socialism with an emphasis on people and democracy.

[Question] This is an obscure statement. Isn't this demagoguery?

[Answer] No. Why would it be? In a weak economy like ours all citizens must take part in determining directions and running matters.

[Question] This would be called democracy, not socialism with an emphasis on people.

[Answer] A principal matter must be recognized: the people must participate on the three levels.

[Question] What then are you asking from the government?

[Answer] We want the government to recognize political trends, to make pluralism legal and to allow the existence of parties other than the Destourian Party and the communist party.

[Question] But the government is saying that there are no ideological differences with the other parties, with the exception of the communist party, and that everything you are saying can be found in the programs or literature of one of the stages of the Destourian Party of which you are a member. By the way, how many years have you been a member of the Destourian Party?

[Answer] From 1947 till 1969.

[Question] Now after 22 years in the party, don't you feel you are a member of the Destourian Party?

[Answer] Not at all. I am not a member of the Destourian Party. I do not agree with the party's policy.

[Question] You do not agree with the policy, but what about the party's ideology? Do you agree with it or not?

[Answer] No, I do not agree with it because it calls for a liberal economy.

[Question] Who was it that changed: you or the party?

[Answer] It was the party that changed.

[Question] How?

[Answer] The party changed because there was a radical change in the economic policy.

[Question] And you: didn't you change?

[Answer] No, not from an ideological standpoint. I am committed to socialism.

[Question] How? When you were in the Destourian Party, the question of Arabism was not being raised in your midst, for example. Now your newspaper is presenting it as a basic question.

[Answer] The subject of Arabism [is something else]. I am telling you that from an ideological standpoint I have not abandoned socialism.

[Question] This is part of the ideology, [isn't it]?

[Answer] There were actually changes and developments on the Arab and African scenes.

[Question] Do you believe in Bourguiba's laws?

[Answer] Of course I believe in the regime's laws. I believe in the republican system and in the constitution. We are, however, asking for something: we are asking that democracy become available in the country so that each change [that takes place] would be legal and democratic and so that we would not have chaos in the country.

[Question] There is a trend in government calling for pluralism and democracy. Is it possible that an alliance between you and that trend may be formed?

[Answer] [Proponents of this trend] only pretend to call for pluralism and democracy. People have to look at things as they are. [Proponents of this trend] are calling for pluralism, but pluralism is not being applied.

[Question] But this trend is not the only one in government, [is it]?

[Answer] It is not the only one. Then what does its survival mean?

[Question] [Proponents of this trend] are saying that their survival is what is preserving your newspaper.

[Answer] No. This is not true.

[Question] All right. You are in the opposition. Aren't you embarrassed when you insist that the constitution remain unchanged while the president's wife calls for substantive reforms to make the constitution more democratic? Don't you feel [embarrassed by the fact] that she has outdone you even though she is in the palace and you are in the opposition?

[Answer] Amending the constitution requires the establishment of democratic rules. It cannot be done by the stroke of a pen or by a parliamentary body about whose legitimacy we have misgivings.

[Question] Are you opposed then to amending the constitution?

[Answer] No, I am not opposed to amending the constitution, but I do not support amending the constitution as that amendment is currently being proposed because the constitutional structures that exist at the present time are not trustworthy.

[Question] The amendments that are being proposed are evident. They concern the succession. Where specifically do you stand on this point?

[Answer] We have to find a way that would give the people the possibility of making the choice in a better manner.

[Question] [Please] answer the question unequivocally. Do you or don't you support the request that the Praiseworthy Wassila is making for amending the article in the constitution that pertains to the succession?

[Answer] I do not support this or that. I support the method that would give the people....

[Question] What is this method?

[Answer] That the constitution conform to the choices of the people.

[Question] The choices of the people are as numerous as the number of individuals in the nation. Each person makes his choices, but there is a democratic way and there are other ways. There is an existing constitution, and there is a proposal for a constitutional amendment. You do not support the constitution, and you do not support a constitutional amendment. Then you do not have a position. Why are you making matters difficult, and why are you being evasive?

[Answer] We are saying that the people must express their opinion about every change that takes place.

[Question] This statement is obscure and imprecise. Does it mean that you do not believe in anything?

[Answer] I believe that he who takes over power must do so with the will of the people.

[Question] How? By a referendum?

[Answer] [There should be] a referendum when changes are being made, and elections [should be held] when appointments are being made.

[Question] If the constitution is amended and presidential elections are held, will you declare yourself a candidate?

[Answer] This will be up to the movement.

[Question] What is your own personal evaluation [of the prospects for that]?

[Answer] I believe that as far as we are concerned, our movement is still young and is still [in the process of] establishing itself. We are now trying to implant and consolidate the movement.

[Question] All right, if there are several candidates and Ahmed Ben Salah is one of them, where then would you stand?

[Answer] I told you that when we go along with one person, we do not do so for personal reasons, but because of that person's program and what he can offer to the people. Of course there are people whose past would give us an idea as to what their inclinations will be.

[Question] Where do you stand on Mzali's government?

[Answer] At the outset we expected many good things from Mzali, and we worked on the basis of attempting to push "the democratic course" [forward]. However, we were taken by surprise and we regretted several practices that fell short of [justifying] our optimism. These practices had to do with freedom of the press and the problem of pluralism which we thought had been resolved as far as the principle was concerned. We thought pluralism would be legalized and practiced. What is more important than all this is the economic and social direction [of Mzali's government]. All officials found the trend of the seventies responsible for the present crisis, but those practices that were prevalent at that stage have not been renounced.

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CSO: 4504/98

REPORT ON OLIVE INDUSTRY

Planned Production Increase

Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 430, 29 Nov 82 p 21

[Article by Othman Gharbi: "The Sixth Plan and the Olive Industry"]

[Text] The Sixth Plan provides for the replacement of some 24,000 hectares of aging oil-olive trees and the replanting of 3,000 hectares of table-olive trees. It also provides for protective and prophylactic measures (destruction of couch grass on 60,000 hectares and intensified disease control).

The replanting, reconversion, protection and maintenance measures contained in the Sixth Plan are intended to increase the average olive production during the plan period from 520,000 tons to 650,000 tons, i.e. an increase of close to 25 percent.

As is known, these amounts will yield no more than about 20 percent oil. The oil production objective, which was to average 118,000 tons per year, was not achieved since the average annual production was only 107,000 tons of oil.

Under the Sixth Plan, the average production is expected to be 130,000 tons of oil per year, including an excess production of 70,000 tons of olive oil to be exported. This figure is that for the two campaigns 1980-1981 and 1981-1982.

The Sixth Plan also provides for:

- an effort to organize growers (service cooperatives);
- improved grinding conditions through the modernization and expansion of oil mills. The grinding capacity will be increased to 1,150,000 tons of olives per year.

Scheduled Investments in the Olive Industry

- At plantation level: 16.6 billion [dinars].
- At oil-mill level: 20.0 billion [dinars].

An Olive Institute was created by the 1982 Finance Law; it will be in charge of the technical promotion of the olive industry and will supervise the reconversion, replanting and maintenance programs in the plantations.

National Olive Oil Office

Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 430, 29 Nov 82 pp 22-23

[Interview with Abderrahman Tlili, Chairman and Managing Director of the National Olive Oil Office, by Othman Gharbi: "The Common Market Should Guarantee Us a Sales Minimum During the Sixth Plan Period"; date and place not specified]

[Text] According to Mr Abderrahman Tlili, Chairman and Managing Director of the National Olive Oil Office [OHN], the olive industry—from the olive tree to the bottling of oil—must receive special attention during the Sixth Plan period.

This is because the olive industry did not fully realize the objectives assigned to it under the previous plan, especially with respect to production. That was due to several reasons of a technical, climatic, financial and human nature.

Mr Tlili feels that measures like those taken by the government on 14 October could give the industry a good start. But certain problems remain...

[Question] How does ONH play its part in the olive industry?

[Answer] We carry out our program without any state subsidy. Actually, ONH acts as a central cooperative and its board of directors consists only of professionals of the sector, olive-tree growers, olive processors and soap makers, etc. The Office is in charge of the whole olive industry. From the processing to the guaranteeing of a minimum income covering production costs to the largest possible extent.

[Question] This is precisely what olive-tree growers keep asking for.

[Answer] Producers would like the minimum price (down payment) to be as high as possible so the additional payment would be as small as possible. The Office has complied with this request. Indeed, the amount of the down payment is determined before the campaign begins and, in the past two years, even before 25 October.

Editor's note: Actually, this year, the Council of Ministers took measures on 14 October 1982 to make sure that olive-tree growers will have a decent income in addition to having their operating costs covered. As a result, the down payment was increased from 500-580 millimes per kilo during the previous campaign to 600-700 millimes, depending on the quality of the oil, i.e. an increase of 100-120 millimes per kilo.

[Question] Since prices are determined early enough, no fraud is possible...

[Answer] By setting prices, we prevent any form of speculation on the olive market. This would not be the case if producers did not know what the prices were and found themselves at the mercy of speculators.

Note that it is only with the 1980-1981 campaign that the maximum down payment for super-premium oil exceeded the 500-millime level. From 530 (in 1981) it increased to 580 (in 1982) and recently to 700. That is a 120-millime increase at once instead of 50. Is not that an incentive to producers?

[Question] It is. But we know that at the end of each campaign, olive growers may also receive an additional payment (or commission) if ONH sales justify it. Some may wonder: if the producers get as much as possible "before," it gives the impression that they will load all the burden of selling on ONH...

[Answer] A decision has to be made. We give all the incentives we can to the producers. The commission is our problem. We do all we can to make it big. Besides, it is related to production since it amounts to distributing among producers additional payments proportional to the quantities delivered to ONH. If they deliver a lot, both the down payment and the additional payment are large. In the last two campaigns, the additional payment amounted to 95 millimes per kilo.

[Question] Some say there is a glut in oil mills...

[Answer] I deny it. All oil is removed 24 hours after it has been ground, precisely to prevent a glut at the oil mills. We now have very rapid means of transportation (21 trucks).

[Question] What about the ONH storage capacity...

[Answer] There is no problem. ONH can store the production of two full campaigns.

[Question] If you please, let us talk about sales. First, on the domestic market.

[Answer] Domestic sales are unregulated. The only intervention of public authorities is to set the prices for sales to canners and to the public.

[Question] It should be noted that 30, or even 40 percent of the olive oil production is consumed by the growers. This is not a small amount.

Contrary to what one might think, we do encourage domestic olive oil consumption and we even provide for its [word illegible], either as pure olive oil or as oil blends with up to 50 percent olive oil. This is intended as an incentive to producers.

Soon, an oil blend will be sold in one-liter plastic or glass bottles. Along with bottled oil sales, bulk sales will continue for those who buy less than one liter at a time, i.e. the working classes. The bottling of the "Zouita" blend was developed by the General Food Industries Company of Sousse which received the approval of the Investments Promotion Agency.

[Question] What about sales on foreign markets?

[Answer] Under the Sixth Plan, our objective is to continue exporting 70,000 tons per year. Of course, the plan also provides for measures to be taken upstream to ensure sufficient production.

In my opinion, there are three types of markets for olive oil:

- The Common Market (over 70 percent) is a traditional market that pays well; however, since the expansion of the European Economic Community, that market has become self-sufficient and may even produce more than it consumes.

At least, this is the reasoning of the Common Market. So, we must negotiate an agreement to obtain the minimum sales required by our plan.

- The market outside the Common Market, where decisions are made by importing countries.
- The Arab market. For instance, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Syria...

[Question] What about the Gulf countries and the United States... Are they not future potential markets?

[Answer] They are difficult markets with well-established distribution networks dominated by large agro-food companies. To penetrate these markets, you must own an interest in these store chains, and consumers' tastes are often a problem (pork fat may be used instead of olive oil and, in the United States, immigrants from Mediterranean countries have a marked preference for oil from their native countries...).

[Question] Then, we are back to the Common Market...

[Answer] In my opinion, this is the only solution. We must deal with the European Economic Community which should guarantee us a sales minimum during the Sixth Plan period.

[Question] Are you optimistic as to the future of the Tunisian olive oil industry?

[Answer] Yes, I am. If I were not, I would not be in charge as I am.

Table Olive Production Development

Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 430, 29 Nov 82 p 23

[Article by R.K.: "Table Olive Production Development Project"]

[Text] Present Situation

The present situation of table olive production is characterized by:

- a small production;
- small yields per hectare;
- the heterogeneity of plantations.

The objectives of the project are as follows:

- conversion of 1,000 hectares of young oil-olive trees to produce table olives;
- 2,730 hectares of new plantations: 2,200 hectares on irrigated land and 530 hectares without irrigation.

New Plantations

To be realized over five years in seven governorates: Beja, Zaghouan, Jendouba, Siliana, Bizerte, Nabeul, Tunis.

Investment cost: 1,459,693 dinars.

Credits will be provided as scheduled by the Special Agricultural Development Fund.

Improvement of Existing Plantations

To be realized over three years in seven governorates; 905 hectares are involved.

- Fertilizers and Pesticides

A subsidy in kind will be granted: 36.650 dinars per hectare for irrigated plantations, and 27.700 dinars per hectare for non-irrigated plantations.

- Tilling of the Land

This will be the growers' responsibility.

Conversions

One thousand hectares distributed in five governorates: Beja, Zaghouan, Siliana, Nabeul, Tunis.

Conversions will be achieved over a five years' period, by grafting.

Subsidy of 75 dinars per hectare.

A research program is contemplated to gain a better knowledge of table varieties, their yields and adaptability.

Intervention of the territorial popularization cells.

Cost of the project: 2,810,000 dinars.

Increased Olive Production Planned

Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 430, 29 Nov 82 p 24

[Article by Othman Gharbi: "Oil-Olive Tree Yields. What Is PRAPO?"]

[Text] These initials stand for: Project for the Reconversion and the Improvement of the Yields of Oil-Olive Trees; this project, to be realized under the Sixth Plan in the Sousse, Mahdia and Sfax governorates is part of the large olive-grove modernization program. In these governorates, the project involves 298,413 hectares. This acreage breaks down as follows, per type of operation:

- Preservation and maintenance			 230,850	hectares
- Tree removal and miscellaneous improvements		• •	26,013	hectares
- Couch-grass control (especially in Mahdia and Sfax).			13,532	hectares
- Tree removal and replanting with young olive trees			12,033	hectares
- Conversion into mixed orchards			7,829	hectares
- Regeneration through pruning			6,752	hectares
			+ 1,404	hectares

Total . . 298,413 hectares [as published]

1. Preservation and Maintenance

As can be seen, these operations involve over 77 percent of the acreage covered by the project. These are good plantations which simply need maintenance. This problem—poor maintenance—is unfortunately quite common in the Center and is a major factor in the decline of plantations. What must be done, therefore, is to improve yields in existing plantations through the introduction of a large-scale maintenance factor.

2. Tree Removal and Miscellaneous Improvements

This operation involves only old olive trees with very low yields; they will be replaced by other, more profitable fruit trees. A removal subsidy will be provided, as well as a conversion subsidy. This should be an incentive to both removal and conversion. Only some 26,000 hectares are involved.

3. Couch-grass Control

Couch-grass--"najir" in Arabic--is the number-one obstacle to the rehabilitation of existing olive-tree plantations. Its destruction must be organized on a large scale, especially in the Mahdia and Sfax olive groves. A total of 13,532 hectares will be treated.

4. Removal and replanting with young olive trees

This operation is intended to rejuvenate aging olive groves where aging trees will be replaced by young olive trees. Over 12,000 hectares will thus be rejuvenated.

5. Conversion Into Mixed Orchards

Growing olive trees as a single crop is profitable only when the acreage is large enough and with fully healthy trees. In many cases, the conversion into mixed orchards with increased yields is recommended. This would lead to olive trees being included in the general orchard maintenance. These orchards will cover 7,829 hectares.

6. Regeneration Through Pruning

This is a method to regenerate olive groves either by pruning or by cepage [variety selection], or by a "stump isolation" method which has yielded good results.

This vast project will require an investment of some 7 million dinars, not including the direct or indirect intervention of administrative or technical departments.

From a central project cell managed by young enthusiastic agronomists specialized in olive-tree growing, the Directorate of Vegetable Production (Sub-Directorate of Tree Growing) at the Ministry of Agriculture will supervise the project through the creation of 46 territorial popularization cells and with the invaluable assistance of the Sousse, Monastir, Mahdia and Sfax CRDA [expansion unknown].

In this case, the technicians are fully aware of the fact that the major factor in the success of the project will be direct or indirect popularization and sensitization.

Considering the common problem resulting from the age difference between the young technician in charge of popularization and the olive-tree grower, who is often older but has experience, the best approach in our opinion it to win

mature (but not old) olive-tree growers to the cause of modernization—which constitutes direct popularization—so they will act as interpreters for the contemplated renewal among their older colleagues—which represents indirect popularization. If the first step is carefully thought out, it will have a snowball effect. For agriculture is supported by its own successes. And, in this case, emulation together with the improved receptivity of the Tunisian farmers, as a result of the work undertaken by his organization, are guarantees of a successful outcome.

9294

CSO: 4519/92

POLICY OF ALLIANCE WITH PHALANGISTS ATTACKED

'Ofra NEQUDA in Hebrew 22 Oct 82 pp 8-9

[Article by Yoel Ben-Nun: "The Unholy Alliance With the New Testament"]

[Text] On the night of Rosh Hashana the skies of the Middle East were lit with a blinding, cruel light. In the morning the sun shone down on the murderous Arab pogrom. It was a direct continuation of the pogroms by the bands on the Jewish settlement in Eretz Israel in 5681 [1921], 5689-5699 [1929-1939], and so on, the slaughter of the Palestinians by the Hashemite Legion, the atrocities in Damur and Tall Za'tar, and the Syrian oppression in Hamah. It was the continuation of the work of Khomeyni in Iran and of Saddam Husayn in Iraq and of the "polite contact" between them. It was, of course, the continuation of all the actions of the PLO.

Like the Damascus organs which hastened (like the guilty who are haunted by their sense of guilt) to blame us (!) for the murder of Bashir al-Jumayyil and like his brother Amin who had already called for revenge and then also blamed us for it, so did all the Israeli leftist groups rush madly to fish in muddy waters—to demand an inquiry and to predetermine its results, and even to demand immediately the implementation of its conclusions. All of this in order not to view the Middle East in its true light—the Ishmaelite: "And he shall be a wild ass of a man, his hand shall be against every man, and every man's hand against him; and he shall dwell in the face of all his brethren" (Genesis 16, 12).

What finally exploded irreparably on the eve of Rosh Hashana was the strange collaboration between the State of Israel and the Phalangist forces. Whoever was unaware of the combatants' ethic and the military caliber of these forces which were equipped and trained by us is now very knowledgeable of the subject. Whoever deceived himself that it was worthwhile and feasible to foster pro-Israeli Arab forces and to depend on them has received a Middle Eastern slap in the face. Our area is an arena of Arab tribes who live by the sword and the blood vendetta. Whoever wants to integrate himself in this area by the peaceful method of the noble compromise is only a deceiver.

He is not essentially different from that percentage of deluded who hope to become integrated in the area by an "Israeli order" in several Arab capitals

and the fostering of various pro-Israeli forces, both of which will result in our becoming like one of these tribes.

The chief of the deceivers is Shimon Peres! How is it possible that he did not ask himself and the public why the IDF did not also enter the refugee camps? Why was a vacuum left there, without an army? How did it happen that Israel declared to the world that it was responsible for the security of Beirut and nonetheless left such a vital corner exposed?

Had he posed these questions, he would have discovered at once that he was a loyal partner in the responsible policy: Because of his constant pressure, the TDF avoided entering West Beirut. When all the achievements of the operation were on the verge of collapse after the murder of Al-Jumayyil and the TDF acted, it also refrained then from entering the refugee camps out of consideration for the United States and our own opposition, and specifically out of concern over many casualties.

Had the IDF entered Sabra and Shatila, Shimon Peres would have led the attacks and rebukes for this action! And the unholy alliance between the Phalangists and us also did not begin with Mr Begin. In the idea of the partnership with them and in their mopping up of West Beirut, Mr Peres was a partner of Mr Begin.

The root of this trouble is the thinking that advocates the fostering of Middle Eastern tribal allies in the additional empty areas and demilitarized zones which permit them to operate.

The curse of the alliance with the Lebanese cross has haunted us since the beginning of the war in Lebanon, since the agreement or the understanding that the IDF would not enter West Beirut because that job would be done by the Phalangists.

The real subject for an inquiry is: Did this coordination antedate the campaign? Was it that that was the basis for the assurances that the IDF would not enter Beirut? It is even more important to know if such coordination preceded American pressure on us not to enter. When they applied their pressure, did the Americans already know that the IDF had no intentions at all of entering—and yet gave themselves the credit for the IDF's non-entry?

It is now absolutely clear that the IDF cannot leave any part of any job in the hands of any other force. The responsibility is naturally ours. Therefore, the implementation also must be ours alone. Only one other thing is correct in the arguments of the opposition. That is that in every place that the IDF is not operating and does not intend to do so, there must be a strong and sovereign Arab army that can be responsible to us for everything that happens. Half a job is worse than nothing! Therefore, if there is no Lebanese Army worthy of its name—and as of now, its prospects for full functioning are slim—then it is better that in any place where the IDF is not present, the Syrian Army should operate.

The ones who introduced the Syrian Army into Lebanon were the Americans. The one who agreed to this was the Alignment. The most serious mistake,

however, was the policy of the red lines and the buffer zones. Had the IDF and the Syrian Army at that time stood on both sides of the Litani or the Zahrani and had we then imposed on the Syrians the responsibility for restraining the PLO in Beirut, the entire country would have had a different look today. Syrian occupation is a poor solution for Lebanon in every respect, but it is still much better than the anarchy of the militias or the sad joke called the "Lebanese Army."

In a vacuum where there is no strong and sovereign army, the militias flourish, and a jungle of anarchy develops.

A military vacuum is the legal father of Sodom and Gomorrah. The empty spaces, in the form of buffer zones with the red, green, violent and blue lines, the UN forces, and the international forces, are all illegal offspring of American political wisdom. The Americans, who stopped us the entire time from entering and establishing order in West Beirut, who persuaded Bashir al-Jumayyil not to sign a peace treaty with Israel "in the meantime", and whose entire aspiration is only to gain Arab support at Israeli expense, are now screaming at Israel for not entering the camps. At the same time, they are seeking to replace the IDF with UN observers (!) as if they could have stopped the Phalangists or even reported the matter in time.

This has also finally become evident: The American mediation is fouling us up everywhere. It is preventing direct contact between the Arabs and us. And all of this is motivated by the clear intention to reap profits for the United States: once with Egypt, today with Lebanon, and in the near future with Syria. Instead of our being able to maintain direct, effective, and clear contact and even to reach respectable agreements—at least de facto—the Americans are spoiling matters so that they can be sponsors.

When the Israeli "left" competes with the "right" over the question as to who can guarantee better mistress-relations with the United States of America and who is capable of giving Israel a higher harlot's pay for the concessions to the United States, we must place them both in the same compartment. Both favor the American concept of empty areas in the Middle East, as it were for the sake of mutual security and in actuality, for American interests.

This kind of settlement can exist for a time in desert regions such as Sinai, and even there it has already exploded once with a great thunderous noise and led to the Six Day War. Also in Sinai we have a serious problem with the Bedouins. In their world view, no border exists for them. In Lebanon, in densely populated locations, demilitarized zones are really fraught with disaster.

Now for the direct implication for Judaea and Samaria. It is clear to all that the return of the Egyptian Army to Gaza and the Jordanian or the PLO Army to Judaea and Samaria is a prescription for suicide for the State of Israel the moment that the Arabs decide that the conditions are favorable. Therefore, everyone is working—in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza—for the creation of buffer zones or demilitarized zones or the fostering of local allies. The Alignment is proposing the demilitarization of the populated regions and

giving Israel a triple eastern border: the Tulkarm-Qalqilyah line, the Allon Route line, and the current Jordan line. The Likud is proposing a "redeployment" of IDF forces and the establishment of a "strong autonomy police."

Now look at the Lebanese patient who received these two remedies. From the Alignment he received the zones of non-intervention by Syria and Israel until the PLO-Phalangist jungle grew there and covered everything with tens of thousands of victims of the militias' war. From the Likud he received the armed fostering of "our allies" who are so reliable for everything agreed upon with them and who tried with all their might to drag us into the Lebanese turmoil so that they would be able to develop negotiations with the Syrians from a position of Israeli strength.

The minister of defense—it was he who based the security of Israel on a symbiotic partnership with the Phalangists, and it is he who is now fostering the village leagues in Judaea and Samaria as a basis for the autonomy forces. To begin with, of course, they have been supplied weapons for self-defense, and since "the offense is the best defense," several murders on both sides have already occurred! There are cynics among us, also in our settlements, who believe that it is better for us if our enemies kill each other. They do not understand that sooner or later, we will find ourselves in the pot.

The village leagues project is the story of the Phalangists for a number of years: wild, murderous, and vengeful Arabs terrorizing their adversaries with the help of Jewish weapons. Next will come the training and the medium and heavy weapons in the name of balance. They will convert the area defense structures into a counterpart Jewish militia, and in the middle the Shekhem and Ramallah police will function as proper arbitrators. In a short time the population in Israel will be able to breathe freely upon hearing the news and think that although it is painful, "it did not happen on our street." And then—the Katyushas and the shelters will begin in Tel Aviv and Petah Tiqwa. Together with the American mediation, if a demilitarized Jordanian—Palestinian district is established through border adjustments, as in the Peres—Reagan proposal, the same process itself will occur—without the slightest disburbance by the Jewish and village militia. Maybe then it will become evident that Israel uprooted the PLO jungle from Lebanon in order to replant it in Judaea and Samaria.

The light, glaring in its barbarity, of the Beirut massacre clearly shows us that we dare not depend on any local "ally" and we dare not take into consideration the slippery friendship of the Americans. Any autonomy that is not an inseparable part of unequivocal Israeli sovereignty means Lebanon: a void which is the supreme source of the pollution of bloodshed and murder. Everywhere Israel must be—albeit only for security reasons—it must be there directly and not via an emissary. The head of the village leagues in the Hebron Hills, Mustafa Dudin, has already welcomed the Reagan plan and declared that the fate of Qiryat Arba will be the same as that of Yamit.

The legitimate critics of the government must attack it on the unholy alliance with the Lebanese Christians who are the dregs of the Arab world. Those versed in Jewish law should study the subject of an alliance with idolators who are stepped in incest and bloodshed. Our people should adopt an independent policy and not identify with the government concepts because whoever identified today with the minister of defense is actually supporting autonomy, and it will not be long before he regrets it.

5830

USE OF ARTILLERY FORCES IN LEBANON DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew 20 Oct 82 pp 24-25

[Article by Yanun Shenker: "A Thousand Shells With Direct Aiming"]

[Text] A few days before the arrival of the multinational force at the port of Beirut, we first met Ayal's men in the battalion. Beyond the depots which concealed the self-propelled guns the tall buildings of West Beirut were visible. Yesterday several of them in which the terrorists took cover received direct hits from the artillerymen.

Ayal's gunners were with the infantry and armored forces which seized control of the junctions and key points in West Beirut by subduing the terrorist forces can leftist organizations. In this action they again proved the effectiveness of "the discovery of the war for the gunners"—firing by direct aiming.

We met them again a short time after they left Beirut with the evacuation of IDF forces from there. We sat during a rest period and together with Nir, 'Idan, Amir, Tzvika, and others, we reconstructed their war in Tyre and on the coastal road, in Damur and the outskirts of Beirut.

"At the beginning of the war I chased after the unit," 'Idan from Be'er Sheva told us. "A short time after my arrival the salvos began."

During the first weeks of the war Maj A's unit advanced, mainly along the coastal road. His men first worked with their self-propelled guns in Rashidiyah, Tyre and Sidon.

"My battery assisted in the capture of the Rashidiyah refugee camp while the rest of the force moved northward," relates Tzvika from the Bet Hanan co-operative settlement. "They began to fire on us, and we quickly located the sources of the firing. Bullets whistled all around us, and we fired by direct aiming. Afterward we jumped eastward to fire by indirect aiming in areas which had not been mopped up. In this jump we located the famous 130 mm gun which shelled Nahariyyah. It was standing next to an apartment house and whenever the family left, it would fire a round and go back inside. Subsequently, we spread the battery out in the hill region. It was a scene out of the movies: We deployed the self-propelled guns on the terraces, a gun on each terrace, and this is how we fired. I think that this

was the only time when the self-propelled guns worked in this manner, on the terraces. We did a good job there until nightfall, and then we continued on toward the Zahrani."

"Bivouacking at the Zahrani was a real pleasure. At that time we made our first shower with a rubber hose used for wattering a nearby golf course..." says 'Idan.

From the Zahrani the gunners, along with the other forces, moved northward to the Damur sector. The giant oil tanks in the Zahrani area were left burning. The area where IDF forces landed from the sea was also behind them as they advanced toward the next objective.

No Advance Without Gunners

Amir Sharon from the kibbutz of 'En Dor relates: "We were the lead battery. It was clear that the area was not mopped up. We moved with tension, the barrels pointed outward, and we all had belts and jackets. We reached the position, and I tried to find a place for the command APC. I noticed a classic location on one of the hills. I went there, and I suddenly observed among the shrubs a kind of green metal sheet. I took a closer look and I saw that it was a jeep with a strange tube. It seemed to me that the jeep was abandoned, but in any case I requested permission to fire. Permissions was granted, and we blew the jeep into the air. This was our first encounter with an enemy force while after the fact it appeared that it was a recoilless gun and three of its operators were found lying burnt to death alongside it after we fire."

"The advance in Damur was very frightening; there was firing and smoke all around all the time. You feel the shells landing while you are sitting in the self-propelled gun without knowing exactly what is happening outside. Suddenly, rounds from 81 mm mortars began to fall in front and back of us. It was extremely frightening," relates Nissim.

After Damur there was Beirut. Ayal's gunner force moved with the paratroopers who were the first to reach Beirut. In the Lebanese capital they registered the opening signal for what later became a much-applied technique-firing by direct aiming.

"I was in a position in Blabda, and we were working on several targets," relates Amos. "It was the afternoon. We were aiming at the terrorists' head-quarters. The shell went out and the headquarters was destroyed. You cannot imagine what kind of feeling it was. Afterward, an anti-aircraft position was also destroyed this way."

"A terrorist headquarters was located in a house, and they were firing at our forces from there. We fired a bullseye, and the survivors fled like mice. The shell of a self-propelled gun has a significant effect," says Maj Ayal, the commander.

'Idan relates: "We fired at a 41-story building, one of the tallest in West Beirut, which was a kind of terrorist stronghold. Each gun took a floor and began to rake the windows while moving from top to bottom, floor after floor. They would tell us: 'Terrorists in window X, fifth floor, from the left'--and within 2 minutes there was a bullseye there!"

"Even tanks don't work that way," says Tzvika in praise of his men. "We stood with the self-propelled guns exposed on the pavement and knocked down target after target. The guns destroyed headquarters, terrorist positions, and Katyusha launchers. We wiped out every target given to us."

"Our self-propelled gun," says 'Idan in seeking to praise his gun also, "is the best gun in the world but the worst tank. Once we had a competition with the commander of a Merkava tank force. We said to him: 'There is a target up ahead of us. Each of us will put in a first shell and try to knock it donw.' We faced the target. He fired the first shell and tickled the target. We fired—the target fell. But try and compete with his speed of movement and rate of fire...."

"As a result of Operation Peace for Galilee, we have experience in firing by direct aiming. This is cumulative experience, and it is logical that we know how to function well also with this technique," says Maj Ayal, the commander.

During the first weeks of the war Ayal was forced to command fragmented forces. His crews fought alongside infantry forces which were advancing to take objectives on the way to Beirut and on the outskirts of the Lebanese capital until the encirclement of the city. Even when the encirclement of Beirut was completed, his forces were not regrouped. For many days Ayal's gun crews were "dispersed" among various forces. It was only when the evacuation of the terrorists from Beirut was completed that there was an indication that the unit was to be regrouped, but then they were hit with a surprise in the form of the entry into West Beirut, and they were again fragmented.

Long before this, some of Ayal's gum crews had seen at extremely close range through the sights of the self-propelled guns the embassies quarter through which the IDF forces advanced on their way into West Beirut. In the "residential section", the area south of the embassies quarter, the gumners sat with the Golani troops and the armored personnel in the days when mortars, anti-aircraft guns and other weapons operated by the terrorists were in proximity to the embassies' yards.

"I began to feel the war in Tyre when we saw our burnt tanks and APC's, the wounded, and the destruction," says Dror.

"I did not feel the war until now," interjects Aharon Mariner in a heavy tone of voice and a conspicuous Russian accent. Today, he lives in Tiberias; in 1978 he was still in the Soviet Union from where he immigrated to Israel.

"I volunteered for the gunners," he emphasizes, "after I completed a Hebrew course in Olga and learned a lot about the history of Eretz Israel. I saw films on the wars of Israel, and I felt that my place was in the army."

Another crewman, Hillel Aviv from Ashqelon, is bothered by the idea of "success of the gunners". "For a long time we did not fulfill our role as gunners. We did not fire by indirect aiming but only by direct aiming. In my opinion, this is not exactly the role of gunners. Before, we did not fire directly even once at buildings," he says.

"It has been shown," responded Tuvia Yankelevitz from Kfar Saba, "that there can be no advance without the gunners. I happen to be satisfied with firing by direct aiming. It is not as if you are standing on a hill and do not see where you are hitting. Here you fire, and the house crumbles before your eyes. There is enormous satisfaction in this."

Their Problem

There is another aspect to firing by direct aiming.

"You not only see the target in front of you but you also see whom you are hitting," says Hillel. "When a shell is fired by indirect aiming, it lands without your seeing and knowing immediately whom and what it hit. In firing by direct aiming, we saw the terrorists in front of us, we saw the flags in the headquarters, we knew exactly whom we were hitting. I was not trained to hit children, but I learned that if you do not fire, someone else will fire at you. If the terrorists arranged to locate their headquarters and staffs precisely in populated areas, that is their problem, not ours."

"The operations of the artillery forces in the north during the year preceding Operation Peace for Galilee constituted an outstanding school for testing deployments, familiarization with the territory, and training for what was to come," recapitulates Col Eli, a senior artillery commander. According to him, methods of using self-propelled guns in a built-up area, firing by direct aiming, and fighting in a mountainous areas were practiced even before the war.

RUSSIAN OPTION PROPOSED AS ALTERNATIVE TO UNITED STATES

'Ofra NEQUDA in Hebrew 22 Oct 82 pp 14-15

[Article by Elyakim Ha'etzani: "Mysticism Goes Well With Communism"]

[Text] In Bulgaria, a member of the Soviet bloc, the Bulgarians live fully national and sovereign lives in their land. Their affiliation with the Soviet bloc is expressed in their extreme dependence on the Eastern superpower while their regime is communist and undemocratic.

With the passage of time, this regime of lies and oppression will also disappear. And then, the Bulgarians will be found living in their land as they have for years. Finland is also extremely dependent on the Soviets, but its regime is relatively free and its economy is capitalistic.

Not only is this writer not a communist, but he is also far removed even from socialism. Freedom of expression and the rest of the civil liberties are the soul of this writer. In a communist dictatorship it is doubtful if he would be allowed to go about freely. Nevertheless, this writer states openly that given the choice between a whole Land of Israel dependent on the Soviets and a stunted, dismembered, and demoralized Land of Israel under the rule of the Stars and Stripes, he prefers the completeness of the land to the form of regime.

This is because the land is here forever while the regime is a transitory entity.

Examination of an Alternative

How does one arrive at such terrible thoughts? "With the help of" the Reagan plan. Of course, when the Government of the United States, assisted by agents from within, tries to rob the Zionist state of the heart of the Land of Israel, it is natural for one to seek a way out. The spirit seeks an alternative.

When one is seeking, various thoughts and memories, which for many years had not even reached the threshold of awareness, come to mind. Let us examine a few of them:

a. Soviet Russia has consistently supported the sovereignty of Israel within the green line. This means that as of today on this issue there is no longer any difference between its policy and the policy of the American Government.

(The distinction, so important to Shimon Peres, between turning over the heart of the Land of Israel to Husayn and abandoning it to 'Arafat tells us nothing.)

- b. We were victorious in the War of Independence and established the state with weapons supplied to us by the Czechs, read—the Soviets, whereas the United States maintained a complete and scrupulous arms embargo against us.
- c. The border that the Americans are determining is not a border of peace. Their guarantees are not reliable. Their friendship is suspect.

After they intervened in South Vietnam and, with the aid of agents from within, imposed on it a government that was acceptable to their "experts," they
applied pressure on it to agree to a "peace" (Kissinger) of surrender and
submission which rapidly led to the complete loss of the entire country.
When the shah of Iran encountered difficulties, they immediately applied
pressure on him to conceded to his enemies and brought about his fall. They
never had such a faithful ally as Taiwan. Yet, they severed diplomatic relations with it. Now they are also reducing weapons shipments to it. The
purpose of all of this is to curry favor with the People's Republic of China,
a communist regime.

Therefore, the Tsraeli servants of the United States who are seeking to topple the government within the framework of an American connection should not delude themselves. When they achieve their desired objective, that green line that has become a sacred cow to them, they will immediately find themselves again subject to new threats of war, infiltrations and murders. No "American guarantees" will save them. As has happened in all the previous withdrawals—all under American pressure—America did not save us from the necessity form paying again and again with the blood of our sons to defend that shortened border behind which she pushed us. This is how it was after the 5708 [1948] war and after Operation Sinai.

In contrast, the border which the Soviets established is reliable and stable. Not one soldier has yet been killed on the Oder-Neisse border which the Russians imposed on Germany. The same applies to that between Czechoslovakia and Poland and between Rumania and Hungary, and so forth.

d. Russia is progressively losing its positions in the Middle East. This, in the same tempo and in direct connection with the cutting of our borders by the Americans, is the barter for taking the Arabs out of the Soviet camp and bringing them into the American camp.

Those Who Are Eating Our Flesh

Its last positions (aside from Libya and South Yemen)--Iraq, Syria, and the terrorists establishment--are falling with their moving closer to the

Americans. All of this is happening through the chief American agent, Saudi Arabia. The barter, as was stated, is the Reagan plan. Read: us. Read: Judaea, Samaria, Gaza, Jerusalem and the Golan.

The Bechtel men, who are now directing the United States and whose spiritual and economic base is that same Saudi Arabia, are the ones who are orchestrating and engineering this process and are doing to with considerable skill and astounding effectiveness. It is they who are creating with their very own hands the strange commonality of interests between the Russians and us. Whoever is eating my flesh should not be surprised at my preference to see him hungry—even if he is my "friend."

In other words, if the price of the entry of the Arabs into the American camp is the dismemberment of our homeland, it is only natural that we prefer the Americans to have fewer Arab friends and the Russians more.

It follows that just as the Russians are interested in remaining influential in Syria and Iraq and among the Palestinians, so are we. Would that they had also remained in Egypt and we in Sinai!

e. However, matters are even going much farther. The Americans are also pushing the Soviets toward us. After they also lose their last Arab "friends," the Tsraeli "horse" will actually remain alone in the area. In itself, it is a horse whose prospects are not insignificant at all.

After all, who opened the gates of the Middle East to the Americans? Among others, it was the Jewish underground organizations which drove out the British Empire and created a vacuum which America entered, the same America which supported the Jewish state against British opposition.

Strengthening and Restraint

Ever since the first days of the State of Israel, the Americans have been continually gaining the friendship of the Arabs by the simple technique of alternately strengthening and "restraining" Israel (as process which grates on our nerves and drains our blood). The day that the Soviets conclude that they have nothing more to lose, they will try to supplant the Americans by the very same method. For this purpose they will have to move closer to Israel which, like the Soviets, is being pushed and forced out by the Americans.

f. This has happened before. For many years Russia supported the Kurds of Barzani and afterwards abandoned them in favor of Iraq. It aided Eritrea and then abandoned it in favor of Ethiopia. The Palestinians are also vulnerable to the "game of the nations." And the wheel is likely to turn. Even the identification of the Russians with certain verses of the Bible, which cannot be mentioned today in America and even among our leftists, will not be a very novel thing. When the interest requires it, "mysticism" goes very well with communism.

g. If such a day comes, a day of an absolute and necessary meeting of interests between the Soviets and us, the only thing that will stand between us will be the issue of price. It is not impossible that Judaea, Samaria, Gaza, Jerusalem and the Golan will not see to heavy a price—not for the purpose of realizing the vision of the prophets, of course—but rather in exchange for access to the strongest country, the one with the best army, technical know—how, maintenance, ordnance, intelligence, creativity and motivation in the entire region and perhaps even beyond it.

From Russian With Love?

Absolutely not! With revulsion, from a solid inner aversion, with a sense of no alternative. We have been abandoned and cast aside like filthy and lowly objects by America, the country which, together with its people and government, we would prefer by a thousandfold.

However, we are being continually betrayed and sold out by the Americans. Where they have overstepped the bounds of propriety is their setting out on the road of internal subversion, their associating with Israeli parties in order to topple our government. This is an action which is not far from the typical methods of Soviet Russia. Even it did not invade Poland but rather "arranged" through its agents an "internal" reshuffle.

It is still not too late. The United States has not yet applied crude pressure. It has still not burned all the bridges. Also, Syria, Iraq and 'Arafat have not yet left the Soviet camp. Indeed, would that they would remain in that camp and we with Uncle Sam.

However, there is already a clear commonality of interests between the Soviets and us, at least on one point.

They are likely to be interested in signalling to their Arab "friends" who are beginning to "waver" that they also have an option. We also need to have something to signal to our great friend across the sea.

There is no doubt that it is more comfortable for them to remain where they are now just as it is good and pleasant for us to be where we are now.

However, in diplomacy there are no sentiments, only interests, and these mean orders of priorities.

In our camp, so it must be hoped, the top priority is given to the Land of Isrel. Would that this message, loud and clear, reach the United States of America in time.

PROFILE OF NEW AIR FORCE COMMANDER

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Oct 82 p 2

[Article: "Amos Lapidot To Be Appointed Air Force Commander"]

[Text] Brigadier General Amos Lapidot, the chief executive of the Lavi aircraft project, is soon to be appointed air force commander replacing Major General David 'Ivri who is concluding his active service in the IDF. With his appointment, Brig Gen Lapidot will be promoted to the rank of major general. This was reported last night by the IDF spokesman.

As will be recalled, Air Force Commander Maj Gen David 'Ivri has been appointed active chairman of the board of the Aircraft Industry, and he is to assume his position toward the end of the year.

Brig Gen Amos Lapidot was born in Kfar Saba in 1934 and joined the IDF in 1953. At the end of 1954 he completed the air force pilot's course as an outstanding graduate and served in a fighter squadron until 1967. During his service in fighter squadrons, he was a member of the absorption team for the Mirage aircraft in 1961, and he was the commander of an Ouragan squadron. In 1965 he was appointed a Mirage squadron commander, and in this position he fought in the Six Day War.

Brig Gen Lapidot began his studies for a B.S. degree in mathematics and physics at Tel Aviv University in 1967, and he completed his studies in October 1970. After completing his studies, he worked in armament development on the air force staff, and in 1973 he was appointed commander of a combat wing, a position in which he served in the Yom Kippur War. In August 1975 he was appointed commander of the Air Force Intelligence Group, and in July 1977 he was appointed chief of the air group at air force headquarters. In 1979 he went to study for a master's degree in the United States, and since March 1981 he has served as chief executive of the Lavi project.

Brig Gen Lapidot is married and the father of four children. His son is serving as an officer in the IDF.

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APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF EDUCATION OFFICER

Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew 20 Oct 82 pp 5, 7

[Article by Emanuel Rosen: "Brig Gen Yoss Alder Appointed Chief Education Officer"]

[Text] Col Yoss Alder was promoted last weekened to the rank of brigadier general and was appointed chief education officer replacing Brig Gen Avi Zohar who is completing his active service in the IDF.

Yoss Alder was born in 1944 in Tel Aviv. Since his joining the IDF in 1962 he has served in the Armored Corps. In this corps he has served in various command positions and has been, among other things, a company commander, battalion commander, reserve brigade commander, regular brigade commander, and division executive officer. He also commanded a multibranch and company commander course. He is a graduate of the company commander course and the Inter-Service Command and Staff College. He took advanced training in the U.S. Army Tests Unit in Texas.

In the Six Day War he fought in the Sinai as a company commander in Brigade 7. In the Yom Kippur War he was a battalion commander in the same brigade which fought in 'Emeq Habakha [literally, Valley of the Tears]. When the fighting began, he was in command of an improvised tank battalion which fought in the Hermon region. During the battle to halt the enemy advance, he fought from an APC because of the shortage of tanks, and he was in the front line where he was wounded and evacuated to the rear. After first aid, he "fled" from the hospital and returned to command his unit. On 16 October 1973 he was wounded again, but refused to be evacuated, and it was only at the end of the battle to halt the enemy advance that he was evacuated to the rear. After a month he returned again to command his unit in the War of Attrition. For his part in the 1973 battles he was awarded the Exemplary Service Medal when it was stated that "his conduct, courage and dedication to duty served as an example to all the fighters."

In Operation Peace for Galilee he was the commander of the Armored School. He is married and the father of three daughters. He is a resident of Rishon Leziyyon.

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MODIFICATIONS OF ENGINEERS' EQUIPMENT

Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew 20 Oct 82 p 5

[Article by David Bender: "Engineers' Bulldozer To Be Armored and Equipped With Machinegun"]

[Text] A new development is converting the IDF bulldozer to an armored vehicle, one that is protected against everything. This development is in addition to the new flak jacket which consists of 25 layers of asbestos and is designed for the operators of the mechanical engineering equipment of the Engineer Corps.

The military bulldozers were a great surprise in the Peace for Galilee war. These vehicles, which lacked real protection, performed many important foundation-laying and road-clearing jobs, all under a rain of heavy enemy artillery and other weapons' fire. One of the first lessons after the war was that the degree of protection for the vehicle and its operator must be increased. Development personnel in the Engineer Corps and in the Military Industry first developed a new flak jacket which covers the operator's entire body and protects him rather well.

The new development which involves the bulldozer itself has now been reported. The development, which is considerably more complex and complicated than the earlier one, has recently been concluded with a series of tests. This development will convert the bulldozer to an armored vehicle which is driven by two crewmen, a driver and a commander. The upper aperture will serve as an observation position for the vehicle commander, and the two sitting there will be able to communicate by means of an internal radio communications system. They will also have a spotlight to illuminate the work area, a machinegun, and devices for weapons and other vital accessories.

The window panes made of armored glass will give the crew a wide viewing area without endangering their safety. An air conditioner will regulate the air and will improve working conditions.

During the development of the operator's compartment, the developers were careful to design it in a way that would provide maximum protection, but at the same time, they strived to maintain its maneuverability and flexibility in difficult areas.

5830

SITUATION IN CAMPS DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1359, 19 Nov 82 pp 92, 93

[Text] The time was almost 6 p.m. last Friday evening when rumors spread around the two camps of Sabra and Shatila in Beirut that Sa'd Haddad's militias were pushing towards the camps. Screams of thousands of children, women and elderly people wandering aimlessly about, became louder as they fled towards what were believed to be safer areas, such as the inner neighbourhoods of Corniche al-Mazra'ah, Burj Abu-Haydar, Zarif and others. Many of them were unable to put on their clothes and women went out in their night clothes and house robes barefooted.

Soldiers of the multinational force positioned in the area quickly reinforced their units already present there. They intensified their patrols and started communicating with each other by walkie-talkie to inquire if any of their positions had been penetrated and the answer, of course, confirmed the negative.

The Lebanese Army positions located nearby, and around which hundreds of citizens had gathered, in turn were reassuring them by announcing through loudspeakers that the matter was only a rumor, and that its units had arrested several of the originators of these biased rumors, who were described by Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan, as people who would undoubtedly be "harmed by the spread of state sovereignty."

Whatever the case may be, that incident which was repeated for a second time, clearly exposed the fears, the anxiety and the lack of stability in which the camp residents live. As one of the residents was quoted as saying: "Saving their skin was their only wish."

We started our tour of the Sabra and Shatila camps from the Dana Station side. French soldiers had taken their positions at the entrance to the camp and on the rooftop of one of the buildings across form it. A group of children and adolescents huddled around them. Conversations took place by gesture; soundless talk. In the direction of Sabra Square, vegetable carts and stands were spread on both sides of the street. The market place was crowded as usual. There were vegetables and fruits of various kinds and a vendor calling out "Fathers of children come and buy!" Close to the place that the "Armed Struggle" used as its center, French soldiers moved towards

their supply truck, while others stared at the crossroads leading towards the Sabra Square. Water was still pouring out from one of the sewers along with its foul smell close to the Dana Mosque, or what is called the "Sabra market." The Calls of vendors were rising from all directions. A French soldier was buying parsley and mint and smiling at Joe Nakhleh who was taking his picture.

Naif Surays, the Shatila camp director, appointed by the relief agency to supervise Palestinian aid to the camp, said to "Al-Hawadith":

The camp was established in 1950 following the 1948 exodus from Palestine; it started out with 200 tents, but the inhabitants soon put up concrete blocks around the tents to protect their homes against leakage of rain water. Then we reached a stage when we had to build the houses you see now, which consist of concrete blocks without foundations covered by corrugated metal sheets except in the case where some inhabitants erected columns for fear that their houses may collapse.

According to Naif Surays, the number of camp residents benefiting from the UNRWA services is 5482 persons. The UNRWA also has four schools with about 500 students each. It distributes rations to all the people in the camp and, furthermore, there is a clinic for the treatment of the residents, operational since the beginning of the camp. In addition, a cleaning crew of ten people supervised by one employee operates in the camp.

The number of houses totally destroyed reached 52. Those partially destroyed reached 120 and another 140 required repair.

The camp director adds, "To this day and since the battles started in June, we have no electricity. The water supply is inadequate. The UNRWA, on the other hand, has decided to clear the destroyed houses and has implemented its decision, but we do not know who will undertake to rebuild replacements.

As to the sewerage problem—and you, as visitors to the camp, have undoubtedly suffered from it—it is related to the problem of establishing and repairing the state sewers outside the camp, and while awaiting the repair of sewers outside the camp, the problem of sewers inside must be solved so that the water will flow into the intended network.

Naif Surays also complains about the slackness of everyone and their failure to fulfill their duties towards the families who lost their breadwinners and household heads during the massacre and other incidents. None of the families has even received sufficient assistance or compensation for their victims and losses to enable them to live unexposed.

Many families remain here without shelter, some taking refuge in the ruins, others sleeping with neighbours. This, in addition to a problem that emerged lately: families living outside the camp in apartments belonging to others have received warnings to evacuate the houses and this might lead to greater problems.

There is also a large number of Palestinians who had previously fled from camps in the south or from Beirut who now live in camps in the North, the Biga' and in the South, not knowing what their fate will be.

About the concerns of the residents, the camp director says, "Security is undoubtedly the concern. In spite of the presence of the multinational forces we have not so far felt a thread of security. We request urgent protection for the camps irrespective of who will provide it. We consider ourselves subjects under the Lebanese Government's care since 1948. Now we do not possess a cutting knife. We request the presence of the Lebanese Army along with the multinational forces so that the people will be reassured by the presence of those who understand their language and feelings.

As to the house searches that cause controversy both on the domestic and international levels, he commented that they may be thought necessary when intended for the arrests of criminals, thieves and outlaws. But these searches went too far to include arresting students under the ages of 15 and 16. However, when the charge is that of carrying arms, the Lebanese did this along with the Palestinians, and what adds to the anxiety is the fact that armed civilians come to the houses at night and arrest whoever they please.

It is now known that a meeting took place between the Directorate for Refugees Affairs and the government in which it was agreed that if the State wanted a citizen from the camps arraigned for questioning on some matter, this would only be done with the knowledge of the camp director and in broad daylight.

Before ending my interview, I asked the camp director about the validity of rumors concerning the existence of tunnels connecting the camp to other nearby camps, to which he replied, "These statements are untrue and whoever is not convinced can come and check for himself. There are shelters known to all and there are ditches the length of which does not exceed a few tens of meters."

Wafiqah Al-Sa'dy, headmistress of the Manshiah school for girls, said, "This is a primary school consisting to ten classrooms with a total of 285 students. Nine teachers work here, but only three are here now since there are 6 teachers now in the north, unable to come back to Beirut."

The school is without water or electricity, adds Wafaqah. Its toilets are unsuitable for use, the students are crowded in the classrooms where the number reaches 52 students for one classroom and the shortage of teaching staff precludes setting up two shifts in the school daily.

And when asked whether there were any losses among her students during the massacre and the war, she replied in the negative.

Books for the students are mostly available and the equipment is acceptable. On the way from the school towards the camp clinic, on a road where one

requires a boat to cross due to the strong flow of water from the sewers, we met Nazirah Jaqlit, the clinic administrator who described the clinic beneficiaries as being Palestinians either living in the camps or coming from outside whose circumstances forced them to remain in Beirut.

According to Nazirah, the clinic received one hundred patients per week prior to the incidents, but today the number has doubled. A doctor who attended twice a week now visits daily. We are trying to re-equip the clinic, whose equipment was stolen and damaged.

We refer patients for whom there is no treatment here, to the UNRWA Ra's Al-Nabi' clinic. I take the available vaccines home every day to store in the refrigerator so they won't spoil and the following morning I place them between ice cubes which I bring with me for the same purpose.

Dr Salim al-Hut, who supervises the examinations of patients told me that the conditions in the camp were miserable. The inhabitants lack psychological and material stability. There is no water or electricity. The sewers are bursting with contaminated water. There are no public services. The condition of homes is unsanitary, not to mention the destruction and devastation that occurred. The financial condition of the people, if they had money, has reached rock bottom. What is left of the revolutionary institutions is paralyzed. An atmosphere of rumors affects everything in the camp. With sunset, exodus from the camps begins. Many camp residents sleep at the entrances of surrounding buildings. The sense of security that came with the multinational force is fragile and as soon as a rumor is heard, people start running. Several families live together in houses consisting of no more than one or two rooms. This is in addition to the atmosphere of unemployment, since many of the families depended on their breadwinner's salaries from the revolution's institutions.

The winter season is approaching and most houses are without windows or doors, even without beds or mattresses.

Diana Erickson, an American nurse from the Society of Churches, who came with volunteer teams to help alleviate the suffering of Palestinians, said to AL-HAWADITH, "I visit, together with a nurse from the clinic, Palestinian mothers and children. People are still living in fear and terror, ignorant of their future, of whether they will remain in the camp or leave to other areas. I found their health situation to be better than I expected. The Palestinians are a strong people, and nothing should make them forgive America. I am sorry, that my country helped in the acts of killing and destruction, but I'm very happy I can help in curing their wounds."

Raqiyah Mahmud, a resident of Bi'r Hasan, who was receiving her food ration from the distribution center in the camp said that her family consisted of 12 persons. Her father, the sole breadwinner, had to stop work after the building where he was employed as a watchman was destroyed. We need more stability, we do not know what will become of us, we do not have enough money to repair our house. We came here to take our share of the food rations. This is begging, is it not?

Mustafa Sa'id Muhammad, an old man over eighty years old, said, "Our tragedy is great. The whole world has abandoned us. The situation is not good. We do not sleep all night and when we hear a sound we get nervous until we learn the truth of the matter. Our house in Rashidiyah was destroyed and we took refuge in Burj al-Barajinah camp, but our house was again destroyed and we now live in the homes of benefactors. Borrowed garments do not last. My children escaped to Germany because of the situation."

Salwa Muhammad, a student describing what she went through during the fighting, said, "Our home was destroyed for the fourth time. After we were driven out of Tal al-Za'tar, we took refuge in southern camps, specifically, in al-Rashidiyah. From there we moved to Beirut and lived in Statila camp, which was heavily damaged. We then moved to Bi'r Hassan camp, where we now face a housing problem because we were warned to leave the house that shelters us. We are now lost without a destiny. Monthly rents in the camp have reached 1000 Lebanese pounds. My father who works as a furniture painter has been without work since the incidents started and still is. Our family consists of 12 persons. My younger brother, who is 13 years old was detained by the army for 15 days, but was later released."

We live in terror, fear and anxiety.

On the way back, we stopped at the Ghaza Hospital, run by the Palestinian Red Crescent. Here, according to the Hospital's administrative director, Aziza' al-Khalidi, the work comprises the nursing force, in addition to the administrative and medical teams, the operations, radiology, laboratory and physical therapy departments.

'Azizah says, "We are assisted in our hospital work by a medical team from the foreign missions, especially from the Council of Churches.

The hospital receives all patients without discrimination. Before the war, we used to charge a nominal fee from the uninsured such as the families of martyrs or those uncommitted militarily to the Palestinian cause.

Since the first of June and until now, treatment has been free, and both the Lebanese and Palestinians have equally benefited from our services. What brings tranquility and stability to the work and to performing one's duty is the provision of security to the hospital by the Lebanese Army.

12284

CSO: 4404/106

BRIEFS

MEA LOSSES VIEWED--The 1982 earnings of Middle East Airline (MEA) are expected to show an overall loss estimated at 185 million Lebanese pounds. It is generally known that of this total, 135 million pounds were lost in June, July, August, and September when operations at the Beirut airport were completely suspended because of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The losses suffered in these months were partly offset by some savings on salaries and by the partial operation of 13 planes that were not in Beirut at the start of the Israeli invasion. Although the anticipated loss for this year will exceed the invested capital of the company, which amounts to 150 million pounds, the situation does not seem to be too bad considering that the loss is covered by accumulated reserves which were ample for the company and from which there remain, according to President Salim Salam, about 50 million pounds. Accordingly, the resulting loss will not affect the company's financial position nor its negotiating ability, especially if it continues to modernize its fleet and carry out the agreement to purchase five Airbus planes. However, since that will not enable the new management to sleep soundly, it intends to take some steps to make up or compensate for the losses in the coming years based on the bet that stability will come to Lebanon. The most important of these steps are the following: (1) Eagerness of management to continue trying to get the loan approved by the Lebanese government in the amount of 150 million Lebanese pounds. As frequently mentioned, it is to be a soft loan either as to term of payment or average interest rate. (2) Doing accurate operations studies to make up for as much of the loss as possible by reducing costs and, consequently, increasing profits. (3) Inclination to lease five planes of different sizes until the end of 1982 and lease 10 other planes next year to increase productivity and handle the anticipated increase in traffic to and from Beirut. (4) Management iniative in leasing out some jumbo jets (Boeing 747's) in view of the great costs involved that are not in keeping with the company's short routes. (5) Effort by the company to build a new repair facility for commercial aircraft costing \$10 million. It is hoped that this facility will produce a quick return in view of MEA's reputation in this field. (6) Beginning air cooperation TMI that will lead to a combining of the efforts of the two companies, especially since a merger is impracticable if not impossible at the present time. Combining efforts or cooperation on certain routes will produce a direct return by lowering costs and boosting productivity. [Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAOBAL in Arabic No 302, 4 Dec 82 p 53] 5214

BANK FEDERATION HEADQUARTERS -- The board of directors of the Federation of Arab Banks, which met in Bahrain on 20 November, reached a final decision to return the general headquarters of the Federation to Beirut by the end of January 1983 at the latest. It terminated all activity outside of the Lebanese capital unless approved by the board. The representative of the Lebanese banks Anwar al-Khalil (deputy chairman of the board of directors of the Beirut-Riyadh Bank), brought up the matter of the headquarters because the Federation's secretary-general Dr Zuhayr 'Ashiy had ignored the board's decisions in Amman on 27 May 1982 to close the Abu Dhabi headquarters on 30 September 1982. It appeared at the board's last meeting that commitments made by the secretarygeneral in Abu Dhabi cannot be easily abandoned. Some time will be needed to meet these commitments, for example, those regarding the office and home furniture rented for the employees. It is obvious that question of the site of the Federation's headquarters which has been shifting for some time between Beirut, desirable for its technical expertise, and Abu Dhabi, desirable from the financial and security standpoints, was finally resolved in favor of Beirut after the security situation allowed those demanding Beirut to speak, out more forcefully. And, in fact, this is what happened at the last meeting when it was decided that the headquarters should definitely be returned to the Lebanese capital. It is worth noting that the coming elections to the Federation's board of directors will take place next April and that the general meeting may be held in Beirut. [Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 302, 4 Dec 82 p 45] 5214

SAUDI BANK, HOTEL PURCHASE—A Saudi group headed by Salim ibn Mahfuz recently purchased a Beirut Bank and hotel valued at about 125 million Lebanese liras. This transaction is the first of its kind since the Israeli invasion. The bank is the Continental Bank for Development, previously owned by an American group. The hotel is the Hilton, not yet completed. It is situated near the business district in the cpaital and not far from the hotel area where the Phoenicia, Holiday Inn, and Saint George are located. The Hilton Hotel was owned by a company of the Nationalist Union headed by Shaykh Joe Kayruz, chairman of the board of directors of the People's Credit Bank. [Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 302, 4 Dec 82 p 45] 5214

CSO: 4404/123

ARAFAT INTERVIEWED ON ATTITUDE TOWARD ISRAEL

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 29 Oct 82 p 3

 $\overline{/\mathrm{Interview}}$ with Yasir 'Arafat by Alberto Jacoviello; date and place not specified/

 $\overline{/\mathrm{Text}//\mathrm{Question}/}$ Mr 'Arafat, Israel refuses to recognize the PLO and the PLO refuses to recognize Israel. It's a dead end. What is the way out?

/Answer/ I suppose that by Israel you mean Palestine. It isn't a play on words. It is the very essence of the issue. We Palestinians are the victims. We were driven out of our land. So why are we asked to recognize the right of our oppressors? It is not up to us to make the first step.

 $\sqrt{\overline{Q}}$ uestion/ But Egypt considered itself a victim too, and yet Sadat went to Jerusalem and made peace.

 $\overline{/A}$ nswer/ By acting as he did, Sadat broke the Arab front and pushed the solution to the problem farther away. We shall not commit the same error.

 \sqrt{Q} uestion But if you were invited to Israel, would you go?

 $\overline{/A}$ nswer/ My people have invited me into the occupied territories many times and I have gone. Under the circumstances I could only go clandestinely.

 $\sqrt{\text{Question}/}$ And if you were invited by the mayor of Nazareth, who is an Arab, for example, would you go?

 \overline{A} nswe \overline{I} I always go wherever I am invited.

Could these words of 'Arafat's contain a message? I cannot say. The PLO leader, who received me at his headquarters in Tunisia in the presence of six or seven of his associates, did not want to be explicit enough. But it is my impression that if there is some change in the internal situation in Israel, the basis and willingness to negotiate exist. I drew this conclusion from the whole atmosphere of our talk.

It lasted less than an hour, but it was very tense and, I think, sincere. 'Arafat is not an easy man to reach. He is always flying somewhere. He stops once in a while in Tunisia for a few hours. Often his associates do not know his movements; at any rate they keep them carefully secret. So he ends up living a completely anomalous life. He is the president of a great political organization, but he lives like someone in hiding.

A Life in Hiding

Is this just for security reasons or is it a past habit, from the clandestine times? Certainly one is never sure of anything with him. I learned this for myself during a three week period when I had appointments repeatedly postponed or cancelled. But once we finally sat down around a table our talk was frank, simple, and lively, even though there were the inevitable reticences due to the extreme fluidity of the situation. 'Arafat is a very unusual person. Sometimes he seems dejected. At other times he is very quick, alert and incisive. When he speaks of the vicissitudes of his people he shows himself to be a man capable of provoking emotions.

Guerrilla fighter? Statesman? The two experiences coexist in his life. In speaking with him one has the feeling that it is not up to him alone to choose between these two characters. But for today it is the latter that prevails.

 \sqrt{Q} uestion/ Mr 'Arafat, you accuse Israel. But how do you explain the fact that after the massacres of Sabra and Shatila, it was only in Israel that there were protests, while in the Arab countries the streets were empty?

Answer/ I consider it extremely important that 400,000 Israelis protested against the criminal acts of Begin and Sharon. I was very moved by this fact. It means that not all Israelis support their government's policy. As for the Arab countries, we received proofs of solidarity everywhere. There is mourning and grief in every Arab home.

 $\overline{\mathbb{Q}}$ uestion/ Mr 'Arafat, you have called the Jews brothers? Are the Israelis brothers, too?

/Answer/ Those who oppress my people cannot be brothers. But we have many friends in Israel. They are the ones we are counting on for peace.

/Question/ Is Begin your brother?

 \overline{A} nswer Begin is a terrorist, a state terrorist.

/Question/ And Sharon?

<u>/Answer/</u> Sharon, too, obviously, He has admitted authorizing, in the government's name, the slaughterers' entry into the Palestinian camps. How can I help but have strongly hostile feelings for him?

[Question] But then who do you consider a friend in Israel?

<u>/Answer/</u> Everyone in the Peace Now movement, for example. Everyone who is in prison for having defended the need for a dialogue to reach a just solution of the problem of coexistence between Jews and Palestinians.

<u>/Question/</u> Mr 'Arafat, a spokesman for the Pope and a representative of Rome's Israelite community have said that during your meetings in Rome with John Paul II and President Pertini you agreed on the need for the PLO to recognize Israel. Is this true?

/Answer/ In my meetings with the Pope and President Pertini there was an exchange of ideas on the question of peace in the Middle East. I listened to their opinions with interest and respect. That does not mean that I agreed with everything they said.

/Question/ Mr 'Arafat, it seems to me that the heart of the matter is the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza, and that in this connection the agreements with King Hussein of Jordan are very important. Is this true?

<u>Answer</u> Our program is the creation of a Palestinian state on every piece of earth that is liberated or that the Israelis withdraw from. Therefore we are for the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza.

/Question/ Are you telling us that for you this is a secondary program, whereas the primary program remains the creation of a binational state in Palestine?

<u>/Answer/</u> There is no primary or secondary program. There are intermediate stages of the same program. I invite you to attend our next congress, that way you will be able to learn directly about our position.

 $\overline{\mathbb{Q}}$ uestion/ Do you mean, perhaps, that your program may change at your next congress?

 $\overline{/Answer/}$ Wait and see.

The Internal Opposition

Question/ There is a lot of talk about opposition within the PLO to your line, i.e. staking everything on diplomacy. It is said that you are waging diplomatic guerrilla warfare at the expense of the military guerrilla war. Is that true?

 $\overline{\text{Answer/}}$ I was elected president of the PLO with 99.99 percent of the votes. I was elected by a majority. There are discussions between the majority and the minority. The PLO is a democratic organization.

/Question/ But majorities can change.

 \overline{A} nswer \overline{I} If that happens I will take a rest.

Question You do not strike me as a man suited to rest.

<u>/Answer/</u> It is not a question of personal preference. If the congress decides that I should continue carrying this cross I shall carry it.

 $\sqrt{Q}uestion$ The cross of diplomatic action?

/Answer/ The cross of acting in defense of my people.

 \sqrt{Q} uestion/ Mr 'Arafat, you have said that the Reagan Plan has both positive and negative elements. Which are which?

Answer It is positive that for the first time an American president has adopted a firm position against Israel's policy of annexation. It is negative that Reasan does not want to recognize the PLO and is opposed to the creation of a Palestinian state.

 $\overline{/\mathbb{Q}}$ uestion/ I read in the newspapers this morning that former President Carter has said that without the participation of the PLO there can be no peace in the Middle East.

/Answer/ I read that statement too. It would have been better if Carter had made it when he was president of the United States. At any rate I thank him on behalf of my people, just as I thank former presidents Ford and Nixon, who have said the same thing. This can help the present administration understand the reality of the situation.

Question I don't think that seems to be happening. Once again, in the past few days, Reagan refused to receive a representative of the PLO on the Committee of Seven chaired by the King of Morocco.

/Answer/ I know that very well. Reagan is trying to ignore the situation.

\(\overline{Q}\) Question\(/ \) Mr 'Arafat, several Arab countries expressed the intention of voting in favor of a motion requesting that Israel be excluded from the United Nations General Assembly. Were you in agreement with that initiative?

As you know, that motion was withdrawn. In any event it was not the PLO that suggested it be submitted. The countries that did so were acting completely independently. But I can understand the motive behind their initiative. Israel is the only country in the world which was created by a United Nations resolution, and it is also the country that constantly refuses to comply with its rules. Something has to be done to put an end to this situation.

<u>/Question/</u> Mr 'Arafat, the abandonment of West Beirut was aheavy blow for the PLO. Do you consider yourselves stronger or weaker now?

Answer Our military force is intact. Our political strength has been doubled. Arab solidarity has been reinforced. Our experience, in evaluating certain mediators, has grown.

Question Mr 'Arafat, there is an impression that the European countries, in particular France and Italy, have no clear, precise position on the way the Palestinian question should end. What is your opinion?

Answer The European countries have all the facts at their disposal to form an opinion. Their position does not always correspond to their knowledge of the facts. They are often subjected to severe pressure by the Americans. This is the reason for their ambiguity.

Difficult Forecasts

/Question/ For weeks and weeks after the Fez summit, which was held in the first decade of September, you almost never stopped. You saw heads of state, heads of governments, the Pope, politicians from various countries. What is your feeling now: that the Palestinian cause has made progress or lost ground? And what solution do you envisage in the medium or short term?

Answer I have done, am doing, and shall do everything possible to make our position known and listen to the positions of others. I am willing to go anywhere to set in motion a process leading to peace and justice. I cannot say when that will produce tangible results. A lot depends on the actions of the states which care about the solution to this problem. The only thing I cannot and will not do is stop defending my people.

Question/ Let us be frank with each other, Mr 'Arafat. A significant part of Western public opinion reproaches you for terrorism. You know that well. What can you do to rid yourselves of that accusation?

Answer I have been asking for an investigation of international terrorism for years, repeatedly. Why isn't it made? We are terrorists? But who are Sharon, who authorized the massacre of Sabra and Shatila, and Begin, who annexes territories that are not his? That's right, Begin won a Nobel Peace Prize. Why don't you explain all that to your public opinion? How did it happen that they went so far as to award Begin a Nobel Peace Prize? That is my question to you. As for myself, I repeat that I am ready to be judged by the International Tribunal. Are Begin and Sharon ready to do the same? Are they willing to account for all our activists that have been killed, all the massacres that have been perpetrated? I repeat that my people are waiting for an answer to these questions. And those answers are essential if we are to start putting the whole issue on a basis of truth.

<u>/Question/</u> One last question, Mr 'Arafat. If you were to send a message through my newspaper to the people in Israel who oppose Begin's policy, what would you say?

 \overline{A} nswer/ I would say: Dialogue is possible between us. We can work together for peace in Palestine and in the whole Middle East.

What conclusion should I come to after this interview? I will make a few comments. 'Arafat used the word war throughout the conversation. Does this mean something? I do not know. My second comment is that he constantly stressed the great importance of channels that lead to the opening of a dialogue, and in this context he had high praise for Begin's opponents. Is this a definitive choice?

It is not easy to answer this question. What I think I can say is that he is operating under extremely arduous conditions. Obviously the PLO cannot go it alone. It needs the Arab countries, but the Arab attitude is often evasive. It needs the European countries, but the European countries take refuge behind vague formulas. It needs the United States, but the United States set very tough conditions. It needs the USSR, but the USSR is cut off. It needs to talk with Israel, but Israel has a Begin-Sharon government.

Where can the PLO go in these conditions? Toward what solutions? As long as there is a single command in the person of a man like 'Arafat, despair and an eternal perpetuation of the diaspora are no longer possible. But will a single command under 'Arafat's leadership last for long? And if not, what will happen? We should all be afriad to answer these questions. The floating mines are terribly dangerous in the world we live in. And the PLO could become the most dangerous of all. These were my thoughts as I was leaving 'Arafat and his men in their sad refuge in Tunisia, in the Salwat Hotel, in front of which there are always two Tunisian armored cars. Perhaps this is a reassuring presence for the guests. But perhaps it is ambiguous. Who can say.

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CSO: 4628/2

BOMB ATTACKS BECOME DAILY OCCURRENCE IN KABUL

BK211341 Hong Kong AFP in English 1243 GMT 21 Dec 82

[Text] Islamabad, 21 Dec (AFP)--Bomb attacks have become a daily occurrence in central Kabul, striking mainly at public buildings and often in broad daylight, Western diplomatic sources report here.

Last week alone, bombs went off at the offices of the Afghan secret police, the university, the Education Ministry and at the homes of soviet officials, the sources said.

In addition the residence of the governor of Kabul came under a rocket attack from Muslim rebels.

The diplomats said that most bombs appeared to be small devices, causing few casualties.

However on 15 December a huge night explosion shook the capital. The blast was thought to have hit the secret police headquarters in the modern Share-Nau area, where large contingents of troops and police were seen moments later.

A few hours later a string of explosions were heard appearently coming from the Microrayan Soviet suburb.

Later that day, foreign diplomats heard four new, smaller explosions, while the next day several blasts were heard in the southwest of the city, from the university campus.

That day, 16 December, a rocket smashed the garden wall of the [words indistinct] damaged the building itself.

The diplomats noted that, in contrast to a spate of bombings of Kabul restaurants last month, Afghan officials have made no mention of the new blasts.

The new reports appeared to indicate that the resistance had autonomous units inside Kabul, supplied with explosives. However shooting on the streets at night appeared to have died down compared to the autumn.

The diplomats also confirmed resistance reports from Peshawar of a major Soviet-Afghan anti-guerrilla operation in villages north of Kabul where rebels are thought to be sheltering for the winter.

Soviet troops were said to be carrying out house-to-house searches, both to capture rebels and to draft all able bodied men into the Afghan army, crippled by desertions.

cso: 4600/161

BAKHTAR CITES JOURNALIST ON U.S., UK AID TO REBELS

LD220634 Kabul Bakhtar in English 0432 GMT 22 Dec 82

[Text] Kabul, 21 Dec, Bakhtar--A big trailer covered with tarapaulin arrives once in 3-4 days in Parachinar, Pakistani town on the frontier with Afghanistan. Its cargo chiefly long wooden boxes--is carried, in a matter of minutes into a barrack. A few hours later a caravan of heavily loaded mules and horses set out in the direction of the frontier....

Such scenes were observed more than once by E. Van Linden [spelling of name as received], a Dutch journalist, who spent several months among the leaders of counter-revolutionary gangs in the area of the Pakistani-Afghan frontier. He writes in the WASHINGTON POST that the trucks arriving in Parachinar invariably contained machine-guns, mortars, rifles, mines and grenades.

He stresses that the flow of arms to the anti-Afghan counter-revolutionary scum in Pakistan is steadily increasing.

According to his estimates, three times as many arms as a year ago now go via Parachinar alone.

The supply of arms to anti-Afghan gangs is organised and coordinated by the United States. E. Van Linden says this was confirmed by different sources, including the counter-revolutionaries themselves. Although the leaders of these gangs allege publicly that they acquire arms in an "open market" they admit in private conversations that they simply have no money for buying arms. The journalist says that it was the Central Intelligence Agency of the USA that arranged the purchase and transportation of arms for the anti-Afghan gangs.

E. Van Linden says that Britain is actively involved in the implementation of Washington's aggressive plans against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Among the latest arms in possession of the counter-revolutionaries were British-made mortars.

Pakistan has let its border districts to be used as bridgeheads for waging an undeclared war against democratic Afghanistan. The journalist recalls that the USA agreed in return to give the military regime in Pakistan military and economic aid totalling 3.2 billion dollars.

CSO: 4600/161

TEHRAN TURKISH CITES COLLUSION OVER AFGHANISTAN

GF210940 Tehran International Service in Turkish 1830 GMT 20 Dec 82

[From "The Movement of the Oppressed is Bearing Its Fruits" program]

[Text] Dear listeners, news agencies have reported that the unwavering struggle launched by the Afghan Mujahidin against the Soviet and Babrak Karmal forces continued with all its force during the past week, resulting in the killing of 20 mercenary troops of the occupationist forces in the vicinity of the district governor's office in [word indistinct]. In this 4-hour long clash, the occupation forces suffered losses in life and equipment and were forced to withdraw.

It is obvious that while the 5th anniversary of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is approaching, the [word indistinct] attacks of the Afghan Mujahidin are being intensified.

Under the present circumstances, diplomatic contacts have begun between the superpowers aimed at resolving the question of Afghanistan. However, just as in past cases, the superpowers are once again moving to play with the existence of the Muslim Afghan people with a view to safeguarding their interests in the international domain. In fact, the UN Secretary General is currently on a tour with the intention of protecting the interests of the superpowers and ending their crises which have stemmed from the strengthening of the Islamic revolution.

In their private talks, the United States and the Soviet Union have begun negotiating to agree (?not to be at loggerheads) over the fate of the Afghan people. Meanwhile, irrespective of the political games between the superpowers, Soviet troops have intensified their moves to suppress the just voice of the poor Muslim people of Afghanistan. Obviously they want to impose their conditions on the Afghan Muslim people through the use of force. Related to this is the Soviet bombing of the town of (Leva) in Paktia Province, a move which killed 12 of the Muslim people in the town.

Irrespective of such savage moves, the Afghan Mujahidin, who do not make any compromise at all from their legal rights, have attacked a convoy of the occupationist forces and destroyed 30 military trucks and tanks. In another attack, the Muslim Mujahidin have caused heavy losses to the joint Soviet and Babrak Karmal troops in Herat Province, capturing six Soviet officers as prisoners of war.

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CSO: 4600/161

SECRET MEETING OVER IRAQ-IRAN WAR DISCUSSED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 145, 20-26 Nov 82 pp 13, 15

[Article by Amir Taheri: "Details of Secret Meeting Headed by Khomeyni To Discuss Iraq-Iran War Revealed"]

[Text] Last week Ayatollah Khomeyni invited a number of senior Iranian officials to a closed meeting to consider the developments and future possibilities of the war with Iraq. This meeting, which was held in Khomeyni's office in (Jamran) north of Tehran was attended by 120 prominent clergymen, a number of senior leaders in the Iranian army, military officials, Prime Minister Hosein Musavi-Khamenei and some ministers. The meeting was also attended by Ayatollah Hosein Ali Muntazeri who is likely to succeed Khomeyni. This was the most important and the largest meeting held by the Iranian leadership in 2 years. It took place following the 2 weeks of seclusion that Khomeyni had imposed on himself.

Well-informed Iranian sources revealed to AL-MAJALLAH the details of what happened at that serious closed meeting. These sources said that Khomeyni resolutely informed those who were present that all peace efforts to stop the war with Iraq had to be stopped. He said that Iran had to prepare itself for a long battle to the end with Iraq. "The present rulers of Baghdad have to go. If they do not, we will." It was noticed that Khomeyni referred to Iraq as "the land between the two rivers" and did not mention the name, Iraq.

A prominent source told AL-MAJALLAH that this was the first time for Khomeyni to speak in this manner. Khomeyni explained that Iran could not coexist with the Iraqi rulers. [He said] that if the war did not bring about the fall of the regime in Baghdad, the Iranian regime would be upset.

One Condition

During the meeting Khomeyni expressed his fury with "the doves" among Iran's leaders, those who are calling for peaceful negotiations with Iraq. The most prominent of "those doves" are Iran's president Ali Khamenei and Ayatollah Mahdavi, the official responsible for monitoring the constitution. Addressing those doves, Khomeyni said, "Those who lay down and discuss what they call conditions for negotiating with Iraq have to change their tune before we ourselves change it for them." This statement was tantamount to an obvious threat to the Iranian tendency that is calling for negotiations with Iraq.

Khomeyni went on to explain his plans, "We have no conditions. We rather have one condition: that the regime in Baghdad come to an end and be replaced by an Islamic Republic to be chosen by the Muslim people of the land between the two rivers."

Khomeyni spoke during that meeting about his views on the continuing war with Iraq, and he emphasized that all the energies of Iran have to be mobilized for that purpose.

The same sources revealed to AL-MAJALLAH that at the end of the meeting Khomeyni issued a signed formal legal opinion—the first of its kind—proclaiming the war with Iraq to bring about the downfall of the present regime [in Iraq] to be "a sacred, religious duty" for Iranians. Observers who have knowledge of this formal legal opinon described it as one that considers the war with Iraq tantamount to "a holy war."

Ayatollahs Reject Holy War

When this meeting was adjourned, Iranian officials began taking action "to implement" Khomeyni's instructions. The first task was that of implementing general conscription and accepting volunteers. A special committee was set up to supervise this process. Ayatollah Nateq-Nuri, Iran's minister of interior and supreme commander of the army revealed that the purpose of the campaign was to ensure that Iran round up 1 million volunteers to fight in this war in the course of no more than 3 months. Nuri also said, "We must pray in Karbala' on the fourth anniversary of the revolution," that is, next February.

Informed sources told AL-MAJALLAH that these measures and activities do in fact reveal an atmosphere of anxiety in the Iranian regime because of the way military operations with Iraq have been going. It seems evident that Iranians, in general, are not as enthusiastic about the continuation of this war as Khomeyni is. Last July universal conscription was declared to recruit 400,000 Iranian fighters. However, only less than half that number came forward and volunteered to fight.

This difference in perspective on the war is reflected on the highest levels in Iran. Khomeyni has tried to secure from five senior ayatollahs their approval of his formal legal opinion so that the war would become "a holy effort" and volunteering mandatory and inescapable.

AL-MAJALLAH has learned that Khomeyni contacted the five senior ayatollahs to get their approval of his formal legal opinion. These ayatollahs are: the Supreme Ayatollah al-Haj Sayyid Abu al-Qasim Musavi Kho'ini; the Supreme Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Qalbayqani; the Supreme Ayatollah (Shihab al-Din Mar'ashi); the Supreme Ayatollah al-Haj Sayyid Kazim Shariatmadari; and the Supreme Ayatollah al-Haj Sayyid Mohammad Hosein Musavi Khunsari. However, the five ayatollahs refused to support this formal legal opinion. After that rejection, Iran's president Khamenei addressed Iranians and explained to them that the formal legal opinion did not call for a holy war.

AL-MAJALLAH contacted Ayatollah Qalbayqani, one of the five supreme ayatollahs who rejected the formal legal opinion to ask him what he thought of the matter. Ayatollah Qalbayqani said, "I am saddened because of the turn events have taken.

A holy war cannot be proclaimed by one religious authority." He added that he believed that "such a step is inappropriate."

Ayatollah Mahdi Rohani told AL-Majallah, "Holy war can only be proclaimed against non-believers who attack Muslims. Even in this case three warnings must be sent to the non-believers before a holy war is proclaimed." Rohani added, "The Iraqis are Muslims like us; therefore, we cannot fight a holy war against them."

A Setback for the Revolutionary Guard

A review of Iran's history makes it evident that the last time a holy war was declared in that country was in 1819 when the war between Iran and Russia began. That war lasted 5 years. At that time all the principal religious authorities in Iran signed the holy war proclamation.

In return for this important setback for Khomeyni, the Iranian government approved the allocation of 1.8 billion dollars to the war effort against Iraq. AL-MAJALLAH has learned that Iran's armed forces have been given the primary responsibility in leading military operations. This constitutes a setback for Iran's Revolutionary Guard.

Informed observers and experts expect military operations in this war, which has been going on for over 25 months, to continue for several more months. They expect that thousands will die on both sides during those months. Those experts agree that Iranian forces will not be able to reach and establish their control over Basrah and Baghdad, as Iranian officials had wanted them to, particularly since Iranian forces do not have an effective and a powerful air cover. The air force is one of the significant weaknesses of the Iranians. In addition, Iraqi forces can hold out in their positions for a long period of time.

Some military experts are saying that Iranian forces may try to cut the road to Safwan which links Iraq with Kuwait. The importance of this road lies in the fact that it ensures one third of the various products and materials that Iraq needs and receives from abroad. Iranian forces have another objective: it is that of cutting the Basrah-al-'Imarah Road and trying to control the city of Khanqin in the north.

In the coming period the dispute between Iraq and Iran will undoubtedly see bloody battles and violent fighting. More than any time [before], however, this dispute has now become a political war waged by the Iranian regime against the Iraqi regime. No one knows when or how this war will actually end.

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CSO: 4604/4

CONSULAR, ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED WITH BULGARIA

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 30 Nov 82 p 3

[Text] The economic delegation of Bulgaria, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Andrey Lovganov, of that country, which had come to Tehran, left after a three-day stay and holding talks with Iranian officials. It left Tehran yesterday morning after signing a memorandum of understanding and an agreement on consular affairs to facilitate issuance of visas between the two countries. This memorandum of understanding was signed for Iran by Mohammad Salamati, minister of agriculture and rural development; and for Bulgaria, by Mr Lovganov. Also, the consular agreement was signed by Mr Zeyqi, directorgeneral of consular affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria.

After signing the memorandum of understanding between the two countries, first of all, Mohammad Salamati, minister of agriculture and rural development, during a speech thanking the Bulgarian delegation, stated: "These meetings for cooperation between the two countries are very effective, as a result of which, the two countries were able to reach an understanding and consensus in the fields of industry, energy and commerce."

He added: "This speed of action and this mutual understanding are illustrative of the desire of the two countries for expansion of political and economic relations. Since the two countries are interested in expanding their economic and political relations, the results of these endeavors and negotiations was the signing of the memorandum of understanding that can help them develop the economies of the two countries."

The minister of agriculture and rural development added: "To begin, with, our country is going to set up long-term planning, and understanding with friendly countries in various fields is very important in our planning process. As you know, the signing of the memorandum of understanding between our two countries will bring about a desirable increase in the future in the volume of exchanges of the two countries—and this is beneficial to the two countries."

On the other hand, these understandings and agreements will make the two nations more prepared to struggle against world imperialism and thus create suitable grounds for stabilizing and strengthening the two countries." He added: "Your country also is in a state of struggle with world arrogance and

"imperialism, so that the economic effectiveness of this kind of agreements and understandings can make you more resistant against imperialism. The two countries have moved closer together, and they can use the existing conditions to strengthen their economic structure."

Then on the subject of the signing of the memorandum of understanding, Andrey Lovganov said: "This memorandum of understanding was very important, and the economic and political relations between the two countries will be based on it." He added: "The signing of this memorandum and document does not mean that our work is over but rather it is the beginning of the business." Concluding his speech, he stated: "Signing this document is very useful for economic cooperation, and the struggle against imperialism, peaceful coexistence of nations, as well as promoting and expanding the economies of the two countries."

Regarding the text of the trade and economic agreement between Iran and Bulgaria, the minister of agriculture and rural development said: "The memorandum of understanding signed by the two delegations is in the fields of agriculture, food industries, commerce, petroleum and financial affairs, industries, energy, and transportation." Then, he explained the matters that were signed and added: "In agriculture, talks have been held on cooperation, exchange of agricultural information, and exchange of improved seeds. Regarding dams anticipated in the five-year plan for water [storage], efforts will be made, with the cooperation of Bulgaria, to eliminate the difficulties, and to sign agreements in this field."

Also, Bulgaria has projects in the cities of Neyshabur, Golpayegan, and Garmsar about which talks will be held to solve the difficulties. In the field of transportation, the two countries achieved certain agreements. In the fields of trade and commerce also, agreements were reached for increase and expansion in food products, cigarettes, chemical fertilizers, tires, pharmaceuticals, and metals. In the food industries also, agreements were made to set up factories for canned food, preserved fruits, repairing agricultural machine-tools, wood resources, and forests. And a joint commission of the two countries will meet once a year."

During a conversation, Hojjatollah Ghanimi-Fard said: "The level of exchanges between the two countries this year is twenty-five billion five-hundred million rials in which Bulgaria will export to Iran tobacco products, meat, cheese, and machine tools."

In return, Iran will increase its non-petroleum exports to Bulgaria four to five fold.

CSO: 4640/67

RAJAVI DISCUSSES IMPORTANT ISSUES AT INTERVIEW

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 144, 13-19 Nov 82 pp 15-18

[Report on Interview with Mas'ud Rajavi by Muhammad Ma'tuq; in Paris]

Last week Iran rejected the appointment of France's new ambassador in Tehran, (Jose Pauli) because of "the support France is offering the terrorists and those who oppose the revolution" who are living in France. This was the first practical step taken by Tehran to translate the anti-French feelings that were created in August of last year when Paris granted political asylum to former President Abol Hasan Bani Sadr and leader of the strong Mojahedin-e Khalq organization Mr Mas'ud Rajavi. France granted Bani Sadr and Rajavi asylum immediately after they arrived [in France] after an exciting journey from Iran. A few days before that Iran had celebrated the anniversary of 'Ashura', slogan that is partly new and partly old was proclaimed along with other slogans. In addition to wishing death to the United States, the Soviet Union and Iraqi president Saddam Husayn, Iranians commemorating the religious celebration in Iran wished death to France. French television showed the French public pictures of the demonstrators as the French public read the threats that were made against France for giving those terrorist asylum by the speaker of the Iranian parliament Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

AL-MAJALLAH met with Mas'ud Rajavi, whose presence along with the presence of some of his assistants in the Paris suburb of (Ouver Ciroise) created a crisis in relations between France and Iran. AL-MAJALLAH conducted a comprehensive interview with Rajavi about his status as a political refugee in France and about the most recent developments in Iran in the areas of security, politics and the war.

The question I asked him when he entered the room where I was waiting for him— I asked him how he was—was a conventional question. The young man who is not more than 34 years old spoke to me first with a beaming smile and greeted me in Arabic. I returned his greetings and I asked him how he was. He told me that he was delighted with recent developments in Iran and that he had full confidence in the future.

There was nothing in the attire of this serious young man to indicate that a few

^{*} Translator's note: The 10th day of Muharram, the anniversary of Husayn's martyr dom at Karbala'.

days earlier he had married Fayruz, one of the daughters of President Bani Sadr, his ally in the National Council for the Opposition, which sees itself as the alternative to the present regime in Iran. This was the second marriage for the leader of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization who has devoted his life to the revolution. The fact that Bani Sadr did charge him with the task of forming a provisional Iranian government that would rule Iran in a 6-months period of transition before the people would choose the form of their new regime has placed enormous responsibilities on this young man's shoulders. He does not dwell on his marriage; he just makes a brief comment on it and [then] he indicates that the social situation in Iran, as it is in some Arab countries, is such that marriages strengthen and consolidate relations. Rajavi's second marriage may not differ from his first marriage to Ashraf Rabi'i who died last year in an armed confrontation with the Revolutionary Guard that took place at one of the hideouts of the Mojahedin-e Khalq in Tehran. When Rajavi was released from jail in 1979, one of the Iranian fighters who had also been released from jail was a 29-year old woman whose first husband had been killed by agents of the former Shah. This young woman had been engaged in secret political and military activities since she had been 19 years old. She had therefore been imprisoned repeatedly and had endured all kinds of physical and psychological torture.

Hardly did a few months go by after Ashraf got out of prison when she joined the ranks of fighters and took part in the February 1979 uprising which led to the fall of the Shah's regime and the flight of his prime minister, Shapur Bakhtiar. Imam Ayatollah Khomeyni became the actual and official ruler of Iran. In the midst of [their] political activities Rajavi and Ashraf got to know each other; they got married, and they continued the march together [toward the revolution]. In August 1981 Rajavi fled to Paris seeking refuge, but Ashraf remained in Tehran leading the revolution inside the country until she, Musa Khayabani, the organization's commander of secret operations and member of the organization's Political Bureau and others were surrounded at one of the secret locations of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization. They were all killed.

Hardly did a few weeks go by after his arrival in Paris before Rajavi was declaring that Khomeyni's regime was about to fall. He was saying that the expected event would happen in a few months. It's been more than 1 year since Rajavi made those statements: Khomeyni's regime is still intact, and the danger it is posing to the region is growing with Iran's repeated military invasions of Iraq even though these invasions were not successful. Iran's hard-line position with regard to the commendable efforts that are being made by more than one party to end the war between Iraq and Iran, which entered its 3rd year last September, appears to some observers to be an indication of strength. Some military analysts in Paris insist that Iranians will ultimately be victorious despite news that invading Iranian forces are being defeated by the Iraqi defenders.

Mas'ud Rajavi has another point of view. He told AL-MAJALLAH, "When I announced that Khomeyni's regime would fall, I did not take into account the foreign assistance that this regime might receive. At the end of 1981 this regime had no weapons or money with which it could go on fighting Iraq. I obtained this information from very sensitive reports that I received from within the army command and the various institutions of the regime. Suddenly, however, funds and weapons began pouring in, and the regime stood on its feet again and continued its method. Israel and Syria were simultaneously offering this regime support to

prolong its life. To this I would add that I misjudged how far Khomeyni would go in the reign of terror he has been practicing in Iran. Executions have increased, and prisons have been filled with people opposed to the regime. Government agencies have not spared women or children. Despite this delay, however, I am reiterating that this regime cannot survive much longer, and our victory is not far off. In fact, we are on the verge of victory."

Rajavi has no idea how the downfall of the Iranian regime will come about, but he affirms that the vast popular opposition to that regime will be a factor in its downfall. He does not offer a specific date [for that event], but he can assert with authority that the matter may not be more than a few months at the most. Rajavi says, "We entered the second stage of confrontation 4 months ago. In the first stage we were working to destabilize the regime and to expose it as a reactionary, bloodthirsty regime. Then we offered our alternative, and we established the National Council for the Resistance. We set up a program for the provisional government, and we were able to set up the broadest popular base for ourselves. The vast majority of the people support us, and every day important figures, ambassadors, charge d'affaires, physicians, pilots and athletes join our ranks after they break relations with the regime and condemn it. In the first stage we lost 20 men who were executed by the regime, and more than 50,000 of our people were taken as political prisoners. However, official statistics provided by the Iranian regime indicate that the regime lost more than 2,000 men who were politicians, clergymen and agents of repression. By comparison, the regime has received many more strategic blows then the ones we received. We lost only one leader: Khayabani."

Rajavi continued, "After the first stage was successfully completed, we entered the second stage whose principal feature was that of concentrating on the regime's repressive military agency. I am referring to the Revolutionary Guard which is responsible for arresting, attacking and executing innocent people. [Members of the] Revolutionary Guard are the ones who are responsible for the torture that took place in prisons and camps. So far, the activities of this stage have been progressing successfully. Every day there is more than one clash between the armed popular resistance and the Revolutionary Guard. These clashes occur all over Iran. In this second stage we will make preparations for huge demonstrations and general strikes that will paralyze the regime in the different fields of its activity and put an end to it."

Internal Terrorism

Rajavi listed two reasons for Khomeyni's survival in power: internal terrorism and some international support.

Internal terrorism is being confronted by the forces of Mojahedin-e Khalq in Iran. Rajavi commented with confidence that these forces were able to break the cycle of terrorism. International support, however, is being dealt with in a different manner.

"I ask our Arab brothers once again: if they are interested in peace and stability in the region, if they are interested in building a friendly relationship with the Iranian people, they are to stop all support to Khomeyni's regime."

Rajavi and his organization have had an experience with Khomeyni's regime. Rajavi wants the Arab countries that are dealing now with Khomeyni to benefit from that experience. "From the beginning we did not want to fight Khomeyni. He was the one who forced us into this position. With experience we concluded that the only way to deal with him was to resort to legitimate resistance." This was in June of last year, after about 2 and a half years of Khomeyni's rule. About 2 months before seeking asylum in France Rajavi had said, "We suffered and endured throughout the 2 and a half years period. We did not cooperate with him. We opposed his policy, and he arrested the members of our organization, tortured them and executed more people than the Shah had executed. We suffered and we endured as much as we could, but the problem was that Khomeyni, who is the real nonbeleiver, wants everyone to obey him. He says he is the theological authority and [he says that] his judgment is that of a theological authority. He says he is the imam, when he is [in fact] an impostor. He asks questions, but does not wait for the answers. You as a Muslim read the Koran. Does the Koran allow the killing of innocent people? Does it allow the killing of pregnant women and children? Does it allow young girls to be raped and executed?" Rajavi went on, "We rejected Khomeyni's constitution and we boycotted the constitutional referendum because we do not accept someone who would use religion for his own ends."

The Regime Is Finished

The Mojahedin now constitute the principal opponent of the Iranian regime. They present themselves in the context of the National Council for Resistance as a real alternative to that regime. Rajavi said, "We are responsible for all military activities and armed confrontations, for our populist organization is one that is widely scattered throughout the country. I do not exaggerate when I say that more than 90 percent of the armed struggle, and even more than that, is carried out by the Mojahedin. We have a social foundation, and we are the only factor that Khomeyni cannot do away with. Khomeyni even did away with the mullahs very easily. As an organization we fought the [Shah's] regime with Khomeyni; then we split with him. From the beginning, we were Khomeyni's principal enemy. Khomeyni did not fear the communists, for example, because they do not have popular support. The communists are not the alternative to Khomeyni's regime. That alternative will not come from outside the revolution. The alternative will rather come from within the revolution. We have attracted all the forces of the revolution to our progressive Islam, our true Islam, which is neither coercive nor hostile and disturbing to neighbors. Our Islam is that of freedom and peace, of "forgiveness and mercy." There are now two alliances: that of Khomeyni who claims to be a Muslim and a Shi'ite, and that of the Mojahedin who are Muslims and Shi'ites. We are now the principal force on the military and political scene. There are other opposition groups, but any observer can see who is really engaged in action and who is active."

Rajavi does not deny the fact that there are other military operations carried out by persons outside the Mojahedin's organization. "There are a few small leftist groups that sometimes carry out some operations, but these are very rare. These operations are confined to the placement of explosives: they are not directed against officials, and they sometimes hurt innocent people."

Rajavi is careful to refer to the fact that there are such small groups, especially royalist groups, that are friendly to the Shah. In his opinion they are

the ones behind some of the explosions that occurred in public places. This, [he affirms], is not the style of the Mojahedin. "If you accuse the Mojahedin in Iran of being responsible for an explosion in which civilians were hurt, people will tell you that you are mistaken and that the Mojahedin do not do such things. The people are the source of our support. We are not fighting the people; we are rather fighting for the people. Our principal target are those officials who are responsible for the torture, the murder and the repression. We are not the ones responsible for the explosions in public places."

The latest of these explosions took place last month in Khomeyni Square. Scores of people were killed and injured, and buildings were destroyed as a result of that explosion. No one declared responsibility for the explosion, but the Iranian regime accused "the hypocrites"—the name Khomeyni's regime uses to refer to the Mojahedin. The Mojahedin, however, accused the regime and claimed that the regime was using these explosions to justify the campaign of internal repression against the opposition and to cover up the tremendous losses that Iranian forces were suffering in their war with Iraq.

Rajavi makes no distinction between the factions of government in Iran. He emphasizes that his organization and the council he chairs have no relationship whatsoever with any of the people who are related to the regime and who are taking part in government. He does, however, acknowledge the existence of elements he does not call "moderate," but rather "elements whose positions differ from those of the regime." As far as Rajavi is concerned, "The whole regime is finished: there is no future for it, and nothing can save it. The condition of Khomeyni's regime is just like that of the Shah in its last stage. There were elements opposing the other factions but the regime as a whole had been finished. When one is taking part in a government, one cannot wash one's hands of the crimes committed by that government. People will ask one why he said nothing about what was going on."

Rajavi welcomes any change or reform "because we will ultimately gain by that. If the killing, repression and terror are stopped, the entire regime will soon fall. This is what happened with the Shah: when he stopped the repression, he was finished. This is the law of nature. In 1853 an American philosopher said that when there are no more possibilities for reform, any reform action will inevitably lead to revolution. Rajavi went on to say, "The reforms that Khomeyni will carry out should have taken place before the ouster of President Bani Sadr. This would have been logical. Now, however, it is too late, and Khomeyni cannot perform miracles. Any reform will bring about our victory." Rajavi explained, "I am affirming that as soon as the regime declares its willingness to hold free public elections, we will immediately put down our weapons. We will participate in the elections; we will accept any outcome; and we are certain that we will win. But I assure you the regime will reject this because it knows that our people hate the regime, but they love and support us." Rajavi thinks that the Mojahedin movement is a unique movement and that its power among opposition movements the world has seen in a quarter of a century [is also unique]. "If we had not been strong, Khomeyni would have finished us. Believe me, we lose 40 or 50 people every day, but we are still alive." Not all those who lost their lives are members of the Mojahedin organization. A very small number of the organization's members are being held in captivity. Most of the people who lost their lives and most of those who are in captivity are Mojahedin sympathizers. Most of

those to whom the regime refers as Mojahedin leaders and who have been arrested are Mojahedin sympathizers. Rajavi gave an example: Tehran broadcasts news that security agencies arrested 40 Mojahedin leaders in (Kish) Island. "(Kish) Island is a small island; it cannot have that large number of leaders on it." There was also news that the regime had arrested 150 members of the Mojahedin organization in the mosque of Sulayman. "This is impossible. These people are sympathizers. Some of them are mothers who are proficient in the use of weapons. Nevertheless, the regime arrests them and executes them."

Rajavi added, "The organization's imprisoned members are less than the organization's sympathizers. This is because our members fight till the last bullet and then they commit suicide because they know that if they are captured, they will die. [To them] then, the outcome is the same."

The Confrontation in Detail

Rajavi started talking about the details of the confrontation: "We lost Khayabani, and they lost about 20 of the regime's leaders. Khomeyni had seven representatives throughout the country. Only one of them is left; the rest died in suicidal guerilla operations." The last one of Khomeyni's representatives to be killed was Ayatollah Ashrafi Esfahani. He died last October 15 in Kermanshah, the capital of Iran's western province, which is the area of his constituents. Before him Ayatollah Saduqi was killed in central Iran; (Wad Astaqib) was killed in the province of Fars; Madani was killed in Azarbaijan; Ihsan Bakhsh was killed in Gilan; and Hashemi was killed in Khorasan. The one that is left is Taheri, and he is in Esfahan."

Rajavi considers these blows deadly. "These are ayatollahs, not puppets that can easily be replaced. Despite the support people have given us, we have not been able to fill Khayabani's place. What about them [with six positions to fill]? As a result, they are continuing the war. Khomeyni must be telling his aides that his position has been weakened and that stopping the war would finish him. There is nothing legitimate [about this regime], and there is no ability to regulate [matters]. There is only one difference between the dictatorship of the Shah and that of Khomeyni. [The former] had the ability to regulate [matters], whereas [the latter] is the product of the Middle Ages or rather the Stone Age. He does not even have a minimal ability to regulate matters, and we have thousands of examples of that. There were more than 70 physicians in the hospital of Central Tehran where Khomeyni had been admitted when he suffered a heart attack. Now only 10 physicians are left. The other 60 fled the country. Some of them had been persecuted for trivial reasons."

Rajavi went on to say, "The first principle in our Islam is that of coexistence, friendship, peace, democracy and respect for people's rights. Our Islam is not that of Khomeyni. We must remove the chains that shackle people, not increase those chains."

Military activity is not the only activity in which the Mojahedin are involved, although they do devote considerable attention to it at this stage of their confrontation with the regime in Iran. The Mojahedin are engaged in the media and in political activity. "We have a secret radio broadcast that Khomeyni tries to jam. Recently, however, these jamming devices at one of the military bases in

(Ouidan) have been blown up. We also distribute leaflets and bulletins to the people."

The National Council for the Resistance includes not only the Mojahedin and Bani Sadr, but it also includes more than 15 organizations. Among them is the Kordestan Democratic party in Iran. One of the statements issued recently by Rajavi's office states that the Kordestan Democratic party had fought alongside the Mojahedin a military battle with the regime's forces in Kordestan. [The National Council for the Resistance also includes] the National Democratic Front, the United Leftist Front, school and university students' organizations, physicians' and athletes' associations and independent figures.

The Provisional Government

What about Karim Sanjabi who recently sought refuge in Paris? AL-MAJALLAH had been the first magazine to publish the news that he had secretly sought asylum. Rajavi said that Sanjabi went to the United States to recuperate. "I did not discuss with him the matter of joining the organization, but I am confident that he will be responsive. We have very good relations with him."

The basis of the alliance between the Mojahedin and Bani Sadr is the fact that the organization still considers Bani Sadr president. President Bani Sadr asked Rajavi to form a provisional government that would govern with him in the transition period before responsibility is turned over to the people. "This is because we do not wish to repeat the Khomeyni experience. When he was in Paris, Khomeyni promised many people that he would step down, but he reneged on all the promises."

Rajavi preferred not to answer a question about whether he had formed a provisional government. "We must respect the laws here." Rajavi indicated, however, that he had proclaimed the government's program and its constitution. He said that according to that constitution there would be a prime minister who would choose the ministers himself.

Because the [provisional] government has not yet been declared, the letters and telegrams of support Rajavi receives from party leaders and from leaders of organizations and European and international professional associations are addressed to him as president of the National Council for the Resistance. Rajavi showed me a large number of telegrams he had received from Britain. Among them were telegrams from hundreds of British MP's, the most prominent of whom were Labor Party leader, Michael Foot and the leftist leader in the party (Tony Ben).

Rajavi's reference to the fact that he insists on respecting French laws brings up the subject of his residence in France and of the ongoing debate about that matter in Iran. Because of that relations between Iran and France have been tense. Rajavi says, "The outcry in Iran against granting me asylum here began ever since my arrival and has continued ever since. Sometimes the outcry is more vehement as is the case now. The reason for this outcry is because [the Khomeyni regime] is receiving strong blows, the resistance to it is growing, the base for that resistance in the country is expanding, and [the Khomeyni regime] is left empty-handed. [Khomeyni's people] claim that 95 percent of the Mojahedin inside the country have been finished and that the rest are in Europe. Therefore, they

are attacking Europe. However, this does not affect the position of the French government which, I believe, knows that we are a legitimate opposition and that we have nothing to do with the terrorist activities in Iran. The French even know that Khomeyni is the one, not us, who is pursuing the course of terrorism."

Terrorizing Europe

Rajavi revealed that the Iranian regime was responsible for the explosions that had occurred recently in a number of European cities. He said that the explosion in London's Hyde Park was carried out by an officer in the Iranian embassy. He said this was proven by documents that were seized on location. He said the same thing about the explosion in the University of Mainz in Germany and the explosion in the Iraqi Consulate in Paris. Rajavi stated that Iran's Islamic public prosecutor, (Musa Ardabili) had announced that Iran was behind the Paris explosion.

What do they hope to accomplish these terrorist activities? Rajavi replied, "They want to terrorize the European governments, and they want to make them understand that if they do not return to Iran Iranians who oppose the regime in Iran, they will continue on this course. The French government knows this. Rafsanjani warned not only France, but he also warned Germany because [German authorities] had arrested members of Allah's party which supports Khomeyni. In return," Rajavi said, "the person who killed Ashraf Esfahani sacrificed himself. As usual we did not declare our direct responsibility because we know our international responsibilities and we do not wish to break promises and obligations."

Rajavi denied the fact that French authorities might have taken any restricting measure against him. "France has a constitution that honors the political asylum law. As far as I know the French government and the socialist party do not want to break this tradition. The right to seek asylum is sacred to them." Rajavi stated that when he first arrived in France he told French officials that if his presence in France embarrassed them, he was prepared to leave, but they welcomed him [in the country]. Rajavi noted, "This may have been because the French government was perhaps seeing indications of the fact that Khomeyni's days in Tehran were soon to end."

The French government knows that the armed confrontation with the regime in Iran is being undertaken by the Mojahedin and that Rajavi is their leader. Despite that, the French government is welcoming Rajavi in France. Although Francois Mitterand, the president of the principal party, was one of the signatories to a petition submitted to the Shah in 1972 asking the emperor to pardon Rajavi and to commute his death sentence, no "special relationship" exists between Rajavi and France's socialist government. Rajavi said, "The problem is not that of my asylum in France. France had a similar experience when De Gaulle sought refuge in Britain to lead from there the war for liberating his country. The problem is how do we confront Khomeyni's crimes? If he is responsible, our people have the right to practice legal resistance to these crimes, and this is what we are doing."

The French government has not condemned Khomeyni's regime. However, the party that is in power has, and so have some officials in government.

The Iraqi-Iranian War

Our discussion shifted to the Iraqi-Iranian war and Rajavi said that the Iranian

regime did not want to end this war at all. He said that the domestic problems which would be spotlighted after the war make up one of the reasons behind the decision to continue the war. The second reason is "the desire to expand and the dream of establishing an empire like the Ottoman Empire. Khomeyni did announce from the beginning that he was the leader of all Muslims in the world. He needs to make these claims to mobilize people. The war he is waging is a crusade in every sense of the term."

Rajavi believes that "Had it not been for Khomeyni, there would be no war because he is the one who created the reasons for this war. We have the documents [to prove that]. Khomeyni had declared from the beginning that he wanted to export his revolution. In 1980 his former minister of foreign affairs, Ibrahim Yazdi announced to Iranian newspapers that the primary duty of Iran's ambassador to Baghdad was to work for the overthrow of the Iraqi regime. Khomeyni does not respect international conventions, and the reactionary slogan of exporting the revolution is part of the essence of his existence. He cannot control the revolution."

Rajavi added, "What Khomeyni hopes to gain from the war is control of the people and the revolution. He is not the first one to try to contrive a war to cover domestic problems. He cannot convince the people to accept the errors and difficulties [of his regime] and the distribution of food according to ration cards. Therefore, he is looking for an excuse to exterminate people, to kill them and to strike the opposition. If Khomeyni were prepared to make peace now, he would not have started the war in the first place. There have been times when we've had good conditions for an honorable peace, but Khomeyni did not accept them."

As far as Rajavi is concerned, this war "can end peacefully and with direct negotiations, but the provisional government is the only body that has the power to do that." He affirmed that if he takes over power, he will end the war quickly because bringing an end to the war is the second objective of the provisional government's program. "Khomeyni is the reason for the war. If he is finished, the war will come to an end, and if the war comes to an end, Khomeyni too will be finished."

Rajavi said that some Arabs who believe that it is possible for Khomeyni to accept peace and stability in the region are mistaken. Rajavi addressed those Arabs and said, "If you want peace and stability, you must get rid of Khomeyni. Khomeyni and peace are mutually exclusive." Rajavi addressed the Iraqis: "I am hoping the Iraqis will come to this conclusion, which is that the problem cannot be solved with Khomeyni. When you recognize the council and the provisional government, that will be the suitable moment for beginning negotiations to reach a satisfactory solution for the future."

Israel and Iran

Rajavi believes that Khomeyni's war against Iraq provided "a golden opportunity for Israel to invade Lebanon." He stated that he had predicted this invasion in a letter he had sent to the leader of the Opposition and Confrontation Front 3 weeks before Israel's invasion of Lebanon began. This letter was sent after Iraq made the decision to withdraw from Iranian territory. "In that letter I said that the primary loser in the ongoing war between Iran and Iraq are the Palestinian

brothers." Rajavi added, "I am 100 percent certain that Khomeyni provided the cover for what happened in Lebanon. Had it not been for the war with Iraq or had Khomeyni accepted peace, Israel would not have found a suitable opportunity for its invasion."

Rajavi wondered, "Who supported Begin directly and indirectly? I am not the only one who subscribes to that opinion. Ask Palestinian leaders!"

Rajavi declared that he is delighted with the fact that relations between Khomeyni and the PLO are poor. "Several of our Palestinian brothers had been convinced that Khomeyni was Israel's objective ally, but now it seems that most of them believe that. It has become evident to them that we were justified in our view. We have very good relations with them, and we are constantly in contact with them."

Rajavi continued, "I am quite convinced that Israel pays no attention to Khomeyni and to his statements that he will pray in Jerusalem. In practice, Begin and Khomeyni are alike. How would one understand Begin killing the Palestinians and their leaders with one hand and then turning around to offer ammunition, weapons and airplane spare parts to Khomeyni who is ranting about going to Jerusalem?"

The story of Iran receiving weapons from Israel was first revealed in June 1981 when an airplane carrying a shipment of weapons from Cyprus to Tehran crashed on its return journey and was destroyed near the Soviet-Turkish borders. However, Rajavi reported that a pilot, who is also a member of the Mojahedin, said that Israeli weapons had been coming to Iran since the beginning of 1981. Rajavi believes that the story [of Israeli weapons to Iran] began immediately after the war with Iraq.

Rajavi related an anecdote that is common in Iran. It deals with Khomeyni's relations with Israel. One asks, "What is Khomeyni's plan to destroy Israel?" And another replies, "It is to buy as many Israeli weapons as possible so as to strip Israel of its weapons and consequently weaken it. Then, Palestine would be liberated!"

Rajavi believes that Israel and Iran are still maintaining their relations. He intimated that these relations went beyond purchasing weapons and said, "There is an Iranian plan now to destroy the PLO by discrediting Yasir 'Arafat and accusing him of being moderate and accepting a settlement, even accusing him of treason, and using false leftist slogans to overthrow the leadership of the liberation organization. The features of the plan become evident in what the Iranian regime is telling the Palestinians: "You should have stayed in Lebanon and you should have died. Then we would have carried out an Islamic Revolution." Khomeyni himself told the Palestinians, "You have been defeated, and you must now follow me in the Islamic Revolution."

Rajavi commented on Iran's attempts to expel Israel from the United Nations. He said, "This is a simple political maneuver. The Arabs could have told Khomeyni, 'If you are actually interested in the cause of the Arabs and Palestine, you should end the war with Iraq and not give Israel a new opportunity [to harm the Arabs].' "

A final question remained: we were seeking clarification of Rajavi's attitude toward the Soviet role in Iran after the story of the Soviet agent who recently sought refuge in Britain was exposed. Rajavi preferred not to answer the question directly. He avoided talking about the Soviet Union, and he talked about the Tudeh Communist Party. The Tudeh Party "used to cooperate with Khomeyni against us. Members of the Tudeh Party worked against our organization as agents for Khomeyni's intelligence. It is obvious that they were deceived."

It is to be mentioned in this regard that the Mojahedin believe that the operation which was carried out by the Revolutionary Guard and which led to the death of Ashraf Rabi'i and Musa Khayabani was carried out with the cooperation of the Tudeh Party which provided essential sensitive information to the Revolutionary Guard.

Rajavi continued, "As president of the Mojahedin organization and of the National Council for the Resistance I am asking all the governments of major and small countries to respect our independence and our freedom. These are our principles."

Rajavi added, "We, the Mojahedins, are Muslims, nationalists, democratic and non-aligned. This means that we do not rely on one bloc. Otherwise, we would not be Mojahedin. We do not interfere in the affairs of others, and we also do not allow others to interfere in our own domestic affairs. I believe this is in our power. Independent Iran will be strong enough to continue to be independent."

8592 CSO: 4604/5

STRONG SUPPORT REPORTED FOR IRAQI REVOLUTION COUNCIL

Tehran KEYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 12 Dec 82 p 8

[Text]

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iran was freed from the chains of international colonialism and the Islamic Republic of Iran came to life under the wise leadership of Imam Khomeini. However, global impérialism never deviated from its aggressions and mischief mongering. The pinnacle of these crimes can be seen in Saddam's imposed war on Iran. With the start of the war the Muslim people of Iran rushed to the warfronts in order to deter the intruders and establish peace and security. To preserve liberty. freedom, human values and dignity they had no other choice other than to fight the corrupt Iraqi regime.

The cancellation of the Non-Aligned conference in Baghdad that came about due to the diplomatic efforts of Iran and Saddam's recent phony referendum are evidence of Baghdad's shaky regime and its certain collapse in the near future. Also, the formation of the High Council of Islamic Revolution opened a new hope in Iraq. This is good omen for the Mujahideen and the Iraqi PoWs.

The program of the council indicates its genuineness for leading the Muslim people of Iraq. Continuation of Jihad (holy war) until victory against imperialism and the Ba'athist regime of Iraq according to Islamic principles, freeing Iraq from all bondage and the establishment of just Islamic government under the leadership of Velayat Faqih (office of the


religious jurisprudent), are the praiseworthy goals of this Islamic council.

Like Iran under the leadership of Imam shattered the walls of fear erected by the superpowers, the people of Iraq too can teach the imperialists a lesson.

The people of Iraq are aware that any political ties with the two superpowers will be in disregard to their martyrs and a cover for deviating the Islamic Revolution by the counterrevolutionaries. Belief and faith in the independent policy of neither East, nor West juictory in itself.

The Islamic experience of Iran reveals that the founding of racist groups under the title of Arab, Ajam, or Kurdish, is a big plot to destroy all Islamic revolutions. Faith, dedication and Islamic brotherhood between all Muslims consisting of Shias, Sunnis, Kurds, Arabs, Turkomans and others, is the fourth tenet of the constitution of the Islamic Revolution. The world witnessed how the revolutionary people of Iran, despite the various ethnic groups and languages drove away the elements of division.

Since the time the Ba'athist regime of Iraq came to power and organized on a socialist basis the political economic and cultural life of Iraq, the Islamic movement took a new form. Today it has appeared as the High Council of the Islamic Revolution and heralds glad tidings for the Muslim nation of Iraq.



Iraqi women in exile march in Tehran's streets.



The support of Iraqi exiles in Iran for the Iraqi Council of the Islamic Revolution has been very strong.

STATEMENTS BY IRAQI REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL SPOKESMAN REPORTED

LD221222 Tehran IRNA in English 0950 GMT 21 Dec 82

[Text] Tehran, 2 Dec IRNA--Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, spokesman of the Iraq Islamic Revolutionary Council, Monday urged Iraqi people to uprise and deal fatal blows on the Ba'thist regime, calling on the Iraqi army to join revolutionaries to curtail the regime's criminal acts.

Hujjat al-Islam Baqir al-Hakim, speaking after a council's meeting here stressed that the Islamic revolution of Iraq, which had so far presented many martyrs, would continue its path in order to become free from the present Ba'thist regime and establish an Islamic sovereignty there.

He said that a plan for the general mobilisation of Iraqi people was discussed at the council's meeting since Iraq's residing in Iran were insisting on playing an effective role in the war against Saddam Husayn.

Referring to the recent Iraqi missile attack against Dezful, in southern Iran, Hujjat al-Islam al-Hakim said that this was not the first time that Saddam's lackeys attacked residential areas in retaliation of their military defeats. But, he stressed, none of these vicious acts would save Saddam although he was receiving the most sophisticated weapons from international imperialism.

According to reports, France had put modern missiles at the disposal of the Iraqi regime Hujjat al-Islam al-Hakim said adding that lack of credit among the people would ultimately defeat the regime.

Commenting on the recent blast at the Iraqi news agency's headquarters, the council's spokesman said that prior to the explosion Muslim Iraqi Mojahedin had warned foreigners residing in Iraq to leave there.

The explosion, he added, took place through the devotion of a Sunni Muslim, Abu Feda [name as received], who drove a landrover carrying 400 kgs of TNT into the building, destroying the news agency and damaging the adjacent building where a group of Iraqi security officers were holding a meeting.

According to reports 40 foreigners were injured during the incident and several Iraqi officers were killed, Hujjat al-Islam al-Hakim added. He remarked that Bau Feda's martyrdom showed that Iraqi combatants, either Shiite or Sunni, were opposing Iraqi regime.

Abu Feda also proved that Imam Khomeyni's leadership was not confined the Muslim people of Iran but to all oppressed of the world, al-Hakim said adding that the incident was a positive response to the Imam's call on Iraqi people to revolt against the Iraqi regime.

The spokesman of the council further said that the explosion took place by an Islamic group in Iraq and not the Iraqi Islamic Revolutionary Council. Naming the operation after the council was only an approval of the council by the movement of Iraqi Mojahedin, he added.

An Iraqi military announcement on the incident showed how severe it was but connecting it to the allegedly shelling of Iraq's border cities was the same old story for which the Iraqi regime was propagating everyday, Hujjat al-Islam al-Hakim remarked.

He stressed that Muslim Iraqi people who lived in border areas knew that Islamic combatants could destroy these cities in the course of few days time but Imam Khomeyni's instructions had prohibited them doing so.

TEHRAN TURKISH FIRM ON FAIR OPEC OIL POLICY

GF180722 Tehran International Service in Turkish 1830 GMT 16 Dec 82

[Unattributed commentary: "The OPEC Meeting and the Just Demands of the Islamic Republic of Iran"]

[Text] On the eve of the annual meeting of OPEC in Vienna on 20 December 1982, the Islamic Republic's Ministry of Petroleum, insisting on its revolutionary policy, disclosed that it took exception to the realization of the following issues:

- 1. The maintenance of the established oil price at \$34.
- 2. Taking into consideration the view put forward by economists that the demand for oil will not increase in 1983, a maximum production ceiling of 17.5 million barrels of oil should be set for OPEC countries.
- 3. The share of each countries extraction of oil should be based on reasonable facts. These are as follows: OPEC's production in the past; the amount of oil reserves of member countries; the population of member countries; the needs of member countries and their financial resources.

OPEC's annual meeting is taking place at a time when the West is still dominating the world oil markets and when a number of oil-producing countries are moving in the direction of the policy dictated by oil cartels. In view of this, the Western propaganda mouthpieces and the blackmailers siding with giant oil companies have already begun their activities aimed at having the fixed oil prices reduced and the production of oil increased.

Irrespective of all this, and regardless of the sweeping inflation in the West, the price set for oil, which stands at \$34 per barrel, must be maintained, any move to lower this price must be prevented. Apart from this, the total production of OPEC must not be increased. This is due to the fact that increasing production will disrupt the balance between production and demand in the world, and of course, this will favor the oil cartels in the end.

Thus, the Islamic Republic of Iran will seriously press for the freezing of the current fixed price and production level of oil. However, it seems that a number of countries are selling oil arbitrarily and in a disorderly manner, moving away in the meantime from the previously established oil prices.

The point on which the Islamic Republic of Iran brands firms is the establishment of the level of production and sale of oil by OPEC members. This view, which has been expressed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, can be accepted by every merciful person [as heard]. Undoubtedly, the question of population, amount of reserves, financial needs and the history of oil production [as heard] constitutes a just basis for establishing the amount of oil to be sold by OPEC members.

For example, irrespective of the fact that the population of Saudi Arabia, which is an OPEC member, is only a quarter of that of Iran, and regardless of the fact that it possesses favorable conditions for producing oil in an orderly way, the amount of oil produced by that country is a few times more than the oil produced by Iran. What is the meaning of this? Does it not imply that some countries have been treated with preference? Is it not obvious that the decision that the Islamic Republic of Iran should produce 1.2 million barrels of oil per day while Saudi Arabia is allowed to produce 6 million barrels is aimed at creating favorable conditions for the oil cartels to infiltrate OPEC? However, compromising countries like Saudi Arabia will eventually realize the fact that international oil cartels will not always be able to realize their policy of exploitation within OPEC. The Islamic Republic of Iran will participate in the annual OPEC meeting in Vienna as a [word indistinct], and, as one of the founders of this organization, will prove that it will not allow OPEC to fall into the lap of the West.

IRAN'S VELAYTI RECEIVES ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR

LD181842 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 18 Dec 82

[Text] According to the central news unit, the Romanian ambassador in Iran, Mr Nicolae Stefan, this morning met and conferred with our country's minister of foreign affairs, Mr 'Ali Akbar Velayati. During this meeting the Romanian ambassador offered congratulations for the successful holding of the assembly of experts elections. He said: In my view and in the opinion of many diplomats living in Iran, the holding of these elections was an important political event for Iran. He added: Romania attaches a great importance to its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and announced its recognition of the new regime immediately after the victory of the Islamic revolution.

Mr Velayati then said: We have recently raised our relations with Romania to the ambassadorial level. Referring to the principles of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, he added: The degree of closeness of our relations with other countries depends on our common interests with them. We support all efforts in the world for the reduction of tension, real disarmament and the prevention of a nuclear disaster. We believe that all countries of the world should adopt a decisive attitude against such aggressive and racist regimes as Israel and South Africa.

Mr Velayati continued: We are against the polarization of the world into two blocs. We support efforts for independence by the Third World countries and for preventing the expansion of the superpowers' influence. We are also supporters of any organization which brings Third World countries together to help maintain their independence. Our country's minister of foreign affairs added: We support Third World countries together.

At the conclusion of this meeting, the Romanian ambassador once again mentioned the invitation of his country's foreign affairs minister for Mr Velayati to visit Romania. It was agreed that this trip should take place at an appropriate opportunity.

VELAYATI RECEIVES SWEDISH AMBASSADOR

LD201158 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 20 Dec 82

[Text] The central news unit reports that the Swedish ambassador in Tehran met this morning with Mr Velayati our country's minister of foreign affairs. At this meeting the Swedish ambassador expressed his pleasure at the good relations between Iran and Sweden and declared his country's readiness to expand relations with Iran.

Mr Velayati said in reply: One of the points considered by our nation in the revolution was independence. Our nation has succeeded in expelling one superpower as a result of its efforts and now will not allow this superpower to return to Iran or to be replaced by another. We condemn any kind of aggression, whether by America in Lebanon or by Russia in Afghanistan. We will expand our relations with countries which do not pursue policies of expanding their influence or of dominating other countries. We place importance on our relations with countries like Sweden because of our efforts to reconstruct the country and to reach self-sufficiency and independence.

The minister of foreign affairs added: Some of the world population might not have thought it possible that despite the weapons superiority of the Iraqi regime we would be able to liberate our lands. But they saw that with stead-fastness and resistance we have emerged with honor and victory from the war, imposed on us by America and its mercenary agent Saddam. He said of the counter-revolutionares: Since they have no base inside Iran they have escaped abroad and their activities abroad are nothing but futile efforts. The assembly of experts elections which after the referendum for the Islamic Republic has the highest number of votes are a sign of the stability of the Islamic Republic in itself.

The same report notes that an economic delegation will visit Iran in the near future.

IRAN CLANDESTINE CLAIMS ELECTION FIGURES ARE FALSE

GF201137 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 19 Dec 82

[Excerpts] Compatriots: Just as we informed you in the news section today, the actual results of the ballot counting for the council of experts elections reached our hands from reliable sources. On the basis of this confidential information received from the Interior Ministry of the Islamic Republic's regime, the total number of voters throughout the country was 1,923,405 of which 450,000 were from Tehran.

In such circumstances, the humiliated regime of Iran shamelessly announced that the people of Iran welcomed these elections with enthusiasm and unity, and even announced imaginary figures to the tune of (20 million) ballots. Just the day before yesterday, the powerthirsty Charlatan Mullah, Hashemi-Rafsanjani said shamelessly in his deceitful sermon that in these 4 years, such enthusiasm has never been seen by the people of Iran and boasted that the maximum number of people had participated in the council of experts' elections. At the time when this disgraceful Mullah was uttering these lies, he was fully aware of the actual results of the counting of the ballots, because, according to our reliable informants who are working in the Interior Ministry of the regime reported that the leaders of the so-called Islamic regime including Hashemi-Rafsanjani had been informed of the final counting of ballots by Thursday afternoon and the results of the elections compiled by the Mullah Nateq-nuri and the elections' commission in charge of ballot counting.

Therefore, to dispel all doubts in this connection, we should consider that the participation of five percent of the Iranian population in the council of experts elections does not indicate even five percent popularity of the regime. It could be speculated that only five percent of the people are in favor of the Khomeyni regime. In fact, the regime does not even enjoy five percent popularity because everyone knows that the motive for the participation of the five percent of the population was due to other reasons: Namely, duress, money, fear, and if we begin counting the reasons we will become old.

Now if the government interprets such obedience due to duress, coercion, money or fear as a sign of support, we can only shed tears at the plight of such a government. What seems very conspicuous is the nonparticipation by the actual clergy of Iran. Of the 200,000 mullahs present in Iran, only a quarter of them took part in the elections, and only those mullahs participated who are

associated with the regime. The fact is that even before the announcement of the results, it was clear to us that the false figures disseminated by the regime about the participation of millions of our compatriots in the council of experts elections are entirely imaginary and ten times more exaggerated. During the elections, our combatant friends within the country kept a vigilant eye on the various polling booths in the country and the reports that reached us from them were about the booths being deserted and a dastardly defeat of the council of experts.

So if the mullahs wish to please themselves with chimerical figures, they are most welcome for the alert and vigilant nation, the correct figures and the [word indistinct] facts are more important because they pull the roots of the tottering regime a little more out of the earth and expose it to the world.

TRANIAN PRIME MINISTER ON INVESTIGATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

LD202330 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 2030 GMT 20 Dec 82

[Message written by Iranian Prime Minister Musavi-Khamene'i addressed to Dr (Jasbi), Iranian deputy prime minister in charge of the reorganization of human resources; date not given--read by announcer]

[Text] In his exalted name. Your Excellency Dr (Jasbi), deputy prime minister in charge of the reorganization of human resources. In view of the important statement by the Imam, and in view of the necessity for the precise implementation of the guidelines of our esteemed leader it is necessary that the following points are carefully considered in connection with the investigation of the files and records of government employees.

- 1. Investigation teams should not under any circumstances probe into the private lives of individuals. All the members of the investigation teams or appeals groups are dutybound that if they notice a mistake [laghzesh] in someone's file they should not reveal it and should have due regard for the social prestige and dignity of individuals. My representatives in high-level commissions are dutybound that if they notice any violations of this guideline they should immediately act through the high supervisory commission concerning those responsible for the violation. They should speedily send me a report about their actions through your excellency.
- 2. It is incumbent upon all the members of the commissions that in accordance with the guidelines of the imam of the Ummah they should take into consideration only the present condition of the individuals and treat them in accordance with the Islamic kindness and mercy. If it is proven that if such individuals despite having committed some mistakes due to the filthy culture of the former regime, are intent on serving the country they should be treated with complete forgiveness.
- 3. Your excellency should directly supervise all the reports you receive in this connection. If you notice any excesses or violations of the principles you should inform me.

[Signed] Mir Hoseyn Musavi--Khamene'i, prime minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

TEHRAN PAPER ASSAILS SOVIET UNION FOR ROCKETS TO SADDAM

GF220510 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1830 GMT 21 Dec 82

[From the press review]

[Text] Under the headline "All Infidels Belong to the Same Camp," the Tehran newspaper ETTELA'AT wrote in an editorial today that the collapsing Saddam regime once again hit the heroic city of Dezful with rockets, thus committing a crime of killing and wounding hundreds of innocent sons of our people. The newspaper said: In hitting Dezful this time, Saddam used a new type of Soviet rocket 12 meters long and with a range of many kilometers.

This type of weapon cannot be used without the approval of the supplier. This means that the Iraqi regime used this weapon against the Iranian people with the approval of the anti-imperialist Soviet Union, or so it claims to be.

The newspaper asks: What does the Soviet Union want to achieve by adopting such strategy? Why has Moscow extended such overt aid to criminal Saddam and supplied him with various advanced war equipment to inflict such destruction on our cities and rural areas regardless of the fact that it saw various U.S. and Western pressures on Iran and that it admitted this?

In another part of its editorial, ETTELA'AT said: Regardless of the fact that the Soviet Union does not want Saddam and it knows that he will fall, it is trying to delay the collapse of the Baghdad regime by supplying it with advanced weapons so that it will probably take appropriate measures on Iraq's future. The Soviet Union is trying to maintain its presence all over the world, including Iraq, and is trying to avoid losing its political presence in Iraq and among its army.

This is why we see that in return for every Soviet tank and aircraft he receives, Saddam releases a member or members of the Iraqi Communist Party from his prisons. It seems that Saddam has been satisfied with this in order to avoid the Americans' betrayal of him. The Soviets should know that Saddam has lately fallen into the lap of the United States and the West and this is why it is not in the Soviet Union's interest to provoke the Iranian people's anger against it by aiding Saddam. No doubt the communists and other parties are not able to seize power in Iraq.

ETTELA'AT said: If the Soviet Union is keeping Saddam in power in view of this analysis and members of the Iraqi Communist Party are released from the prisons in return for tanks, aircraft and rockets from the Soviet Union, it must know that it is rendering an indirect service to the United States which it usually doesn't do. Perhaps it will like this service. However, infidels all belong to one camp.

PRIME MINISTER NOTES NEED FOR VIGILANCE, MERCY

LD221441 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 22 Dec 82

[Text] Our correspondent reports that members of the reconstruction crusade cultural committee, members of the Red Crescent. Youth Organization, members of the Islamic societies of various departments and some of the fighters from the mobilization of the oppressed met with Prime Minister Musavi last night. They were accompanied by the deputy prime minister in charge of revolutionary organizations and the official in charge of the Red Crescent Youth Organization.

Referring to two basic characteristics of the Islamic revolution organizations—depending on ideology and on the people—and praising the effective role of these organizations in continuing the Islamic revolution and achieving the sub-lime goals of the revolution, the prime minister said: We should know that imperialist and superpower conspiracies to destroy the Islamic character of the revolution will not always take the same form. For the same reason, none of our victories should make us proud and neglectful.

In another part of his speech, referring to the epoch-making message of the leader of the revolution, Mr Musavi added: The Islamic revolution, which has destroyed the satanic and dependent former order and structure and which has established a new order, has naturally given rise to some confusion about duties, leading some organizations to exceed tehir original duties. This is quite normal in a great and volatile revolution; because after the revolution we organized and administered everything through the help of the people and we did not imitate any other models. It is natural that now, with the complete consolidation of the revolution, organizations should refrain from overlapping of duties. Of course this does not mean that the raison d'etre of the organizations is being questioned. Rather, this means that while maintaining their powerful presence on the scene the organizations continue their work in advancing the revolution and safeguarding its Islamic nature in the departments and factories and throughout society with fewer shortcomings than in the past.

After emphasizing the need for constructive discussion and criticism inside the organizations so that they can be corrected and the organizations can play a more powerful role, the prime minister said: At the moment our society's security, intelligence and military forces are well-organized enough to confront dangers with complete strength. While strict sensitivity and strict measures should be adopted toward the counterrevolutionaries, the people who have made minor errors should be treated with forgiveness and with Islamic mercy and com-

passion. In our present society which is homogenous and Islamic, if we behave with compassion toward someone who intends to serve the society, such a person will certainly be attracted to Islam. Of course, in the same way that the imam of the Ummah has separated the counterrevolutionaries and the dependent mini groups from other masses in the society, the people should remain sensitive to suspicious moves that have no aim but to topple us and to restore the domination of foreign powers over this country.

Mr Musavi added: We have no evidence that in the future the United States and colonialist powers will not resume their efforts to divert our country. For this reason, widespread vigilance should be practiced by people, political cadres, revolutionary organizations, workers, farmers and all the masses. However, this vigilance does not mean that the Islamic and human behavior spoken of in the statement of the imam of the Ummah in the capacity of the vice regent [of the hidden imam] should be neglected or violated.

BRIEFS

EXAMINATIONS FOR FOREIGN MINISTRY—The first examination for the Foreign Affairs Ministry's Higher Education Institute was held this morning. In the examination, which took place at the Alborz High School building in Tehran, 900 applicants took part. The purpose of the examination is to secure the diplomatic cadre required by the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Our country's minister of foreign affairs, Mr Velayati, inspected the examination while it was in progress. The applicants will take part at an interview afterward, and up to 90 students will be admitted for the first term of activity of this institute. During their 4-year course the students will be taught theoretical and practical subjects, and after passing this course the graduates will be employed as diplomatic cadres by the Islamic Republic of Iran Foreign Affairs Ministry. [Text] [LD172134 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 17 Dec 82]

KHOMEYNI ORDER RESPONDED TO -- In the name of God. In accordance with the worthy of obedience order of the great leader of the Islamic revolution and the commander in chief of the army, Imam Khomeyni [words indistinct], that was issued to organize the activities of the Islamic Republic organs and councils according to the Islamic laws and traditions, the following will be communicated: 1. The commanders of the Islamic revolution guards corps headquarters of the 10 areas of Tehran and all over the country must let all the forces, from the guards corps personnel to the members of the mobilization, understand the lively and historical order of the imam of nation. The manner of handling the activities named in the order of imam should be taught to the disciplinary forces. 2. In the event of the smallest appearance of violations or infringement of the points given in the order of the commander in chief of the army and his excellency, by the members of the Islamic revolution guards, there will be an investigation and the violaters will be dealt with according to the Islamic laws. [Message sent by Mohsen Reza'i, commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps of Iran to Imam Khomeyni--date not given] [Text] [GF180619 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0430 GMT 18 Dec 82]

USSR REPRIMANDS IRANIAN BROADCASTS--An informed official in the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the mullahs reported to our correspondent that the government of the Soviet Union has sent a notice to its subordinate 'Ali Musavi-khamene'i. The reason this notice was sent from the government of the Soviet Union to this corrupt regime was because the radio of mullahs has used the name of the Soviet Union in a discourteous manner in its Urdu and English programs. This

informed official reported that the officials of the Soviet Union have said: We will not let the people who have [word indistinct], commercial and friend-ship relations with us play games to show off. [Text] [GF190720 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 19 Dec 82]

COMMUNIQUE ON HIGHER EDUCATION—Tehran, 18 Dec, IRNA—The cultural revolution headquarters and the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education in their joint message on the reopening of the universities today emphasised on the significance of the unity of universities and the theological schools of the country. The joint communique further urged the poeple to cooperate, as before, in solving the problems of the higher education system. The message also asked the scholars to actively assist the cultural revolution in planning the future programmes of the universities. The message also criticised the separation of the universities from the state organs, such as had prevailed in the education system before the revolution and [word indistinct] this as one of the main reasons causing proliferation of corruption in the universities. Continuing the message called for establishment of a correct and meaningful relationship between the universities and the state. [Text] [LD191058 Tehran IRNA in English 0913 GMT 19 Dec 82]

BAHRAIN FRONT SOLIDARITY WEEK--Tehran, 20 Dec (IRNA)--The Bahrain Liberation Islamic Front (BLIF) celebrated a week of solidarity started 13 December to mark the first anniversary of the campaign of terror launched by his regime in Bahrain a year ago. Solidarity action took place over the week concentrating on the achievement of the objectives including: 1) An end to the ill treatment and torture of political prisoners. 2) Improvement of detention conditions. 3) Revision of the sentences unlawfully passed against the 73 persons accused of conspiring to sabotage. 4) Inspection of detention conditions by an independent authority. BLIF issued a statement calling upon all Muslims and conscientious people to take part in the campaign. In their statement the BLIF said that the only way of saviour of the nation of Bahrain was Jihad and Islamic revolution. [Text] [GF201724 Tehran IRNA in English 1649 GMT 20 Dec 82]

BUYING ARMS FROM U.S.--The puppet regime of imperialism in Iran has again purchased arms from the arch-satan, the United States. According to the latest reports reaching the news department of the clandestine free voice of Iran transmitter, it looks like the regime of Khomeyni recently purchased 300 (?sidewinder) rockets--a very modern and sophisticated missile--from the United States. According to the same reports, agents of Israeli Government continue their training of the members of the forces of Tehran regime in the use and operation of modern U.S. and Israeli weapons. Israel aids Khomeyni's regime in finding new sources of military material. A source close to the Islamic Republic has told our reporter that the Khomeyni regime has contacted seven Iranian pilots--with the United States consent--who are living in the United States at present and has offered them \$7,000 and a \$250,000 life insurance policy for returning to Iran. This source was unaware of the results of this contact, however, it seems unlikely that pilots of the Iranian Air Force will agree to serve under a regime whose promises do not carry any guarantee. [Text] [GF202056 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 20 Dec 82]

FACTORY WORKERS TO WAR FRONTS--The Tehran regime will be sending a portion of workers in factories, workshops and industrial units to the fronts of Iran-Iraq war. This has been put in a circular which has been sent to the factory managers of large and small industrial units. It asks them to select around 2 percent of their employees and pass on their names to the revolution guards so they can be dispatched to the fronts. [Text] [GF202104 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 20 Dec 82]

ARRIVAL OF SOVIET CULTURAL DELEGATION—A cultural delegation from the Soviet Union arrived in Tehran this morning. The delegation was welcomed by officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Charge of Cultural Affairs, and the cultural attache of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. [Excerpt] [LD212140 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 21 Dec 82]

INSPECTOR GENERAL OFFICE DISSOLVED--The public relations department of Tehran Municipality in a statement announced: We inform the dear compatriots that from this date Tehran Municipality's inspectorate general's office has been dissolved and all the special inspection cards which had been issued by Tehran's mayor up to 23 Aban 61 [14 November 82] are null and void and have no legal validity whatsoever. [Text] [LD220206 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1430 GMT 22 Dec 82]

NEW UAE ENVOY--Mahmud Sadat Madarshahi, the new ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UAE presented his credentials to the UAE minister of state for foreign affairs, Rashid Abdallah in Abu Dhabi yesterday. [GF210524 Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 1 Dec 82 p 2]

MOTOR POWER BOOSTS FISH CATCH

Colombo DAILY NEWS in English 2 Dec 82 p 4

[Text]

The Island republic of the Maldives is one of the very few countries in the world where fishing is a major part of the economy, the industry there beings in almost 40 per cent of foreign exchange earnings and provides employment for some 45 per cent of the working population.

"For the past three years," said the Minister, "catches have been fairly constant at 34,000 to 35,000 tons and we are now trying to increase them through the mechanisation of boats.

But the average Maldivian fisherman is tradition bound. It is difficult to introduce the idea of improvements and economies through mechanisation to a community that has fished for generations.

"However, the idea is beginning to be accepted and we are supplying engines at attractive eight-year credit terms to fishermen with good records in the industry".

One problem was that some recipients of the motors preferred to take their boats near the tourist resorts where they used them to sell joy rides or night fishing trips.

At present the Maldivian fleet totalled 1090 mechanised boats, around 1050 mon mechanised boats and 3400 traditional vadu dhonies. One fast-

growing problem is the shortage of wood once used for making all boats.

"We are now having to import most of this wood, using World Bank funding," said Mr. Sattar.

Most of the catching is in the Maldivian archipelago is done mid-sea during the day, with boats travelling distances of 20 to 25 miles and using the pole and line technique.

Catches are regarded as insufficient. Tourist resorts are taking a heavy slice of the day's haul, leaving little for the people of the islands, "and that too at unrealistic prices," complained the Minister.

He sees the solution in developing deepsea and night fishing, with a mother ship collecting catches out at sea.

"My Ministry has four second - generation boats that we expect to put out to sea very soon," he added. "With them, I am confident there will be an improvement in supplies."

All sophisticated gear and other equipment is imported by the state trading organisation. The supply is necessarily limited by shortage of foreign exchange and constant repairs reduce reliability.

The first of the longer range boats was launched

in September last year. The FAO assisted project to set floating rafts to aggregate fish was completed in June. There were a few technical problems but these are reported to have corrected or circumvented.

Another project interesting the Fisheries Ministry is the possible exploitation of brackish waters in some of the islands for farming tilapia and carp.

In one recent development, Japan's Nippon Kaisha Ltd. decided to pull out of a joint venture (started four years ago) running the only fish cannery in the Maldives, on Felivaru Island.

It has now been taken over by the Maldives Fisheries Corporation.

"We came up against certain sticky managerial problems with the Japanese that could not be solved and so decided to go it alone," said Mr. Sattar. "We have subsequently

exported a consignment of 300 tons of tuna to Thailand.

But tuna is a headache for the Maldivian industry. With the slump in prices in the United States, tuna producers in the islands are going through a bleak period and have been negotiating export prices lower than those they have been getting from its traditional Japanese outlets. At the same time the industry has been trying to develop markets in South - east Asian countries such as Malaysia and Thailand to strengthen its bargaining position.

With export market outlets, the most urgent needs for the fisheries of the Maldives include funds for motorisation of boats, better catching methods and gear, more anchorages and cold rooms to keep catches in good condition after landing. — (Fishing News International)

CSO: 4200/212

POLITICAL LEADERS SUPPORT LAWYERS

GF220446 Karachi DAWN in English 16 Dec 82 p 12

[Text] Leaders of various defunct political parties have, in separate statements, assured the legal fraternity of their unstinted support to the "struggle launched by them for the restoration of 1973 constitution, revival of democratic process, and the rule of law."

They urged lawyers belonging to their respective parties to take active part in an all-Pakistan lawyers' convention to be held in Karachi on 18 December.

Khawaja Khairuddin, president of the defunct Pakistan Muslim League (Khairuddin group) and secretary-general of the MRD, [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] said that "the lawyers' noble cause for which they are struggling is also our cause" and, therefore, the lawyers belonging to the PML [Pakistan Muslim League] and the MRD should make the forthcoming convention a success.

Mr Mairaj Mohammad Khan, deputy secretary-general of the MRD and president of the defunct Qaumi Mahaz-i-azadi, said that the proposed convention was "a step towards the cause for which the lawyers are struggling." He appealed to "the democratic parties, professional bodies etc to extend full support to the legal community."

Mr Fasihuddin Salar, central information secretary, defunct Pakistan National Party, said his party had remained in the vanguard of every democratic movement and, therefore, it supported the lawyers' struggle for a cause "which also is our own."

The "democratic forces, including students and workers, should not only make the lawyers' convention successful, but also extend active cooperation to the lawyers in their struggle," he said.

Mr Nafees Siddique, in his statement, said that since lawyers had been in the forefront of every democratic movement in the past and since their present struggle was also for a democratic cause, they should be supported by all segments of society.

CSO: 4200/238

PAKISTAN, CANADA TO COOPERATE IN COPPER PROJECT

GF201258 Karachi DAWN in English 17 Dec 82 p 1

[Report by Fazal Imam]

[Text] Montreal, 16 December: President Gen Ziaul Haq, confirmed on Wednesday that the government of Quebec has agreed to participate in Phase I of the Saindak Copper Mining Project in a joint endeavour with the Pakistan resource development corporation.

This appears to end the tears, if not the toil of the enthusiasts in the corporation who have been patiently working on it since its inception in 1976—turning out endless reports and studies, in the off-again and on-again hope of seeing the light at the end of the tunnel. I understand from knowledgeable sources that one of these documents—study No 82—did the trick and brought the Quebec government closer to the decision announced on Wednesday.

President Zia was responding to the earlier disclosure by the Quebec minister for external trade, Mr Bernard Landry, in his welcome remarks at a lunch hosted by him at the hotel four seasons here. Referring to the importance and size of the project, the minister said: "It was an awesome challenge to both Quebec and Pakistan." He remarked that, beyond its economic aspects, the "eventual implementation" of Saindak would involve a transfer of high technology that would benefit Pakistanis in various other fields.

The Quebec minister had conveyed the firm and full commitment of his government to the project in a meeting with the minister of finance, Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the Quebec minister was more forthcoming than his admission in his subsequent declarationary statement at the lunch.

I understand from a reliable source that the operational effect of his commitment is that the Quebec government is not only participating in Phase I but is also examining the possibilities of being involved in the second phase, if such a forward move is justified by the results of Phase I.

Phase I, with an investment of 8 million U.S. dollars, will update the engineering side of the feasibility studies and the preparatory arrangements for equipment purchasing plan needed for Phase II. Phase I should conclude within 12 months from now. The signing of relevant agreements would take 3 months and another 9 months would be enough to carry through the operation.

Quebec's participation will be implemented by a consortium of private firms, well-reputed in the field--SNC, SOQUEM and SDI. The whole project will cost as much as 500 million U.S. dollars.

I understand that the Canadian federal government's sanction to the scheme is expected in a day or two. A high-level Pakistani spokesman told me on Wednesday that Pakistan Government is already sold on this and is just awaiting a green signal from Ottawa.

CSO: 4200/238

REFORM CAMPAIGN NEEDS TO CATCH 'BIG CULPRITS'

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 8 Nov 82 p 7

/Editorial: "How Long Will the Big Culprits Allowed To Remain Loose"/

/Text/ A social reform campaign is in progress mainly at the expense of unfortunate policemen, police constables, subinspectors and inspectors. Every 2nd or 3rd day, you come across a news report saying that such and such a constable was caught accepting a bribe, in such and such a place an assistant subinspector, a subinspector or an inspector has been reported. These reports seem to indicate that all corruption is limited to police officials between the ranks of policemen and inspectors only, and that others are faultless. But the people who are well aware of the existing state of affairs, know very well that the conclusion reached from the results of this social reform compaign is evidently incorrect.

The question now is why is it that offenders above the rank of inspector are not caught. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that all the work of receiving bribes is taken care by lower ranking officials of the police department and the bounties are shared by all other officials in the department including those at the top. As high ranking officials are not directly involved in the acts of receiving bribes from clients it is only natural that officials caught redhanded are not officials above the rank of inspectors who are engaged in carrying out raids. Among police employees at the rank of inspector it has not been possible to come across any courageous and conscientious officer who has contacted the anticorruption department through his client and arranged for a raid at the time the loot is handed to the higher-ups. If by some chance such a courageous and conscientious official does appear then it is possible the anticorruption officials do not have the necessary authority to carry out a raid directly against the high ranking officers without prior permission of their officers and higher authorities, and it is difficult for them to obtain this permission simply because all high ranking officers irrespective of whether they belong to the police, anticorruption or the administrative department have common interests. All of them have gotten together and formed a nameless organization to supervise and protect their mutual interests.

Raja Zafarul Haq, the supervisor of the social reform campaign, who is also the right-hand man of the president, should consider ways and means of bringing bigger culprits to because the prevailing conditions cannot be expected to change unless punitive measures are taken against them.

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cso: 4656/43

BRIEFS

ADVICE FOR ASCHAR KHAN--The leader of defunct Tahrik-e-Istiqlal Party, retired Air Marshall Asghar Khan's wife speaking about the air marshall said that though there is no difference in his health there has not been an improvement in his ears. It is a matter of regret to find that Mr Asghar Khan is still suffering from ailment in his ears. Under such circumstances effective treatment of this illness is not only necessary for Mr Asghar Khan's sake but it is a matter of national importance as well, because so long as he suffers from defective hearing he will not be able to pay any heed to our advice that he should sever relations with MRD--the Movement for Restoration of Democracy--and in collaboration with like-minded political parties find new ways of political struggle. /Text//Editorial: "A National Necessity"/ /Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 8 Nov 82 p 7/ 9315

ADVICE TO PRESENT RULERS--Mr Gohar Ayub, vice president of the defunct Muslim League, addressing a provincial meeting of the Muslim Students' Federation at Peshawar, said that his late father former president Ayub Khan who promulgated regulations like the Defense of Pakistan Rules, did not know that some day his own son would come under its impact. This he said should serve as a lesson for the present rulers so that they may not make laws that could adversely affect them at a later date. This is a truth which is difficult to understand while one is intoxicated with the pride of power, but it begins to dawn no sooner one comes to one's senses the moment the power is lost. If one could only understand matters of wisdom and sagacity during the period one is in power then the cultural and political history of mankind would have been different today. But this is something that has to be re-affirmed every now and again. Mr Gohar did the right thing by drawing attention to this matter. We pray that Mr Zia-ul Haq and his colleagues in the government may receive divine guidance to avail themselves of the wisdom of this truth. $\overline{\text{Text}}$ /Editorial: "The Truth" /Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 8 Nov 82 p 7/ 9315

MEDICAL CHECKUP FOR ZIA--On the conclusion of his official visit to Canada, the president will be paying a visit to the Walter Reed Hospital, Washington for a routine medical checkup. The members of the president's entourage will return to Pakistan as per schedule. [Text] [BK190756 Karachi Domestic Service in English 1700 GMT 18 Dec 82]

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